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Abstract
This thesis addresses the organisation of socio-economic life in the context of rapid 
social change. It does so by analysing people’s livelihoods in 2000, and their 
implications for social differentiation in a large industrial city in the Urals region of 
Russia. It shows who the winners and losers in the reform process were and why 
opportunities to prosper were restricted to a small group. As a case study of one city, 
the thesis is limited, but it does indicate how the shift 'from plan to market' actually 
happened in ways not expected by reformers and how institutional failure was 
circumvented in ingenious ways at the local level.
This thesis focuses on how people in a large provincial city responded to the 
weakness of formal legal structure and high levels of state corruption and organised 
crime, and their engagement in the formal and informal economy. It provides 
information on the emergence of economic elites and how people made a living 
despite dismal wages.
After laying out the its theoretical concepts and discussing the research methods used, 
the thesis considers how the institutional context shaped people’s responses to rapid 
social change. Arguing that the ability to make a living was determined by access to 
social, human and material resources, it examines the reasons behind the economic 
positions of different kinds of households. The thesis contends that social networks 
were a major influence on people’s situation and that access to them was determined 
by a range of factors, including gender. Organised crime is analysed as a form of 
social organisation that stepped into the void of the Soviet state’s collapse, with
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long-term implications for life in the city. Drawing upon these various local level 
responses, the thesis makes some conclusions about the dynamics behind social 
differentiation in the city.
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Chapter 1; Introduction
Finally we were boarding the 1.10am Moscow to Ekaterinburg flight. I made my 
first fieldwork observation - 1 was the only woman in the queue made up of young 
and middle-aged thickset men in suits. One of the younger men introduced himself 
to me. He had bought up a pipe-producing factory with a group of friends. His wife 
was learning English in order to teach it to their two daughters who they planned to 
send to school in England. Three hours later, I was peering out of the taxi window 
eager for my first impressions of the city... Forest, then the city outskirts. Unlike in 
Moscow, the snow had not been cleared. Were those factories abandoned? 
Approaching the city, I saw towering buildings with billboards advertising Nokia 
and Coca-Cola, empty unlit streets, banks and salons. The following day, I had my 
second significant conversation. I was sitting in a kitchen sipping tea with a woman 
who would turn out to be my flatmate. She had worked in the same state enterprise 
for twenty years earning an income below the subsistence minimum. On the floor 
was a box of potatoes from a friend that meant she had not gone hungry over the 
winter. In the other room was a large new television she bought when she sold her 
mother's garage.
What was I to make of the different fates of these two people who occupy separate 
worlds in the same city? How could such a young man own a factory and why were 
there not any businesswomen on the plane? Given that the market economy had 
clearly reached the city, why had the state employee who I sat with in her kitchen not 
found better-paid work in trade, and why when she did not have enough money for 
food, had she bought a television?
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1. Conceptualising Rapid Social Change1
Over the last ten years, people's belief that the Soviet state would plan for and 
provide a life-long guarantee of their livelihoods has been shattered. They have 
witnessed the overhaul in socialist ideologies, rising prices, the disappearance of 
savings, the destruction of jobs, financial crises, the appearance of a wider selection 
of expensive goods in new kiosks and shops and a small elite's sudden prosperity. 
This study is about how people have responded to these changes in one Russian city 
whether factory workers and traders or TMew Russians' and *bandits'.
Whilst it is self-evident that economic reforms have brought about these changes, 
there are various perspectives on how determinative they are of current behaviour as 
compared to other factors such as cultural practices. The challenge is to approach 
local level responses in a way that does not presuppose either a straightforward 
'transition'2 to market-oriented behaviour or cultural inviolability. On the one hand, 
economists have implied a unilinear move from a socialist state to a market economy 
and a shift from collective to individualist values (Sachs 1993). Political scientists 
espousing a totalitarian theory of the communist state that controlled all aspects of 
social life hold that when the Communist Party collapsed, the whole system came 
down with it (Malia 1994). On the other hand, path dependency theorists argue that 
legacies of the Soviet period, such as elite networks and state corruption, continue
1 This study adopts the holistic term 'rapid social change1 to refer to the social, political and economic 
aspects of change throughout the 1990s. The term 'economic reform' is used to denote the neo-liberal 
policies originally introduced by El'tsin's Western-influenced finance minister, Egor' Gaidar that are 
described in chapter 3. Russian people often identity perestroika (restructuring) and the Gorbachev 
era (1985-91) as the point of change.
2 The use o f inverted commas around the word transition indicates that this study does not take for 
granted that a transition is occurring.
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(Rona-Tasl998). Likewise, anthropologists point to the persistence of redistribution 
and reciprocity as dominant forms of economic activity. They argue that authentic 
cultural difference is rooted in Russia's historical specificity. Local culture is seen as 
sufficiently resilient to tame and interpret outside ideas on its own terms. Chris 
Hann goes so far as to suggest that the very concept of'transition' is suspect. 
Differences in Eastern European countries make any general theory either of 
socialism or its succeeding period pointless (Hann 1994).
These contradictory perspectives can be reconciled by adopting a theory of change 
which recognises the importance of cultural frameworks as well as the fact that they 
are not always internally coherent and can be changed or even broken by rapid and 
violent external change. Culture is a resource, which people employ with varying 
degrees of success to avoid, survive or benefit from change so long as their structural 
position in the household and society allows.
This study examines how people circumvent institutional obstacles to the way they 
make a living in ingenious ways through the labour market, the household and social 
networks. Focusing on people's behaviour in these local level institutions provides 
an alternative way to understanding rapid social change than that provided by 
economists, as Michael Burawoy and Katherine Verdery have pointed out. They 
state that we need "to attend much more to how the unfolding uncertainties of macro 
institutions affect practices within micro worlds and also how the family, work and 
community are refashioning themselves - often in opposition to what governments 
intend" (1998, 7). Economic reforms have produced outcomes unanticipated by 
radical reformers that have implications for the way people make a living.
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Rapid social change at the level of households, networks, work and organised crime 
is reconfiguring socio-economic life in the city. One outcome of rapid social change 
is that the city's institutional context has become more diverse and fragmented. 
Organised crime groups have stepped into the void of the Soviet state's collapse.
The evolving relationship between organised crime, the local state administration 
and business has produced a new kind of political community that serves its limited 
interests, rather than functioning in the collective interests of the people.
Meanwhile, the majority of people try to survive or secure a living without the 
support of the institutional context they once had, falling back on the individual and 
collective resources to which they have access. They have adapted their work 
practices and the way they use their support networks to meet their changing needs 
and rely increasingly on resources obtained through the household. While some 
people are well positioned to mobilise the resources they offer, the dynamics of these 
institutions mean that other people are marginalized from their benefits or are 
dragged down by them.
These examples show that the manner by which macro reforms have articulated with 
local level institutions has produced a novel situation that shapes the way people 
make their living. The dismantling of the centrally planned economy means that 
there are greater opportunities for enrichment and at the same time, there is a greater 
risk of impoverishment, a situation, which demands that people develop new 
responses. By addressing the livelihoods of a cross-section of all social strata, rather
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than exclusively those of the poor or elites,3 this study identifies the opportunities 
and constraints that go towards making up people's responses to the new context. In 
so doing, it reveals the dynamics of inclusion and exclusion from the city's power 
structures and why the opportunities to prosper are restricted to a small group of 
people. Overall, it hopes to contribute to our understanding of processes of social 
differentiation and the nature of social change in Russia.
This thesis adopts a holistic approach to the conceptualisation of rapid social change 
and social differentiation in Russia. It takes a slice of social life that contains 
different micro and macro levels of sociological reality. It addresses individual and 
collective responses to the new context in institutions from the economy, labour 
market and organized crime to social networks and the household. In so doing, it 
produces a dynamic picture of these institutions, how they interact and change and 
how they shape social life.
The thesis incorporates a cross-section of the city’s population from the rich to the 
poor in a range of professions in order to provide a picture of the processes of social 
differentiation. By analysing how different kinds of people participate in these 
various institutions mentioned above, it is able to build up a picture of how 
institutions affect people’s ability to mobilize resources and explain why 
opportunities for wealth accumulation are restricted to just a few.
3 James Hughes and Peter John define elites as "persons exercising power and influence as a result of 








.Ntrhruy Novgorod ^  
Kswir ^  
•Yak*»fffio«rB 
"t,— -\^ r ChWyabinsk
's>  • ' i  -  .''5
KAZAKHSTAN
Recent local level studies in Russia have tended to focus either on Moscow and St. 
Petersburg, where dramatic change is linked to foreign investment, or on remote 
regions and small towns thereby emphasising continuity with the past. In contrast, 
the chosen research site of Ekaterinburg, named after Ekaterina I, Peter the Great's 
wife, is a large industrial city in the Urals, which provides an insight into both the 
opportunities and constraints of rapid social change. With a population of 1.3 
million, Ekaterinburg is the capital of Sverdlovsk region and the fifth largest city in 
Russia. Named Sverdlovsk during Soviet times, it was homeland to the military 
industrial complex producing tanks and weapons for the military and trucks, 
machinery and drilling equipment for the civilian economy. With the recent 
introduction of market reform, Ekaterinburg has become a relative 'boomtown' with 
a modernising economy that exists alongside Soviet-style industrial enterprises.
4 Available at http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/cia01/russia_sm01.jpg
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2. Local Level Responses to Rapid Social Change
Systematic power differences in society are conceptualised in terms of differences in 
access to material, human and social resources that shape an individual's socio- 
structural position. Local institutions such as households, social networks, the 
economy and the state, that are imbued with power relations, shape different kinds of 
people's ability to mobilise these resources. Material resources include tangible 
goods such as property, credit and transportation. Human resources are 
competencies and attributes that reside in individuals such as education, profession, 
health and personal or familial experience. Social resources are about relations with 
institutions, such as the household and social networks, and norms such as trust and 
the rule of law. Examining the extent to which different people are able to 
manipulate the resources around them in the way they make a living provides an 
insight into social differentiation in the city.
2.1 Employment
The type and place of employment is an important starting-point to an analysis of the 
different ways people make a living in the city. Louise Grogan has analysed the 
impact of rapid social change on individuals in Russia by examining worker flows 
through the labour market (Grogan 2000). She shows that high labour flow rates are 
not an indicator of improvements in labour productivity as neo-liberal reformers 
predicted but involve workers moving into other low-quality jobs. Grogan shows 
that gender, length of residency, marital status, education and age affect sector of
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employment. She demonstrates that disparities in wages and work stability across 
different sectors of the labour market affect different kinds of people differently.
Building on Grogan's findings, this study shows the processes behind people's 
decisions about where they work. For example, why do people leave one place of 
employment for another equally low-paid job? Why did the state employee, 
mentioned in the opening paragraph, not actively search for better-paid work and 
what prompted the businessman to buy shares in the pipe-producing enterprise? 
Answering questions such as these reveals the processes behind (im)mobility within 
and between employment sectors and the impact this has on people's ability to make 
a living. It is possible to go further than macro economic analysis by looking at 
informal income-generating opportunities and social resources available through the 
workplace and how work choices are influenced by household relations and social 
identities. The household seen in terms of its internal relations (gender relations, 
beliefs and networks) shapes people's participation in the economy and the way this 
changes according to wider processes of social transformation. For example, 
respondents from female kin-based households were more likely to be engaged in 
employment in the state and privatised sectors while men in conjugal households 
were more likely to work in the new private sector. Women whose husbands have 
become successful businessmen sometimes found that unequal power relations and 
pressures to conform to a new housewife ideal prevented them from engaging in 
employment altogether.
Addressing employment sectors as state, privatised, new private and individual 
labour activity is consistent with other research, such as Grogan's. The state sector
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includes budgetary enterprises - so called because workers are paid directly out of 
the state budget - for example, in teaching, health and culture. Privatised enterprises, 
which were formerly state-owned, appear to employees to be virtually 
indistinguishable from state enterprises in terms of continuity in management 
structures (Institut Ekomomiki Uralskovo Otdeleniya RAN 1998, 36). New private 
sector enterprises have been created either de novo or by reassembling the assets of 
former state enterprises within new management structures (Clarke 1999,19). 
Individual labour activity includes self-employment and employment in partnership 
with others, including family members. The organisation of this labour activity is 
informal and is not registered. Analysing the formal and informal dimensions of 
work in each type of workplace, it is more appropriate to draw the links rather than a 
sharp dichotomy between official and unofficial activity. Official workplaces 
provide access to informally procured goods. In addition, state officials provide 
informal protection 'roofs' and some organised crime conglomerates resemble the 
inclusive Soviet enterprise.
2.2 Livelihoods
The way people make a living is not restricted to the formal employment context.
An individual's wage is only one part of the way a person makes a living. Work is 
wider than employment and includes meaningful activity embedded in social 
relationships, and encompasses a range of activities often ignored by economists, 
such as household management, maintaining social networks and informal work 
(Morris 1990). With this in mind, some theorists adopt the term livelihood, which 
embraces a wider conception of work and incorporates the household and the diverse
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strategies employed by its members to mobilise available resources and opportunities 
(Grown and Sebstad 1989, 941). Strategies include income-generating work, 
subsistence production, savings accumulation and spending, changing patterns of 
consumption, investment in children's education, and labour and asset pooling 
arrangements.
Conventional conceptualisations of livelihoods look at how access to material and 
human resources explains people's ability to seize opportunities. However, social 
resources also contribute towards livelihoods. In Russia, it is crucial to understand 
the way social networks and household relations shape people's ability to turn 
material and human resources into strategies for livelihood security and enrichment. 
Social networks are important because in Soviet daily life they were used to get hold 
of deficit goods and services,5 and in present-day Russia they act as a buffer 
protecting households against external shocks. The household is of particular 
relevance because its internal relations shape its ability to compensate for the 
withdrawal of state provision.
2.3 Do 'Strategies' Exist?
A growing body of literature on survival strategies in Russia has recognised that the 
ways people make a living are not restricted to employment alone (White 2001, 
Lytkina 2001, Rodionova 1999, Pine and Bridger 1997, 11). How useful is this 
concept of 'strategies'? What does strategizing mean, and, if strategies do exist are 
they individual or collective?
5 In an economy characterised by shortage, a huge range of goods were considered deficit from foods 
to children's prams, cosmetics, winter boots, sheep skin coats, record players and jeans.
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The concept of 'household strategies' was first coined in Africa and Latin America in 
order to encompass activity in the informal as well as formal economy and to 
emphasise the agency of individuals acting in the collective interests of the 
household (Roberts 1991, Hart 1973). According to Mercedes Gonzalez de la 
Rocha, the advantage of a 'strategies based approach' is its emphasis on the fact that 
even within structural constraints, choices are possible and households do respond to 
changing economic conditions (1994,12-13).
This approach has been criticised on a number of fronts in relation to Russia. It has 
been suggested that it is wrong to assume when conducting research that informants 
are 'actors' who make 'choices', which shape their life paths. Ray Pahl and Paul 
Thompson writing about life history research conducted in Russia in the early 1990s, 
comment, "the view of the Russian interviewing team was that people were not so 
much 'actors' as 'victims'" (1994,135). In addition, it has been argued that to talk of 
the household as a decision-making unit is flawed. Simon Clarke has argued that 
"...the concept of the household survival strategy is triply inappropriate: the unit of 
decision-making is not the household, decisions are not made strategically and the 
objective is not survival" (1999,14). He argues that there is no co-ordination within 
the household as to employment decisions. Rather, each individual makes individual 
decisions albeit within the context of constraints. In addition, people do not use their 
time strategically but take on all opportunities presented to them. Finally, people do 
not make survival the object of their behaviour.
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In contrast to Clarke's conclusions, a study of eighty families in St. Petersburg 
(Piirainen 1997) examined the role of household coping mechanisms in responding 
to transition. The outcome is a typology of three basic economic strategies available 
to these families: Soviet, market and informal. The first two are based on continued 
low wage labour, or some kind of small enterprise activity. The third includes home 
production, barter, clientelism and self-provisioning. In reality, Timo Piirainen 
argues, families try to survive by the use of any or all of these strategies depending 
on their assets and opportunities. This can lead to different outcomes, the most 
desperate being abandoning the market altogether and attempting to survive through 
agricultural self-sufficiency away from urban settings.
The limits of the St. Petersburg study become clear in its approach to the household. 
Conceptualising the household according to rational-choice theory suggests that 
market behaviour can be universally applied to all behaviour involving scarce 
resources. With respect to this, Piirainen writes, "individual households are 
perceived as actors in this study... Optimising is characteristic of the conduct of a 
prudent investor in the stock market... analogously a household seeks to place its 
assets in several objects... in order to optimise between expected returns and risks"
(p. 42). However, as Diane Wolf points out, members of households, and not 
households themselves make decisions: "the household can neither decide nor think, 
since analytical constructs are not so empowered. Rather, certain people within the 
household make decisions" (1990, 60). In the light of this, Piirainen assumes that the 
household has a joint welfare function in which rational distribution amongst its 
members is guaranteed on the basis of family altruism under the benign dictatorship 
of the household head.
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Nancy Folbre has pointed out that this approach6 portrays household relations as 
based on reciprocity and characterised by consensus rather than conflict (1986, 254). 
It assumes that a self-interested individual in the market becomes altruistic in the 
home. The feminist critique shows how unequal power relations mean that the 
household cannot simply be treated as an extension of the market (Harris 1981). 
Some economists, notably Amartya Sen (1990), have since provided a non-unified 
view of the household by applying a bargaining model to its internal decision­
making. Accordingly, co-operation occurs as long members are convinced that gains 
outweigh the gains of household fragmentation. This provides a good starting point 
to analyse the link between households' internal dynamics and the construction of 
livelihoods. It suggests that changes in the conditions under which individuals form 
a household affect their decision-making power. This point is important because 
individuals turn to a variety of sources to maintain their livelihoods or alternatively 
may not have such opportunities, both of which can throw into flux the basis of the 
household's power relations.
To focus on decisions made at the household level does not preclude an analysis of 
conflict and negotiation in the household. At least some of the time, household 
members act in its collective interests. In addition, while considering people's active 
responses, they nevertheless show some continuity with the past. Respondents 
continued to engage in activities that are familiar to them. They followed the 
livelihood paths nearest to them, which they saw their family members of friends 
following, and used resources they had always used. Factory managers and
6 This approach is called New Household Economics and one of its most well-known proponents in 
Gary Becker (1981)
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specialists decided to try entrepreneurial activity after seeing their friends do so. 
Factory workers moved from one cash-struck enterprise to another one nearby. 
People's ability to create opportunities depends on past personal and the previous 
generation's experience. For example, many of the respondents who seized 
opportunities brought by the market economy exhibited an entrepreneurial outlook in 
Soviet times or had parents who had engaged in trade.
People's strategizing does not correspond to economically rational market-led
models of behaviour, which is why the concept is often disliked. This argument has
been persuasively put in relation to the role of subsistence plots. Subsistence plot
production is commonly seen as an economic response to rising prices and instability
(Seeth, Chachnov and Surinov 1998). However, self-provisioning on garden plots is
more a cultural preference than an economic strategy (Clarke 1999) premised on the
virtue ascribed to physical toil and self-sufficiency (Lovell forthcoming). Garden
plots are a source of pride and social integration (White 2001) and appear to be a
Russian form of keeping up with the Joneses. The assertion that social and cultural
factors also influence the make-up of people's strategies adds weight to the argument
that people's actions are active choices and not simply due to the impact of macro
level forces. In this vein, Francis Pine and Sue Bridger have stated,
Survival strategies are not necessarily 'economically rational' according to 
models of supply, demand and efficient self-interest. However, in terms of 
cultural meaning, local knowledge and understanding, and within the context 
of social relationships and networks, they are often the best and most sensible 
responses people can make (1997,11).
People's perceptions of their options and priorities and the changes taking place
around them are central to this study. For some resource-poor respondents, survival
of a particular identity was prioritised over material survival, while for wealthy
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respondents, shaking off the negative image of 'New Russians' through self­
promotion, as deserving success was important. While resource-poor people outside 
the market perceived it as immoral and criminalized, for wealthy business people, 
illegal activity had lost its criminal meaning.
For the purposes of this study, 'strategy1 refers to the capacity of individuals in the 
household context to react to the extra-household environment through work 
mechanisms and social arrangements according to culturally contingent norms. The 
term is used to illuminate how people perceive and respond to the opportunities and 
constraints with which they are confronted. However, it does not infer voluntarism 
in people's actions. People's responses to the new context are best conceptualised in 
the form of a continuum between those who have access to resources that they are 
able to manipulate actively to create opportunities out of rapid social change and 
those without the necessary resources who are closed off from those opportunities.
2.4 Is there a Shift from the Enterprise to the Household?
Literature on the impact of economic restructuring on livelihoods in Latin America 
has brought our attention to household involution, a process whereby households 
draw intensively on their reserves to combat poverty (Chant 1991). Increasing the 
number of workers per household and increasing the number of household members, 
together with the modification of consumption patterns cushioned the blow of the 
falling rate of incomes in the 1980s (Escobar Latapi and Gonzalez de la Rocha
1995). Significantly, these Latin American studies find an increase in women's
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participation in the labour force during restructuring (Chant 1993, Gonzalez de la 
Rocha 1991, Moser 1989).
In Russia, Michael Burawoy, Pavel Krotov and Tatyana Lytkina have developed the 
term 'household involution' to describe a process whereby the vast majority of the 
population are driven "back onto their own resources, intensifying household 
production" (2000, 46).7 These "routines of the Soviet period" (2000, 47), or forms 
of "defensive traditionalism" (Piirainen 1997, 75) and "demodemisation" (Rose 
1994) entail a withdrawal from public life and short-term survival tactics in use since 
Soviet times.
Analysing strategies at the individual and household level as 'Soviet' or 'modem', as 
the above mentioned studies do, succumbs to unilinear assumptions of change and 
depicts behaviour as either 'traditional', regressive and maladjusted or 'capitalist' 
implying by contrast, progressive and well-adapted. Although people's behaviour is 
shaped by traditional social norms and practices, it is novel and takes on new 
meaning in the new context. In an urban context like Ekaterinburg, people cannot 
cope by returning to subsistence production. For many respondents, the official 
workplace continued to be the key determinant of households' responses to rapid 
social change both for the official wage and informally procured resources it 
provided. Despite the difficulty of living on a low, formal sector income, it was the 
most practical source of stability for some respondents in an uncertain environment. 
The role of the informal sector has increased during the 1990s but was an
7 Burawoy, Krotov and Lytkina borrow the term from Clifford Geertz (1963) who used it to describe 
peasants responses to the expansion of Dutch sugar agro-export industry. Peasants returned to their 
land and, intensified rice production, distributing it equally amongst themselves.
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opportunity for enrichment accessible only to those respondents with the necessary 
resources, rather than a survival practice for the most desperate. Some households 
exhibited relatively successful strategies that ensured security and a small number 
experienced enrichment.
Household involution in Russia differs from Latin America in a number of ways. To 
begin with, unemployment in Soviet Russia was non-existent, and has since arisen 
along with wage delays, the lowering of the value of incomes, payments in-kind, 
shorter working weeks and extended leave. In contrast to Latin America, where 
female labour force participation increased, Russian women's employment was high 
in Soviet times and so households have not experienced such a shift. Although at the 
onset of market reforms, it was predicted that women's unemployment would 
increase more than men's (Fong 1993, Mezentseva 1994, Rimashevskaia 1992, 
Bridger and Kay 1996, Rhein 1998, World Bank 2000), this has not been the case 
(Ashwin 2002, Satre Ahlander 2001). Rather, household income is boosted to 
cushion the fall in the value of incomes through the income-generating strategies of 
able-bodied pensioner family and household members. A further difference is that 
individuals join households not to provide additional incomes but because following 
the collapse of state welfare provision, they cannot survive on their own.8
The household is understood here to encompass a variety of forms - not just based 
around the conjugal couple - and functions. Resources flowing into the household 
from those residing beyond its physical boundaries, such as family members and the
8 This more closely resembles the situation under Structural Adjustment Policies as noted by Nazneen 
Kanji in Zimbabwe, who found that households expanded in size due to dependants rather than 
income-eamers joining households. This placed further pressure on the core household and conflict 
rose causing "irreparable damage to kinship relations" (1995, 51).
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state, may be greater than the contribution from members within it. Differences 
between households in terms of members' gender, age, income, education, social 
networks and access to state provision (housing, welfare, social benefits, permits and 
licenses) affect members' economic status. Thus, while elderly people were a 
significant support to respondent households because of their pensions and possibly 
also, income from employment, young people could be an economic burden. In 
addition, differentiation in access to resources including education, housing and 
networks for finding work meant that better-off respondent households were able to 
conform to the nuclear form while resource-poor households were more likely to be 
extended and dependent on the state and cross-generational mutual support.
3. Networks
Social networks are important to this study because they played a central role in 
social stratification in Soviet Russia (Willerton 1979, Rigby and Harasymiw 1983) 
and continue to do so today. The collapse of the redistributive state has presented a 
context in which networks both allow the fortunate few to generate great wealth and 
ensure that the poor majority survives. Among the rich, former nomenklatura 
(Soviet high level officials) and mafia groups have through their networks seized 
control of the reform process (Hedlund and Sundstrom 1996). Among the poor, 
networks of'kitchen circles' (Greenland 1992), 'friends of friends' (Shlapentokh 
1989), 'informal exchange relations' (Lonkila 1998) and 'blat networks' (Ledeneva
1996)9 play a welfare role in obtaining resources in the context of a failing state.
9 Blat relations are defined as "an exchange of favours of access to resources in conditions of 
shortages and a state system of privileges" (Ledeneva 1998, 37).
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This study looks at the various ways people have manipulated social networks to 
shape their livelihoods and asks how the introduction of market relations has 
changed those roles. It finds that many goods, which in the past could only be 
acquired through networks, can now be purchased. Nevertheless, people continue to 
rely on networks to gain access to services, food, money and work. Business people 
depend on networks to minimise the risks of market activity.
Following Elizabeth Bott, the term network is used here to define a set of social
relationships for which there is no common boundary (1971, 59).10 In adopting this
definition, Bott relies on John Barthes who she quotes:
Each person is, as it were, in touch with a number of people, some of whom 
are directly in touch with each other and some of whom are not... I find it 
convenient to talk of a social field of this kind as a network (Barnes 1954, 
43).
Social networks are based on distinct rules (norms, informal agreements and 
customs) that determine what is done, how it is done and who will benefit. In line 
with a European comparative project on networks that included a Russian element,11 
the approach to networks adopted here is concerned with the daily actions of 
individuals. It adopts an ego-centred approach to personal networks and examines 
the totality, or "multiplexity" (Mitchell 1969) of respondents' social relations. In this 
way, different personal ties are understood in the context of all other ties, household 
relations and wider social processes and institutions. Networks exclude because 
attributing positive status to insiders implies a heightened negative significance of 
strangers. How power and powerlessness shape inclusion in and exclusion from 
different types of social networks and how these processes influence differentiation
10 For other definitions of networks, see Mitchell (1969), Uehara (1990), Podolny and Page (1998),
Shteinberg (1999) and Burt (1980).
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is addressed. It finds that factors including marital, work and social status and length 
of residency in the city explain why some households gain access to networks more 
effectively than others.
One limitation to social network analysis has been the absence of gender. For
example, Alena Ledeneva in her analysis of blat, gives no explanation of how gender
manifests itself in networks. Instead she explains,
When asked about gender differences in creating blat networks, respondents, 
whether men or women, were vague or tentative in their answers. For most 
of the people I interviewed, gender was not a salient category in 
consideration of blat ties (1998,119).
Ledeneva's reference to blat as "an extremely elaborate and all-pervading old-boy
network... Everyone, including the most ardent Party members, deals in it" (1998,1)
suggests a blindness to the gender aspects of network relations. It is left unclear
whether these blat networks are exclusively masculine, itself a statement about
gender, or whether women are simply rendered invisible in her analysis.
Gender matters to the analysis of networks because, like all institutions, networks are
not gender-neutral and do not serve everyone equally. Rather, the gender division of
labour in Soviet and post-Soviet Russia is mirrored in men and women's networks.
This study considers the extent to which networks operate in favour of the
household's collective interests. Do networks promote co-operation within the
household or a divergence between the individual and household's needs? It
examines whether increased work burdens, resulting from the withdrawal of state
welfare provision and economic collapse, have curtailed certain people's
opportunities to participate in networks. If so, is this curtailment legitimised by
prevailing ideologies of the family and gender difference? By identifying the gender
11 The research project in St. Petersburg is entitled 'Cultural Inertia and Social Change in Russia' and
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norms of giving and receiving help, it shows how men and women in different socio­
economic positions experience specific opportunities and constraints in relying on 
networks.
Jakob Rigi, in his study of networks in Kazakhstan, makes a useful distinction 
between rich people's 'networks of influence', which were formed for plundering 
state resources, and the 'networks of the dispossessed', formed to cope with the harsh 
conditions related to the collapse of the welfare state (1999, 48-9).12 This distinction 
between network types is useful because it brings to the fore the issue of network 
access and the opportunities and constraints that different networks present to 
participants. This study finds that only respondents with influential networks 
successfully adopted the risky strategy of investing all their resources in 
entrepreneurial activity. Some of these networks have become more powerful and 
well established over the decade, making entrance into some sectors of the economy 
increasingly problematic. While support networks are important to survival, for the 
poorest people, network relations showed signs of coming under strain as a result of 
social differentiation. The danger with this conceptualisation of network is that it 
risks presenting a dualistic and static portrayal of networks that fails to recognize 
overlap between these networks and how their meaning and function is changing in 
conjunction with wider social processes. It is with this limitation in mind, that the 
study explores the different characteristics of these network types and how they 
change over time.
published articles from it include Lonkila (1999), Alapuro and Lonkila (2000) and Salmi (2001).
2 Rigi's thesis is that Almaty society has disintegrated into networks, which are replacing the state as 
new moral communities.
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A second useful distinction made by Mark Granovetter is between weak and dense
1 ^ties (1973). In order to prosper, weak ties are particularly valuable. These ties are 
instrumentalist and provide bridges to moneymaking opportunities. People with 
contacts in many places have greater access to resources and information 
(Granovetter 1973, 1366). These relations are heterogeneous, providing access to 
and opportunities for mobility into different social spheres. People with these ties 
hold individualist values because they interact with people unlike themselves who 
have different beliefs and motivations and are not indebted to others. By contrast, 
dense ties14 act as a form of social support and are important to getting by in the face 
of increased hardship. Obligations to others within the network are great as it is 
made up of people with the same values and orientations, such as kin and long-term 
friends from work. Dense, close-knit ties restrict people because they do not furnish 
links to new places and information. Adopting a gender perspective, this study 
suggests that women invest in dense kin relations as a result of their household 
management responsibilities. This provides women with a safety net in times of 
hardship, but on the other hand, is a quagmire dragging them down. Meanwhile, 
men are at once freer to engage in weak networks that act as bridges to 
moneymaking opportunities and less protected by dense networks.
The analysis of social networks provided here intends to be a critique of social 
capital theory. Social capital is commonly defined as ‘the stock of formal or
13 Granovetter says weak ties are "more likely to link members of different small groups than are 
strong ones, which tend to be concentrated within particular groups" (1973,1376 emphasis in 
original).
14 Strong ties are located primarily in the family. The strength of the tie is defined as a "combination 
of the amount of time, the emotional intensity, the intimacy (mutual confiding), and the reciprocal 
services which characterise the tie" (Granovetter 1973,1361).
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informal social networks that individuals use to produce and allocate goods and 
services’ (Rose 1997 3).
International development institutions and donor agencies such as the World Bank 
now view social capital as an important prerequisite for the achievement of 
sustainable development. Social capital is conceived of as the ‘glue’ that holds 
societies together and is considered vital for economic growth and human well­
being. Finding ways to protect existing social capital and promote the creation of 
new social capital is viewed by international development organizations as a key 
challenge in their development work (See Forward by Ismail Serageldin from the 
World Bank in Rose 1997, i).
Richard Rose has been commissioned by the World Bank to undertake a series of 
studies on how social capital in Russia should be promoted. He argues that Russia is 
characterized by organizational failure and corruption of market and state 
institutions. Russians rely on social capital networks to get things done (Rose 1997). 
In this context, the socially excluded are those people who do not have a network 
they can fall back on and who instead are forced to rely on dysfunctional market and 
state institutions.
The thesis broadly supports the argument that those who have become rich with the 
opening of market institutions have done so through influential networks that have 
provided wealth-generating opportunities. These influential networks are exclusive, 
in the sense that they prevent outsiders from benefiting from market opportunities. 
The most vulnerable people are those without mutual support networks that they can
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turn to in times of need. Further to this, the proportion of people marginal to support 
networks is growing as people find it increasing difficult to devote resources to 
servicing them. Featuring prominently in this marginalised group are men -  either 
single or struggling to support a family - with small or no incomes who feel that 
asking for help from their networks compromises their manhood.
However, this study goes further than simply show that networks exclude as well as 
include. It questions the premise of the argument made by development 
organizations that social capital should be promoted as a way to influence societal 
development positively. It does so by demonstrating the negative impact of social 
capital on certain types of people. The norms and values that govern the ways 
people participate in networks are restrictive for some kinds of people. As an 
illustration of this proposition, the thesis demonstrates how the work and time 
women have to devote to maintaining support networks hinders their opportunities 
for engagement in the market. This is especially the case for women with dependent 
parents or children, who, as the primary carers, are responsible for ensuring their 
survival. Combining jobs and working longer hours to earn a meagre income and 
spending all their money on impoverished kin comes at the expense of engaging in 
wider circles that potentially offer the prospect of economic improvement.
An implication of this argument is that interventions promoting social capital that 
fail to ask about the types of networks being promoted, who participates in them and 
how may unwittingly add to women’s workload. Development policy which 
assumes that a high level of social capital is positive, because it props up the most 
vulnerable and prevents them feeling the full force of institutional failure, fails to
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address the consequence that women, bogged down by care-giving, are further 
marginalized from enrichment opportunities as a result.
4. Organised Crime
Organised crime has penetrated the city's socio-economic life influencing people's 
livelihoods in new ways. In contrast to social networks, which are a positive social 
resource substituting for the state's inability to guarantee people's livelihoods, 
organised crime groups are a negative albeit functional reaction to state failure. 
Organised crime groups constitute a new addition to the city's economic elite, having 
transformed into powerful participants in the commercial and industrial sectors. 
These internally coherent groups form informal loose coalitions with business and 
state interests, who co-operate to pursue or control resources. Organised crime in the 
city has not so much replaced the state as semi-captured it, partly absorbing it, and 
partly inserting itself into a relatively stable system where both co-exist 
symbiotically.
Theories of organised crime can usefully be presented in two categories, viewing it 
either in a negative (Sterling 1994, Handelman 1994, Rawlinson 1997, Sergeyev 
1998) or a positive light (Leitzel 1995, Gustafson 1999). The former see crimes 
committed such as money laundering, prostitution, arms and drugs smuggling as a 
new threat to international security while the latter see it as kick starting the 
economy and dwindling as the liberalisation of economic life proceeds (Williamson 
2000). In Ekaterinburg, organised crime is neither simply a predatory threat nor
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dwindling. It is an emerging organisational form that is adept at adjusting to the 
changing economic environment and helps as well as hinders business.
Three theoretical approaches help explain organised crime. Firstly, a rational-choice 
based argument sees the rise of private protection as a rational solution compensating 
for the weakness of the state and the lack of trust in the market (Gambetta 1991). In 
post-feudalist Sicily, power shifted from the class of landowners to the Mafia, as the 
former voluntarily paid the latter to protect their properties from predatory attack. 
Federico Varese, following Diego Gambetta's analysis of the Mafia in Sicily, argues 
that in Russia, after perestroika, the spread of property ownership was not matched 
by clear property rights legislation, which generated a lack of trust and a demand for 
alternative sources of protection. There was a supply of potential protectors such as 
dismissed soldiers and officers from the army, KGB and police. In this situation, 
Varese argues that "it is highly rational to buy private protection, despite the 
collective evils it produces" (1994, 231).
A second kind of argument stresses historical continuity of market-oriented criminal 
practices before the onset of market reform and points to the importance of local, 
culturally specific meaning and values of these practices (Humphrey 1999a). There 
is evidence of a range of criminal groups prior to perestroika that each had distinct 
identities and raison d’etres. These include underground factory operators illegally 
owning property, society-rejecting thieves-in-law, speculators, plunderers, and 
foreign currency traders (Gurov 1990).
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A third kind of argument is that organised crime groups are powerful not because of 
a rational need for their services so much as their control over the use of force 
(Volkov 2000, Glinkina 1999). It has been argued that organised crime groups are 
"fundamentally appropriative institutions" extracting payments through coercion 
(Humphrey 1999a, 212).
For the purposes of this study, organised crime is defined as groups of people with 
distinct collective identities who primarily engage in activities defined as illegal by 
the state and who through coercive techniques of service provision establish order 
over that which they control. The three theoretical arguments mentioned above are 
all important to understanding organised crime. Criminal groups provide contract 
enforcement in a context where, because of the weakness of the state, there are few 
institutional constraints on cheating business partners in the market. The relations 
between these groups and businesspeople are imbued with power that is the result of 
organised crime groups' control over the use of force, and increasingly as a result of 
their political and economic capital. However, the forms these groups take and their 
wealth accumulation strategies are historically and culturally rooted and have 
changed considerably over the decade.
This chapter has outlined how analysing individual and collective responses in the 
labour market and economy, households, social networks and organised crime will 
illuminate the overall focus of this study, namely the organisation of socio-economic 
life and the dynamics behind social differentiation in the city. These four inter­
linked spheres correspond to different levels of social life, and by focusing on them, 
this study builds a cross-section of sociological reality at a time of rapid change.
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5. An outline of the following chapters
The empirical methods adopted in this study are the subject of chapter 2. The 
rationale behind the choice of research site, the research strategy and characteristics 
of the study sample are described. The fieldwork process - problems faced during 
fieldwork and how they were confronted - is outlined.
Chapter 3 describes the institutional context shaping people's livelihoods. It situates 
the fieldwork site in the national and regional context to show how rapid social 
change creates opportunities and constraints that shape local level responses.
The following two chapters focus on the variety of livelihoods visible in the city. 
Chapter 4 outlines five economic profiles, into which respondent households are 
categorised. It discusses income-generating and household practices employed by 
respondents attempting to survive and secure a living. By describing six livelihood 
paths taken by respondents over the course of 1990-2000 and the role played by 
household relations, the chapter seeks to explain households' economic positions. It 
then looks at how respondents' economic position relates to their identities and 
perceptions of change. The livelihoods of entrepreneurs who have experienced 
enrichment are the subject of chapter 5. By outlining five livelihood paths, the 
resources necessary for enrichment are identified. The chapter considers the 
problems entrepreneurs have faced and how they have surmounted them and 
discusses entrepreneurs' ideologies of entitlement to the fruits of the market.
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Chapter 6 shows why social networks are important in determining the shape of 
people's responses to rapid social change. It considers the determinants of access to 
social networks and whether participation is gendered. It seeks to distil which 
networks are important to different kinds of people and the role they play. It looks at 
how rapid social change is altering the meaning and function of networks. In so 
doing, it draws conclusions about how network relations are reconfigured in the 
context of rapid change.
Chapter 7 looks at changes in the political economy of organised crime. It considers the 
social function of organised crime and asks whether these groups are becoming more 
legitimate. Chapter 8 concludes with some wider conclusions about the determinants of 
different kinds of responses to rapid social change and their implications for people's 
livelihoods and social differentiation in the city.
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Chapter 2: Research Methods
This chapter discusses the methods used for investigating the theoretical concerns 
already outlined. It lays out the research strategy and describes the research 
techniques used, the problems faced during fieldwork and how they were confronted.
1. Research Strategy
I collected information through semi-structured interviews, life histories, a 
household budget survey, and official statistics. Adopting an empirically grounded 
approach to hypothesis generation (Crow 1999), I sought to identify the ideas about 
the main aspects of everyday life and how it is given meaning. After three months 
language training in Moscow in order to conduct interviews alone, I spent nine 
months conducting fieldwork in Ekaterinburg.
2. Semi-structured Interviews
Open-ended in-depth interviews provided a great breadth of data and were conducted 
to collect information on how people make a living and the meaning they attach to 
social change. The potential weaknesses of this approach include biases in the 
sample and on the part of the fieldworker. The quality of interviews was ensured by 
assessing the credibility of people questioned, examining the nature of the sample, 
and cross-checking the information collected. I addressed my biases by being
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explicit about how the data was collected, my friendships in the field, the reasoning 
and assumptions made during the fieldwork process, and making available the data 
for re-examination.
2.1 Question Design and Testing
After drafting the semi-structured interview questions and household budget survey 
questionnaires, I sought feedback from Russian academics1 and friends on the 
questions, omissions and language. 130 semi-structured interviews were collected2. 
They were between one and two hours in duration and were taped with the consent 
of the respondent. A longer-term perspective on respondents' situations was sought 
through repeated meetings, telephone conversations and informal updates with 
common friends.
Informal interviews with older people, who were forthcoming about their pasts, 
resembled life histories4 and were used to illuminate the elements and cultural 
meanings composing an individual's experience, and to find out about the salience of 
older generations' experiences for livelihoods in present-day Russia.
Interviews with businesspeople took a different format. They focused on the 
decision to move into business, the difficulties presented and how they were
1 These included Teodor Shanin at the Moscow School for Economic and Social Science and Boris 
Petrov from the Sverdlovsk branch of the Russian Academy of Science.
2 See appendix 2 for a list of respondents.
3 Respondents were told that the conversations would be confidential and pseudonyms have been 
used.
4 In Russia, the recovery of life histories suppressed for three or four generations, becomes an 
important part of the struggle to democratise life (Bertaux and Thompson 1993, 6).
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circumvented. The interviews were chronologically organised to collect information 
on how the business environment had changed over the last ten years. Questions 
were asked about self-perceptions, marital relations and aspirations for their children.
After testing the interviews out several times, I made several changes. In relation to 
questions on social networks, rather than asking people to think of an example of 
help to or from another, it was better to ask respondents to elaborate on concrete 
examples of mutual help practices that they brought up in the course of the 
discussion. In order to understand marginalisation from the support that networks 
provide, I found ways of collecting information about situations when certain people 
were isolated from support. This sometimes required posing an intimate question 
about a difficult experience or period when the respondent was particularly low. A 
follow-up question inquired why s/he did not turn to another for assistance. In 
relation to questions about mutual help practices, crosschecks were built into the 
conversation to distinguish norms from practice. Respondents readily answered 
questions about occasions when they helped others, but in answer to questions about 
situations when they were the recipients of help, they often said they preferred to 
solve their own problems themselves. However, in another part of the discussion, if 
an instance in which they were helped was raised I probed about it.
Owing to the erratic nature of additional work and the tendency for respondents to 
exaggerate its importance in the make-up of their livelihoods, specific questions 
were asked about additional work engaged in during the past three months. 
Respondents who had not engaged in additional work were asked why not.
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Questions comparing the past and present - quality of life, attitudes towards work, 
gender relations - showed that people use multiple indicators to evaluate change. 
Respondents distinguished the short and long-term, often holding that the present is a 
blip in the path to a market economy, albeit a lengthening one that might take 
generations to rectify. Their recollections of key events over the decade were often 
hazy but the following events were universally identified as important:
Significant Changes Mentioned in Respondents’ Accounts
1985: perestroika, Gorbachev's anti-alcohol campaign
1991: coming to power of El’tsin, end of the USSR, appearance of advertisements and new 
consumer products, legalisation of trade, loss o f savings.
1993: onset of barter and hyper-inflation
1992-4: turf war between organised crime groups.
August 1998: Financial crisis and rising prices.
January 2000: Murder of Uralmash plant director, Putin becomes president and appointment of 
Presidential Representative.
2.2 Identifying respondents
The respondents were not a random sample, but a mixture - some carefully chosen 
and others identified by accident and followed up because of the processes or 
relations they are thought to illustrate. Various strategies were used to compile the 
sample. This is not a community study based on a particular workplace or 
residential area. I wanted to get a feel of change in the city as a whole. Research 
began through snowballing. Maximum variation was sought out in the sample to 
identify important common patterns, the diversity of ways people make a living and
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the multiple determinants of livelihoods. This took me to different parts of the city 
and to smaller towns and villages in the oblast.
The advantage of the snowball technique is that it allows for the examination of 
people's links to others and creates trust between the researcher and respondent. 
Adopting this technique necessitated continual reviewing of the types of households 
included and omitted to avoid sampling too narrowly (Devereux and Hoddinott 
1992). I ensured that different categories of household were not left out by 
classifying households -  the criteria for which only became known as fieldwork 
progressed. Households were classified according to relative wealth, gender, 
occupation, economic sector of activity, profession, age, household composition, 
length of residency, location in the city, housing type and historical relation to the 
state. In order to counteract biases in the sample resulting from snowballing, 
entrepreneurs' associations, the university and district social protection departments 
were also used to identify respondents.
My identity as a young, British feminist with a research grant vastly higher than 
most respondents’ incomes shaped the relationships that I formed during my 
fieldwork and the kinds of people I chose to spend my time with. While for 
interviews, I endeavoured to select as diverse a cross-section of society as possible, I 
inevitably chose to spend my spare time with people to whom I felt a close affinity, 
and it is during these times to a greater extent than during interviews, that overall 
impressions forming the underlying argument to my thesis, crystallized. My circle 
of friends consisted predominantly of women in their twenties to forties who were 
commonly educated to university level and were familiar with and comfortable
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around the Western values I represented. My friends were either single or married 
and with young families but without the all-consuming obligations to multiple work, 
intensive jobs and family. There were few opportunities to meet spontaneously 
women with great work and familial obligations, factory workers and, older people. 
With a few exceptions, I found it difficult to develop friendly relations with men. As 
a result, my perspective is rather woman-centred, emanating from my generation and 
the one above me, although I interviewed almost as many men as women and made 
an effort to meet older people.
My positionality influenced not only the kind of standpoint I adopted towards my 
environment, but also the ways people related to me, the kinds of stories they told 
and how they portrayed their lives. This also shaped the picture I built up of Russian 
society and the kind of thesis that I wrote. Most businessmen were respectful but in 
a male-dominated and elitest business world, they occasionally would not take me 
seriously or try and charm me. As I discuss further later, the most revealing 
accounts from businessmen resulted from my friendships with their girlfriends or 
wives. On two occasions, businessmen suggested to me after the interviews that 
their divulging information demanded something more from me in return.
In many ways being a foreigner worked in my favour. Businessmen frequently 
mentioned being more comfortable about talking with me on confidential work 
matters because they knew that the information they divulged was going to leave 
Russia with me. I was surprised how, across the board, people welcomed the 
opportunity to tell their stories. When I was lucky, businessmen systematically and 
chronologically recounted their wild operations over the last turbulent ten years for
44
several hours as a detailed story that splurged out from inside them for the first time. 
My impoverished women friends would say how thankful they were to have a friend 
who was genuinely interested in the intricacies of their lives and was such a good 
listener at a time when everyone was preoccupied with their own problems.
On other occasions being an outsider worked to my disadvantage. While people 
generally appreciated the fact that I had made an effort to learn Russian, was living 
in their city for a lengthy period of time and interested in their plight, some people, 
especially isolated elderly women and villagers, were suspicious of my intentions 
and others, such as some factory workers and homeless people, did not comprehend 
my project and found it difficult to answer some of my questions. In addition, the 
fact that I was still learning Russian as I started interviews meant that I missed much 
of what people told me in the initial three months. Some of the nuances of the 
Russian language were lost on me and, initially, I found it difficult and clumsy to 
interrupt people to ask what they meant when I did not understand something. It 
took me longer than it would take a local researcher to detect when people were 
fabricating stories or through coded words were alluding to certain events they did 
not want to mention explicitly.
Researching wealthy households and men's social and business networks was more 
difficult than resource-poor households because of respondents' time constraints and 
the illicit nature of some of their activity. The most informative interviews came 
about when the respondent agreed to an interview as a favour to a friend. For 
example, my housemate, who engaged in additional work for a music composer, 
asked him to do an interview. After the interview, he asked me to comment on a
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local girl's songs, sung in English, which he wanted to market in English-speaking 
countries. Afterwards, he asked what he could do by way of thanks. Declining 
complementary tickets to dance performances and the theatre, I requested an 
interview with his principal sponsor, a successful industrialist. The interview with 
that industrialist proved to be one of the frankest discussions about exchange 
transactions over the past ten years. Honest interviews with businessmen also came 
about as a result of friendships I had formed with their wives / girlfriends.
In successful interviews with business people, there was the sense that the 
information divulged, regarding sensitive topics - organised crime, corruption, illegal 
economic activity and personal connections within the state - was a gift. There were 
predetermined levels of openness in business people's accounts. The level was 
determined largely by the nature of the tie, that is, whether or not there was a 
common trusted person that had brought the researcher and respondent together. 
When that common 'third' person was not a close person to the respondent, 
interviews were characteristically formal and information was withheld. In short, 
interviews mirrored network norms. As Anya, a friend commenting on the 
interviews, said,
Everything happens through personal relations - people will not agree to an
interview unless through a friend and they know it is not dangerous.
Among the rich, there was unwillingness to state income. When they did, a 
complication was distinguishing enterprise profit that was reinvested in business 
from money taken home for consumption. However, they were prepared to state the 
proportion of undeclared income. Thus, while only a rough estimate of total income
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of the wealthy was possible, information about the proportion of income gained 
informally was more accurate.
One group that risked being omitted by snowballing was isolated people cut off from 
networks of support. These people could be accessed through district level social 
protection departments, providing social support, a night shelter and spontaneously. 
In addition, old people often proved to be more reluctant to talk to a foreigner. In the 
main, I relied on friends who introduced me to their parents and respondents’ elderly 
neighbours, which might have produced biases in that I met elderly people who were 
within a support network rather than those who faced isolation.
The sample-size was too small to claim representativeness. Randomness was not 
important to the research because the focus was on understanding processes rather 
than identifying trends. A comparison with official statistics of the oblast and city’s 
population shows that the sample comprised more working age households with 
children and fewer people of pensioner age than is typical of the population as a 
whole (figure 1).













22.4 (52) 18.9 20.7 19.2 20.0
Working age10 61.8 (144) 61.2 58.4 60.1 59.3
Pensioners11 15.8 (37) 19.9 20.9 20.7 20.7
5 Figures include all members in respondent households. The bracketed number is the number of
1999d
7 Goskomstat 1999a, 24
8 Goskomstat 2000b
9 Below the age of 16 years.
10 Working age but may not be working for a number of reasons including unemployment, study, 
housewifery, illness and invalidity.




There is a very large range of per capita incomes within the sample of 83 households 
(figure 2). The average income per household is R10633.44 while the median 
income is R1867.66 -  the large differences between these two figures indicating the 
inequality within the sample.
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household
Figure 2 shows the unequal distribution of wealth within the sample and suggests the 
absence of a middle class -  both of which are mirrored in the city's population 
(Goskomstat 2000c). In terms of the spread of households, the sample comprised 
more households that have a very small per capita income and a very large per capita 
income than larger samples compiled by official statistics, as figure 3 shows. As a 
result, the discrepancy between the rich and poor is emphasised and the range of 
strategies adopted by middle-income households may have been missed.
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Figure 3 : Differential ion in the Pooulation according to Average Income (in roubles)
% of study sample 200012 % of Sverdlovsk Oblast 200013
Up to 400 9.6 (8) 0.9
400,1-600 4.8 (4) 4.7
600,1-800 4.8 (4) 9.6
800,1-1000,0 12.0 (10) 12.4
1000,1-1200 2.4 (2) 13.0
1200,1-1600 10.8 (9) 22.1





Higher than 10,000 20.4 (17)
This sample comprised more people with a higher level of education than is typical 
in the oblast (Goskomstat 2000e). This is no surprise given the city's large number 
of universities and institutes and the presence of business people in the sample who 
invariably had a higher education.
Figure 4: Education level o f Household's Main Income- 




The most common work sector was services, followed by industry and production, 
although the proportion of the city's population engaged in the latter is larger. 
Education and science and art and culture featured in higher numbers than is true of 
the population as a whole, reflecting the social network with which contact was
12 Based on 83 households. The bracketed figure is the actual number of households.
13 Based on 4602 households (Goskomstat 2000c, 95)
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initially established. The largest proportion of respondents was engaged in 
state/privatised sector, followed by new private sector. Approximately one-sixth of 
respondents relied on individual piecemeal work. My aim to understand the 
processes by which the wealthy accumulated resources meant that there were a 
disproportionately large number of enterprise directors in the sample. In addressing 
the strategies of those who have accumulated wealth, I focused on entrepreneurs and 
did not included alternative paths to enrichment in other economic sectors. Figure 5 
shows that my sample contained a relatively small number of industrial sector 
employees.
Figure 5: Work Activity of Main Income-eamer in Sample





Industry &  
Production 
20%
Trade &  Retail 
12%
Education &  science 
11%
A rt &  Culture  
11%
32%
A further key variable is access to land. While the majority of households had either 
direct or indirect access to land, a large proportion had no access to land (figure 6).
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Figure 6: Form of Respondents' Access to Land
EI direct personal access
■  indirect access through 
kin
□  no access
The snowball technique was mainly successful. I was greatly helped by meeting 
Olga, a woman who I lived with throughout the fieldwork period. Olga had a large 
network of friends and acquaintances, which she put to my benefit. Olga and a 
friend transcribed interviews from tape onto computer in Russian. It is important to 
make explicit my relations with Olga and her network of friends as this has 
consequences for the nature of the data and its interpretation (Lockwood 1992). The 
fact that her grandmother was in the theatre, and Olga had been working in theatre 
throughout her working life, meant that initially, respondents were commonly 
connected to cultural institutions. She was single, without kin relations in the city 
and spent a considerable amount of time maintaining her friendship networks. 
Although her networks were mostly work-based - a potential bias in sampling - it 
was relatively easy to move to other ties spanning many different arenas. The 
following are two such snowball trails by way of example:
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Figure 7: Snowball 1 ■n
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Figure 8: Snowball 2
Non-commercial organisation (NKO) resource centre
friend
Lenin District





Metals broker + director vegetable depot Mother of invalid child living near market






Ryad (market) Firms share
building
shuttle trader
Attendant at Uralmash controlled car park







3. Household Budget Survey
The household budget survey provides a more structured longitudinal picture of 
household income and expenditure. The survey illustrates processes -  for example, 
the ways people deal with income fluctuation. The small number included in the 
survey - eleven households14 - meant that it was not possible to generalise from it. It 
does not measure how many households practice certain kinds of budgeting. 
However, when combined with semi-structured interviews, a multiple round survey 
(Devereux 1992, 54) adds to the robustness and quality of qualitative findings about 
the way people make a living. By repeating the survey with the same households 
three times151 was able to ask people to explain why incomes had fluctuated. The 
survey sought to identify any seasonal differences in expenditure related to 
availability of home-grown produce.
The downside to conducting a budget survey is the costs in terms of time. In 
addition, there were problems of inaccuracy due to poor recall. A practical 
disadvantage of repeat surveys was the difficulty for respondents and I to keep to a 
fixed schedule of three rounds. Conceptually, the survey adopted the household as 
the unit of analysis but as chapter 1 notes, it is important to acknowledge power 
relations within it. Respondents were asked about the sources of their income, work 
responsibilities of different household members and decision-making processes over 
the budget.
14 The survey included approximately 23 households in each round although only 11 households 
participated in all three rounds.
Three rounds of a household budget survey were conducted in March, June and September.
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The households were identified through the semi-structured interviews. The need to 
begin quickly in order to achieve the longest timeframe possible was a limitation.
As a result, some households identified turned out to be too far away to revisit. The 
households in the final sample included differences according to income, gender, 
economic sector, age, household composition and access to land.
A number of difficulties emerged during the survey. In some households it became 
apparent that women included their husband's income but ignored their own. They 
called themselves housewives, meaning that they were not employed, although in 
practice they engaged in unofficial income-generating evening work. The failure to 
disclose their income was not because they wanted to hide it but because they simply 
did not perceive it as relevant.
The irregularity of income and its multiple sources meant asking about the previous 
month's income and expenditure was more realistic than 'normal' or 'average' 
monthly income and expenditure. Delays in wage payments and payments in-kind 
added to the problems of evaluating income.16 Monetary income was included but 
not payments in-kind. The existence of food and other resources shared and 
exchanged was noted but not translated into a common value. Also noted were 
unpaid salaries, salaries paid in-kind, the use of official workplace resources for 
private gain and additional incomes. There was a further complication with budget 
sector and privatised enterprise employees who sometimes received an official wage 
and additional payments such as the '13th month's salary*. In the new private sector,
16 Respondents who faced wage arrears of up to a year in 1999, were getting paid these delayed wages 
in monthly instalments alongside the part or full or delayed payment of their current wage. In 
addition, they may be given the opportunity to purchase an item in monthly instalments deducted 
from the wage owed.
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employees sometimes received an official (declared) salary and an unofficial 
(undeclared) salary.17 In the vast majority of cases, respondents were willing to 
report additional work and incomes but sometimes did not think to mention these 
additional payments.
The role of loans is a further problem in estimating income and expenditure. Many 
respondents borrowed money from friends, loan sharks or banks. Loans were either 
repaid directly on receipt of income, or carried over for several months or years, or 
not paid back at all. In the survey, loans received and repaid were noted separately.
Apart from work and invalidity pensions, respondents did not perceive benefits such 
as child support, as income. This might be due to the fact that these payments are 
regarded as entitlements (Kandiyoti 1999). Even more problematic was taking 
account of the value of subsidies as part of income. Their value was accounted for 
by reduced expenditure on certain services.
The household budget survey showed how households do not always function as a 
co-operative unit. In many cases, young family members kept their incomes for 
themselves.18 In a small number of cases, household relations were characterised by 
domination. In one instance, the husband's control over the budget was to the 
detriment to its members. In the third round of the survey, drinking heavily19 and
17 One respondent said he signed an agreement, which obliged him not to reveal his real income to 
anyone outside the firm (22).
181 included incomes that individuals kept for their own consumption as part o f the household income 
because they meant that less o f the pooled money needed to be allocated to that person. In some 
cases, when the joint money ran out, young people would contribute their income.
19 Heavy drinking was an impediment to research. On three occasions interviews were postponed for 
a week due to heavy drinking on the part of the respondent and on several occasions the respondent 
was embarrassed because her husband was drunk. One time, a respondent still under the influence of 
alcohol after a near scrape with bandits, insisted on an interview so that he could explain what life
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without an income, he was reluctant to meet to complete the survey. The chaotic 
nature of their situation and wife's sense of powerlessness to improve it revealed the 
unstable nature of their marital relations and precariousness of their livelihood.
In order to estimate large expenditures that continued over several months, such as 
sending a child to school, transport to garden plots in the growing season, and flat 
privatisation, specific respondents were asked to note costs in diary form.
4 Interviewing 'Experts' and State Officials
In order to collect information about changes in the wider institutional context, 
representatives of formal organisations and state officials were interviewed. The 
processes that underlie policy formation and implementation, vested interests and 
behind the scenes political motivations are often ignored by researchers of 
government institutions (Mooij 1999). State officials were identified for interview 
according to three criteria: their subject area, advice on their competency and a good 
introduction. Issues discussed include safety nets, relations with civil society 
organisations and relations between different levels of the state. Social policy 
discussions were had with state departments of social protection, employment 
agencies, in a state orphanage, a homeless shelter and with non-commercial 
organisations. In order to get at the informal exchange of favours operating within
was really like. On another occasion, I was stranded in a village because the husband (also the driver) 
of the couple drunk for four days, spending all his own money and borrowing money from several 
villagers. This was an awful experience but spending those days with his wife and child, I began to 
understand the wife's problems.
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the state, two interviews were collected with officials through friends and who talked 
in their personal rather than their professional capacity.
Information on bribe-taking was collected primarily through discussions with the 
paying party - business people. Information on the legal context, law enforcement 
and private and informal protection was also collected largely through interviews 
with businesspeople although interviews were conducted with a tax inspector and 
three organised crime group members. Two of these respondents were identified 
through friends and one through a formal organisation.
5. Written information
Official statistical data, purchased from the Sverdlovsk branch of Goskomstat, 
provided useful background information to highlight differences within the city and 
between the city and the oblast, and to draw comparisons with other oblasts and 
cities in Russia. Although Goskomstat provides the most comprehensive 
quantitative data in Russia, there are problems related to the data’s reliability and the 
indicators used (Clarke 1999, 9). Newspapers identified important political, 
economic and social issues and provided different slants on local debates.
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6. Conclusion
The chapter has shown how adopting different methods expands the depth of the 
study. It discussed the advantages and problems brought up by the semi-structured 
interviews and household budget survey. It also considered the advantages of 
reliance primarily on the snowball technique and steps taken to avoid the pitfalls of 
bias associated with this technique. The snowball technique's potential overly narrow 
focus on one network of people, to the exclusion of other kinds of people can, at 
least in part, be averted by continually assessing respondents sampled and 
identifying alternative channels for identifying other kinds of people. The technique 
does have several advantages. Snowballing acts as a method for researching 
networks that allows the researcher to identify and follow-up with significant 
contacts. Networks in Ekaterinburg stretch across work sectors and cover a wide 
geographical area. In a context where there is a sharp distinction between official 
and unofficial activity, a respondent approached through a trusted friend, colleague 
or relative is more likely to talk to the researcher in a relaxed and open manner than 
had they been approached cold by a stranger.
The chapter showed that using a household budget survey adds power to the findings 
from the qualitative analysis by providing numerical information about household 
budgeting processes over a longer time frame. In addition, the analysis of official 
statistics helps identify the specific characteristics of the study's sample, and of the 
city and region more generally.
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Chapter 3: Institutional Continuity and Change
.. .we are travelling on a high-speed train that is travelling in two different 
directions at the same time. (122)
(Boris, a 39-year-old unemployed architect living alone)
How have people experienced the transformation of institutions around them?
Soviet era institutions have collapsed, adapted or continued to operate much as they 
did in the past and new institutions have emerged. By reviewing official statistics,1 
this chapter describes rapid social, political and economic change and its 
demographic and social impact at regional and city levels. It demonstrates how these 
changes that were, for many, incoherent, as the quotation above suggests, affected 
the ways people made a living. The chapter begins by briefly considering why 
market reform has failed and why Russia's situation can be described as one of 
institutional crisis. It goes on to describe the main aspects of economic, political and 
social change at the regional and city levels drawing out the implications of these 
changes for people's livelihoods.
1. Overview of 'Transition*
The structural adjustment model of 'transition' was based on the idea that in order to 
achieve economic growth, domestically-oriented and protected economies had to be 
opened up to market forces that would allow previously stagnant economies to 
benefit from the dynamism of the world economy. The key components of this
1 Statistical data for this chapter comes from the Sverdlovsk branch of Goskomstat.
2 The description of the structural adjustment model is based on Clarke (1998, 10-13).
60
model were macro-economic stabilisation, privatisation and price liberalisation, 
collectively known as 'shock therapy' due to the speed with which they are carried 
out. Implementation of the model would stabilise an economy's price level and 
allow relative prices to freely adjust to market conditions. At the same time, it 
would lead to the decline of inefficient sectors of the economy, freeing up human 
and physical capital for investment in profitable sectors of the economy. Inevitable 
short-term social costs were expected as a result of cuts in state expenditure and 
rising unemployment, but in the longer-term, the expansion of profitable sectors of 
the economy would create new employment, increasing the population's standard of 
living.
Neo-liberal reformers believed that the model of 'transition' needed to be imposed as 
a short, sharp shock because they suspected that if done incrementally, Russian 
powerholders would use their position to seize control over resources. It would 
involve three stages. Firstly, fiscal and financial stabilisation would reduce state 
activity, including public spending on social provision, and bring about the closure 
of inefficient enterprises, creating mass unemployment. The next stage involved the 
reduction of public borrowing, which would lead to falling inflation and interest 
rates, the stabilisation of the exchange rate and falling wages. In the final stage, 
investment in profitable sectors of the economy would bring economic recovery and 
improved living standards.
This structural adjustment model of'transition' was based on advice to the Russian 
government provided by certain economists in the United States and Europe (Wedel 
1998, Haynes and Machold 2002). The doctrine on which it was premised assumed
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that by mechanically imposing the structural elements of the new market system, old 
Soviet structures would be destroyed and market capitalist forces would 
spontaneously be unleashed at the micro-level (Amot 2000).
It is now generally acknowledged that structural adjustment has not taken the path 
predicted by radical reformers and their advisors. For example, the attempt to secure 
macro-economic stabilisation, though it might have kept inflation under control, led 
to the demonetisation of the economy. Enterprises responded to the lack of liquidity 
by moving out of the monetary economy. Barter and the non-payment of wages 
were the most visible manifestation of this. Large state and privatised enterprises
•7
were able to survive due to their ability to leave wages unpaid, and through 
alliances involving barter relations between local administrations and factory bosses 
against greater market discipline (Woodruff 1999). Even profitable enterprises were 
not able to pay their employees' wages because of the shortage of cash in the 
economy. Many enterprises opened shops where they sold their goods, or goods 
acquired by barter, for cash, which could then be used to pay wages. Others paid 
wages in-kind or gave workers vouchers to buy goods in company stores 
(International Confederation of Free Trade Unions 1997). Although the crisis of 
liquidity has now passed, non-payment of wages was a key feature of the reform era 
to which individuals had to adapt.
Flexibility in the labour market was achieved (Clarke 2000) but did not bring about 
the consequences predicted. It did not lead to the explosion of the small and medium 
enterprise sector that was expected to become the engine of economic growth. SME
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directors, noted in chapter 5, identified difficulties in accessing capital from banks, 
restrictive red tape and the absence of regulatory mechanisms promoting trust in the 
market as the main problems faced by the sector. At the same time, although 
unemployment gradually increased over the decade (figure 9), it did not reach the 
levels expected. Rather than become unemployed or move to the private sector, 
workers remained in jobs despite low wages and wage arrears or move between low 
paid jobs (Grogan 2000). The accounts of workers moving from employment in one 
enterprise to another, described in chapter 4, illustrate the extent of labour force 
flexibility.
Figure 9: % of Unemployed in Economically Active Population4
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
% of unemployed5 5.2 5.9 8.1 9.5 9.7 11.8 13.3 12.9 9.7
The introduction of private property was thought to trigger a demand for regulatory 
institutions and legal reform (Hendley 1997). In practice, the law did not become a 
neutral and stable set of norms around which to organise transactions (Hendley 
2001). Coupled with this, the state did not institute universal regulatory safeguards 
to promote trust in private transactions. Instead, alternative means of regulation and 
contract enforcement emerged, most notably organised crime groups, the subject of 
chapter 7.
In addition, the introduction of private property did not led to the concomitant 
demise of patron-client relations predicted (Hendley 1997). The notion of the state 
based on collective responsibility no longer exists. At the local level, the state
3 The ISITO 1998 household survey shows that in January 1998, the state sector accounted for just 
over half of all employed. The number employed in privatised enterprises rose to 20% (Grogan 2000, 
43).
4 Goskomtat statistics in Q4 2000 (2000b 604).
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regulated the economy in an arbitrary manner. It was made up of individuals using 
their position instrumentally for private gain and for the most part, operated 
independently of public control. With the collapse of the Communist Party, the 
political elite had greater leeway to manipulate the gains that could be made in a 
context where there was little legal regulation. In Soviet times, all social entities 
were incorporated into various hierarchical chains of command incorporated into the 
apparatus of the Communist Party (Rigby 1983). Informally, party officials 
exploited the resources of their position to build informal patterns of obligation and 
dependency (Orlovsky 1983, Tarkowski 1981). However, this "mono- 
organisational" (Rigby 1983) system did control the extent of corrupt practices.
With the collapse of Communist Party in 1991, the linchpin of the system that had 
kept state officials in check, disappeared. Without regulation by the Party system, 
corrupt practices had free reign.6 Many of the businesspeople respondents were 
successful because they have used political processes to strengthen their economic 
interests. Chapter 5 shows how this has produced continuity between old and new 
elites.
5 According to the International Labour Organisation (ILO) definition of unemployment.
6 Corruption in the CIS countries is higher than in other countries at the same income level (UNICEF 
Innocenti Research Group 2001,16).
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2. Institutional Change in Sverdlovsk Oblast
2.1 Economic Change
Initial economic conditions played an important role in the fortune of the region. In
ththe early 18 century, the discovery of valuable minerals such as iron ore, coal and 
precious stones in Sverdlovsk region led to the growth of a mining industry. As 
chapter 1 mentioned, in the Soviet period Sverdlovsk was at the heart of the 
industrialisation drive. The demand for labour in the metallurgy industry was 
satisfied through collectivisation and the exile of'kulaks’ to the region producing, as 
a result, some of the biggest GULAGS in Russia. The Second World War saw many 
industries and workers transferred to the region. After the war, Sverdlovsk was one 
of the most productive oblasts. The economy thrived with the mining and processing 
of ferrous and non-ferrous metals, machine-building and defense being the principal 
industries. In the post-Soviet context, Sverdlovsk ranks in the top six regions 
according to many indicators.
Most enterprises continued to be concentrated in heavy industry (Goskomstat 2000b, 
306). Despite a dramatic fall in these industries' production output between 1993-8 
(Goskomstat 2000b), the region nevertheless ranked fifth in gross regional product. 
The rouble value of industrial production in 1999 and 2000 witnessed an 
improvement in some sectors of the economy although there were considerable 
sectoral differences.7
7 Machine-building, metal processing, wood processing, the production of construction materials and 
light industry continued to deteriorate in 1999 while non-ferrous and heavy metals showed an 
improvement in production levels in 1999 and 2000 (Goskomstat 2000c, 8-9).
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Figure 10: Sverdlovsk's ranking among 79 Russian regions. January 20008
Indicator a) Ranking b) Sverdlovsk c) Russian 
(mean) average
b/c
Natural, labour + capital 
resources (million roubles)9
4 517,207 181,645 2.85
Number of small 
businesses10
4 31,891 11,273 2.83
Foreign currency exports 
($m)n
5 2,176.6 805.1 2.70
Gross regional product, 
1998, (million roubles)12
5 80,674.8 30,408.6 2.65
‘Industrial enterprises and 
organisations’13
5 12,349 4,704 2.63
Production of small 
businesses (million 
roubles)14
6 11,830.5 5,363.4 2.21
‘Enterprises and 
organisations providing 
information and computer 
services’15
9 226 172.8 1.31
Real income (ratio of money 
incomes to regional 
subsistence minimum)16
25 148 177 0.84
‘Real’ unemployment17 25 13.9 13.4 1.04
Percentage of population 
living below regional 
subsistence minimum18
30 35.6 29.9 1.19
Telephones per 100 
households
50 40.5 52.8 0.77
Cars per 1000 population20 60 94.4 128.1 0.74
Oblast export levels were high (Goskomstat 2000c, 5), the main foreign investors 
being Cyprus, Germany and Ukraine (Goskomstat 2000c, 51), which invested mostly 
in non-ferrous metals and aluminum production (Goskomstat 1999b, 40).
8 This table is taken from Pickup and White (2002,4). The source is Goskomstat 2000a. Data is for 
the 77 republics, kraya and oblasts and 2 autonomous and self-standing regions. All figures are for 
31/12/99 or 1/1/00, unless otherwise stated in the footnotes.
9 Table 12.37,267-8.
10 Table 13.7, 285-6.
11 Table 24.5, 578-9. 1999 total.
12 Table 12.20,258-9. 1998 total.
13 Table 13.4, 280-3.
14 Table 13.8,287. 1999 total.
15 Table 13.4, 280-3.
16 Table 7.23, 157-8. 1999, presumably average for the year. The total is 61, not 79.
17 Table 6.3, 106-11. Figures based on Labour Force Survey data, using ILO definition of 
unemployment; average for 1999. The total is 59, not 79.
18 Table 7.29, 164. 1999, presumably average for the year. The total is 71, not 79.
19 Table 18.14,441-2. The total is 71, not 79.
20 Table 17.30,427-8.
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The economy was modernising and there was considerable industrial diversity, 
which helped the city overcome some of the economic difficulties posed by market 
reform. Figure 10 shows that the region had a comparatively healthy SME sector, 
ranking fourth in number of businesses and sixth in small business output.21 This 
apparent success with regard to SME is called into question however, when the 
measure of numbers of small enterprises per thousand of the population is used. By 
this measure, Sverdlovsk was below the Russian average (Amot 2000). In addition,
0 0  0 “Xthe sector was unstable and was not an attractive employer.
The distribution of the working population in Sverdlovsk deviated from the norm in 
Russia with a larger proportion employed in state enterprises. In 1999,48% of the 
population were working in the state sector and 33% in the private sector 
(Goskomstat 2000d, 29), a large proportion of which were privatised state 
enterprises.24 Industry employed by far the greatest proportion of the population.25 
This had important implications for people's livelihoods. People depended on 
largely unstructured enterprises for their primary income. While wages in some 
industrial enterprises were rising, many employees continued to receive very low
21 The majority of small enterprises (44.2%) were focused on trade and services (Goskomstat 1999c, 
4). Industry was the second biggest sector among small enterprise (17.8%), focusing primarily on 
machine-construction and metal processing, non-ferrous metals and food. Output from small 
enterprise comprised 7.2% of all output in this sector in 1999 (Goskomstat 1999b, 37). The small 
enterprise sector produced 2.8% of overall industrial output in 1998 (Goskomstat 1999b, 38).
22 The number of small enterprises in the region fell in 1998 as a result of the 1998 financial crisis 
before recuperating to pre-crisis levels in 1999 (Goskomstat 2000c, 286; Goskomstat 2000d, 82).
23 The number of workers in small enterprise fell year on year between 1995-1999 (Goskomstat 
2000d). Incomes in small enterprise were 34.5% smaller than in medium and large enterprises 
(Goskomstat 1999b, 37).
24 Nationwide, 38% of working population in 1999 worked in the public sector as compared with 
44% in the private sector. (Goskomstat 2000a). Goskomstat statistics do not distinguish between 
privatised state and new private enterprises, but a large proportion o f the private sector figure is made 
up of privatised state industries (Clarke 1999,17).
2 In Sverdlovsk, the number of people employed in industry fell between 1995-9 by 16% 
(Goskomstat 2000d, 27) in line with the national level figures (17%) (Goskomstat 2000a). In 1999, 
36% of the working population were engaged in industry (Goskomstat 2000d, 27)
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wages because of the demonetisation of the economy. Nevertheless, some of these 
enterprises attempted to provide social support in the way they did in Soviet times. 
Despite the continuance of social provisioning by the enterprise at limited levels, 
workers could no longer rely on the enterprise as a guarantor of their livelihoods and 
turned instead to resources mobilised through the household.
Figure 11: Unemployment Trends in Sverdlovsk oblast
199826 1999 200027
% of unemployed as compared with 96.7 88.8 70.1
the previous year28
Surprisingly perhaps, given the size and diversity of the economy, figure 10 indicates 
that unemployment in the region was just below average,29 but falling (figure 11). 
The majority of departures from employment were 'voluntary' (70%), a trend which 
was growing. Wage arrears continued although the extent to which they posed a 
problem to employees differed by sector.30 Sverdlovsk authorities made 
commitments during 2000 to working solely in a cash economy and not barter or 
credit which, in part, bore fruit.31
26 Goskomstat 1999b, 101-2: January-December monthly average.
27 Goskomstat 2000c, 73: January-July monthly average % as compared to the same months in the 
previous year.
According to ILO standard data on unemployment.
29 There was a drop in the number of workers taken on in 1998, a trend most clearly illustrated in 
industrial employment. Although this trend reversed in 2000 (Goskomstat 2000c, 79), numbers 
employed continued to fall in sectors such as education, health, agriculture and trade (Goskomstat 
2000d, 30).
30 In August 2000, wage arrears amounted to R1302.3 million. In the industrial sector and science 
and administration, arrears were reduced on the previous month although in the social sphere 
(including health and education) they rose (Goskomstat 2000c, 101).
31 The regional authorities intended to issue no new credits in kind and services from the oblast from 
the 1st January 2000 having to be paid for in cash. There was however, a backlog of debts and one
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2.2 Political Change
Regional and local state activity at the formal and informal levels was critical in 
shaping the environment in which people constructed their livelihoods. The scope of 
this activity has, arguably, increased since the mid-1980s. In the Gorbachev and 
El'tsin years, Sverdlovsk's political preference diverged from that of the rest of 
Russia (Luchterhandt 1997), displaying strong pro-democratic reform preferences.32 
While in most regions the nomenklatura dominated the Soviets, in Sverdlovsk 
democrats sustained a majority for the first time in the elections of March 1990, the 
region having an exceptionally lively civil society at that time33. Eduard Rossel 
became a key figure in the region's struggle for greater autonomy. In 1990, Rossel 
was elected chairman of both the regional Soviet and regional executive committee 
(ispolkom). A year later, in the failed coup instigated by the anti-reformers, Rossel 
rallied the local electorate who, in the referendum on the future of the Soviet Union, 
came out strongly in support of El'tsin (Rizhenkov and Lukhterkhandt 2001, 167), a 
stance for which Rossel was soon after rewarded. That year, he became the 
presidentially appointed administrative head of the region, a newly created post that 
El'tsin intended to ensure, through executive control, continuation of reforms in the 
regions (Sakwa 1996,211).
local entrepreneur had a large debt owed by the Ministry o f Defence that was paid off with a warship 
(40).
32 This is largely due to urbanisation, the education of population, commodity export economic 
sectors and loyalty to El'tsin, who was local to the region (Easter 1997,619-20). The nationalists and 
communists lack popularity in the region. Aleksandrovich Gregor'evich Kobemichenko, Government 
of Sverdlovsk Oblast Deputy Representative on Questions of Internal Politics recalls:
When there was a referendum about whether they would keep the Soviet Union, Sverdlovsk 
was the only one against the retaining the Union... In this region, people are well educated. 
People are used to thinking. They are sceptical about the Communist Party. It didn't get 
more than 10% in the last elections. Zhirinovsky was never popular here. (106)
33 In November 1988, 7 months earlier than in Moscow, the Movement for Democratic Elections was 
created (Rizhenkov and Lukhterkhant 2001, 165).
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Within a short amount of time a regional movement, with Rossel at the helm, had 
gathered force pressuring for greater regional autonomy. In 1993, Sverdlovsk 
declared itself a fully-fledged Urals republic only to be swiftly reined in by the 
federal centre. In response, Rossel was elected governor of the republic in the 
December 1993 elections. In spring 1994, he won a seat in the new oblast duma and 
was also elected its chairman by fellow deputies. From this position of strength, he 
continued to push for greater regionalism, and successfully negotiated with the 
Kremlin the adoption of an Oblast Charter. This charter stipulated that the governor 
be chosen by popular election. In August 1995, Sverdlovsk conducted Russia's first 
gubernatorial elections. Rossel was elected governor.
Rossel went about centralising power within the region through a series of 
gubernatorial decrees, which set out the division of roles between the federal and 
district levels (Startsev 1999). In January 1996, a special bilateral power sharing 
treaty was signed with federal government and seventeen further agreements granted 
Sverdlovsk greater political, economic and fiscal autonomy in the federation (Easter 
1997, 628-630, Wahola 1999, 52). El'tsin at this time was weak and desperate for 
regional elite support to secure re-election (Russian Regional Report, 5(24) 
21.06.00). These actions provided the basis for favouritism in federal policy and 
became the means by which local elites were able to accumulate large profits by 
selling off the region's resources. In a resounding victory, Rossel was re-elected in 
September 1999 for another four-year term.
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Contrary to attempts by the centre to portray Rossel as a separatist (Rizhenkov and 
Lukhterhandt 2001,172), he should be seen as a regionalist advocating centralisation 
of power within the region (Startsev 1999, 338) but never separation from the 
federation (Sakwa 1996, 222) in what could be described as an "intra-state elite 
power struggle over political, economic and status resources" (Easter 1997, 631).
The success of Rossel's regionalist strategies was partly due to the cohesive elite 
structures adept at making claims on resources and forcing the centre to negotiate 
(Easter 1997).
The process of change in centre-region relations took a new turn with federal level 
strengthening of the centralised state. President Putin has taken steps to alter the 
political landscape and re-establish control over the regions (Hyde 2001). He 
established seven federal districts headed by presidential representatives (PR), one of 
which was Ekaterinburg. Presidential envoys were elements of a new 'power 
vertical' and, as such, they presented a way to bypass the governors (Petrov 2001). 
Proposed reforms went to the heart of Rossel's power, challenging at once his reign 
over the region and his influential role in national politics.
Petr Latyshev, the PR to the Urals district was committed to fighting the shadow 
economy34 and challenging local economic and political networks through a more 
rigorous application of the universal rule of law {Podrobnosti 84(567): 11-17 
August, 2). Local media whipped up sentiment against the PR in a conflict over his
34 Rossel's pragmatic approach in contrast was the proposal that 'shadow' capital be legalised and that 
organised crime groups, such as Uralmash, be seen as important investors in the infrastructure of the 
local economy (Argumenty i fakty-Ural, 19.07.01,1).
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residence. The implications of President Putin’s initiatives to strengthen federal 
authority were met with trepidation.36 Some businesspeople feared that Latyshev 
would expose their ties with political elites, on which they relied.
Sverdlovsk’s political system was atypical for the way that elite conflict was 
expressed in electoral processes. While other regions' polities were commonly 
monopolised by one leader or informal elite settlements, leaving little space for 
political parties, in Sverdlovsk the electoral arena was the main mechanism by which 
elites, developing alternative political organisations, battled for control over 
resources (Gel'man and Golosov 1998). With the dissolution of the Urals Republic 
in 1993 and Rossel's dismissal as Governor, Rossel sought to return to power by 
creating his own party, 'Preobrazhenie Urala' (Transformation of the Urals). In spite 
of his electoral victory in 1995, Rossel was unable to monopolise power in the 
region. Rossel's opponents also established their own parties for elections to the 
regional legislature (Gel'man 1999). Thus, his main political opponent, Arkadii 
Chemetskii, mayor of Ekaterinburg, created his own party, 'Nash Dom - Nash Gorod 
(Our Home Is Our City).
Despite the robust nature of formal institutions, these political divisions were 
"between networks who grabbed assets using the state and those who feel deprived
35 Latyshev was met with hostility locally after it became known that he was going to occupy one of 
the city's most prized buildings, 1Dom Kulturi Tvorchestvo' (Pioneer's Palace), which provided leisure 
clubs for 4000 children for 63 years. A few hundred people protested against his occupancy o f the 
building.
36 To give two concrete examples: two businessmen requested that their interviews be destroyed 
because of mention therein of personal connections with influential state officials. They were worried 
that Latyshev, clamping down on the exchange o f favours between economic and political elites, 
would find out about the manner in which they have been helped through these contacts. In addition, 
people voiced concern about the increased presence o f the Federal Security Bureau (FSB) 
surveillance in the region.
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of their fair share" (Brovkin 1997, 516). Socio-Political Union (OPS) Uralmash, the 
legitimate face of Uralmash group, a powerful organised crime group in the region, 
had also participated in the state duma elections as a means of furthering economic 
ambitions, a point discussed in chapter 7. The group's participation fueled people's 
view that criminals ruled the oblast. The dearth of organisations representing broad 
ranging interests, the lack of popular opposition and ineffectiveness of mass protest 
(Startsev 1999)37 explained in part, why people were so distrustful of political 
institutions.
The state administration sought to maintain control over economic and financial 
resources in the region. It possessed a battery of means to influence firms and 
enterprises. These included the ownership of enterprise shares, administrative 
control over enterprises (for example, over bankruptcy and prevention of share 
ownership by outsiders), the distribution of responsibility for various social 
expenditures, individualised tax treatment, the organisation of tax procurement 
campaigns that could destroy a firm, enterprise share acquisition penalties on non­
payment of taxes, the allocation of funds from Moscow or abroad, local customs 
tariffs, the imposition of restrictions and duties on imports and exports and control 
over property redistribution. This administrative control over the economy did not 
function universally to protect all firms. Rather, these measures perpetuated 
particularistic and arbitrary control. Chapter 5 shows how this political management 
of the economy created an unstable environment that dissuaded business people from
37 The political party, Aleksandr Burkov's left-populist Movement o f Labourers for Social Guarantees, 
'Mai', founded in April 1999 may be an exception (Umland 2000).
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long-term investment in production. Chapter 6 describes how it meant that small and 
medium-sized businesses were compelled to seek out political patronage.
Governor Rossel actively pursued economic policies to protect certain local 
industries from market competition. For example, he ensured guaranteed federal 
orders from the local defense industry (Startsev 1999). He sought to bring local 
enterprises together in a unified, planned and closed production cycle through 'cartel 
agreements' between enterprises guaranteed by the regional budget. In such a way, 
enterprises in which the state was a major shareholder became a part of this regional 
network and enterprises with outsider shareholders were excluded (Startsev 1999). 
These examples show how the regional administration's protectionist policies 
promoted non-market economic behaviour among firm directors whose closed 
networks created barriers to competition from outsiders. According to Philip Hanson 
and Micheal Bradshaw, one of the main causes of Russia's economic problems was 
the "tacit arrangements between regional politicians and the bosses of large 
enterprises to preserve the inherited population of firms" (2000, 254).
As Sverdlovsk region accrued greater autonomy from the centre, relations between 
local elites grew more conflictual. Organised crime groups increasingly participated 
in these conflicts of interest (Nelson and Kuzes 2002). Reliance on private 
protection and organised crime groups for contract enforcement meant that violence 
further penetrated economic life. Despite the economic potential of the region, the 
high risk of investment due to "difficult social-political and criminal conditions"
(Ekspert no.22(233), June 2000, 12) deterred investors. As a result, business people
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had fewer opportunities to find new extra-regional markets and expand the scope of 
their activity.
2.3 Impact on People's Livelihoods
Despite the wealth and high production levels in the region, the standard of living
was, according to indicators such as car and telephone ownership and percentage of
the population with incomes below the subsistence minimum, noted in figure 10,
only average or below average.
Figure 12: Disposable income as % of previous year in Russia and Sverdlovsk
oblast38
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Russia 112 84 100 106 84 86
Sverdlovsk 95 84 108 99 82 74
With the exception of 1996, when disposable incomes did improve on the previous 
year, incomes in Sverdlovsk deteriorated to a greater extent than in the country as a 
whole (figure 12). In 1999, income and expenditure levels had not recovered to their 
value in 1995 (Goskomstat 2000d, 9) and disposable incomes were reduced by 15% 
on 1998 (Goskomstat 1999b, 89). There was an improvement in 2000, with 
disposable incomes increasing by 17% on 1999 (Goskomstat 2000c). As figure 13 
shows, incomes varied considerably according to economic sphere of activity 
(Goskomstat 2000c, 94).
38 Goskomstat 2000b (143-6).
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Figure 13: Average w age according to econom ic sphere o f activity  
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Particularly relevant to this study are the above-average incomes of those employed 
in the new accountancy and banking services. Employees in industry also did 
relatively well overall, although as chapter 4 shows, unskilled employees in the 
defense industry received wages that were well below the region's average. People 
employed in the social sphere, which was in the main funded directly out of the state 
budget, had some of the lowest incomes in the region. Taking on additional work 
was one strategy to compensate for low wages. However, as chapter 4 shows, 
opportunities for additional work varied according to sector of employment, skills, 
status and qualifications.
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Household expenditure increased in 1999 even though incomes fell. The rising costs 
of expenditures on the previous year was even greater for 2000, superseding the rise 
of incomes (Goskomstat 2000c, 89-90). The prices of subsidised services such as 
transport, basic foods, housing and utilities rose dramatically. An official 
household budget survey conducted prior to this in the oblast provides some insights 
into the impact of rising costs on households (Goskomstat 2000e).40 Household 
spending decreased in 1998 with the exception of expenditure on food (especially 
staples),41 which continued to increase,42 although it was lower than the officially 
stated minimum allocated to food. This data suggests that resource-poor households 
responded to rising prices and the falling value of their incomes through belt- 
tightening measures, which are the subject of chapter 4. While spending a greater 
proportion of income on staple foods and cutting back on certain foods, such as meat 
and fruits, and restricting calorie intake did make small incomes go further, it was 
likely to have a detrimental longer-term effect on people's health.
39 In July 2000, metro and commercial bus prices rose by 50%, tram by 47%, trolley bus by 43% and 
electricity 47% on the previous month (Goskomstat 2000c, 56).
40 The usefulness o f this survey is limited by the small size o f the sample, which was not broken down 
according to urban rural. There is no discussion of methodology and no comparison with other 
oblasts.
41 Between 1997-9, the proportion of staples in the diet (bread, potatoes, sugar) increased for the rich 
and poor. There was a fall in the consumption o f more expensive items among the poorest especially 
meat, fruit and berries with the exception of eggs, the consumption o f which increased. The rich were 
consuming more calories year on year while the poor, fewer.
42 This trend was most evident among the rich although also among the poorest.
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Figure 14: Oblast level Average Incomes as a % of Subsistence Minimum43 for
Different Categories of People between 1998-2000
199844 199945 200046
Industrial worker 2.38 2.06 2.51
Worker in education 1.33 0.93 1.21
Worker in art and culture 1.18 0.84 1.06
Pensioner 84.947 0.8548 1.0149
Figure 14 shows that in 1999, employees in education and art and culture had 
incomes that were below the subsistence minimum, as did pensioners the previous 
year also. Across the groups, incomes as a percentage of the subsistence minimum 
improved in 2000.
The impact of change was also evident in demographic indicators. The fall in the 
region's population was greater than the national average, this discrepancy being 
largest between 1993-5 (Goskomstat 1999a, 40).50 Men and women's life 
expectancy in the oblast was below national average (Goskomstat 1999a, 74). The 
birth rate continued to fall, with the exception of a one-off improvement in 1998 
(Goskomstat 2000b, 76, Goskomstat 2000c, 112, Goskomstat 1999a, 38). Among 
the causes of death, the rise in alcohol-related deaths (Goskomstat 2000c, 86),51
43 Goskomstat 2000d is used for the 1998 subsistence minimum. Goskomstat (1999b, 94) is used for 
subsistence minimum in 1999. Goskomstat (2000c, 99) is used for the subsistence minimum in 2000. 
The August figure is used for the worker's subsistence minimum in 2000.
44 Goskomstat 2000d 42.
45 Goskomstat 1999b, 94: between January and November
46 Goskomstat 2000c, 93: between January and June
47 Goskomstat 2000d, 44: yearly average.
48 Goskomstat 2000b, 148: yearly average.
49 Goskomstat 2000c, 96
50 This statistic is all the more significant because it deviates from the fall in population of Urals 
region as a whole, which since 1992, had not been as great as in the average country-wide population
(Goskomstat 2000b, 78). Despite the urban character of the oblast, there was a 0.6% above average
chance o f dying in Sverdlovsk despite the fact that the proportion of pensioners was exactly the same 
as the Russian average (207 per 1000) (Goskomstat 1999a, 71).
51 These rose by 18% on the previous year in 2000.
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especially among working age women and men (Goskomstat 1999a, 71),52 is 
particularly noticeable. Suicide and killings as causes of death also increased 
(Goskomstat 2000d, 21; Goskomstat 2000c, 86). There was a rise in deaths of 
children under one year old connected to the health of the mother (Goskomstat 
2000c, 87).
To summarise this section, at the onset of economic reforms, local political and 
economic elites came together to fight for their regional interests, a struggle that was 
epitomised by the momentary existence of a Urals Republic. The alliance between 
the regional administration and enterprise, evident in the numerous agreements and 
treaties, ensured that the regional administration continued to supervise the economy. 
The channeling of intra-elite conflict for control over the region's rich resources into 
a relatively strong party system meant that the historically close relations between 
economic and political elites remained strong. In order for their businesses to remain 
viable, entrepreneurs were compelled to enter patronage networks with state officials 
and large enterprise directors who continued to command access to resources in the 
region.
Given the region's wealth, high levels of industrial production and relatively 
dynamic and diverse economy, the population's standard of living was surprisingly 
low. Economic and demographic indicators point to a population that suffered from
52 Compares 1989 with 1998.
53 1993-4 was the worst period. However, by 1998, infant mortality was at its lowest ever rate 
(Goskomstat 1999a, 41), although it increased in 1999 (Goskomstat 2000c, 87). This rise in mortality 
rate in 1999 when in general, infant mortality figures improved over the decade despite prolonged 
Crisis, could be linked to the sudden disappearance of Western medicines following the August 1998 
crisis (personal communication, Howard White).
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economic decline. Specifically, wages were low and sometimes late while the cost 
of goods rose sharply.
3. Institutional change in Ekaterinburg
As chapter 1 mentioned, Ekaterinburg's wealth and importance derived from the 
region's abundant mineral resources and from the metallurgical and defense factories 
located in the city. It was situated on the Trans-Siberian Railway, and previous to 
that, on the Sibirskii trakt, the road from European Russia to Siberia. In the early 
1990s, it possessed the extra advantage of having the only Urals airport to offer 
international flights.
3.1 Economic Change and People's Livelihoods
Figure 15 shows that Ekaterinburg had the highest number of enterprises of Russia's 
large cities, Moscow and St. Petersburg aside, with healthy industrial, food and trade 
sectors. The majority of the city's working population was employed in industry, 
specifically, in machine-building (figure 16). In Soviet times, a wide range of 
cultural, educational and scientific research institutions were created alongside 
industry. An infrastructure of theatres, museums, cinemas and scientific research 
institutions emerged to support the professional classes that went into industry. 
Research institutes focused around industry and cultural institutions have declined 
and some were converted into commercial institutions (Rizhenkov and 
Lukhterkhandt 2001). As a result, during the first half of the 1990s, people
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employed in these industries and their supporting infrastructure, such as engineers,
researchers and cultural sector employees, experienced a drop in status and many 
had to look for alternative employment.
Figure 15: N u m b er  and D istribution o f  E nterprises  in Cities in Russi 
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Industrial production fell between 1989-98 (Goskomstat 1999d, 46). This decline 
moderated in 1996 and production output recovered slightly in 1997, fell in 1998 and 
rose in 1999 and 2000 (Goskomstat 1999b, 122; Goskomstat 2000c, 112). The 
sharpest declines in production were in metallurgical and machine-building 
industries (Goskomstat 1999d, 48, 51). The defense industry, which dominated the 
city, was epitomised by the large, closed Kalinin defense factory in the city centre.
At the onset of reform, defense-related firms were state-owned, large and 
monopolistic. The defense industry workforce "shifted from being privileged to 
deprived" (Davis forthcoming, 34), suffering a decline in wages and in-kind benefits 
and wage delays.54 People worked in the defense industry for non-monetary reasons. 
As chapter 4 elaborates, the social services provided through the enterprise, such as 
childcare, and engagement in work on the side using the factory's resources, were 
among the reasons people held on to their jobs there.
The recent history of the Uralmash plant illustrates the many different processes at 
work at the local level, which shaped reactions to economic reform. Known as 'the 
factory of Russian factories', producing bulldozers, machinery for steel mills and 
iron foundries, and also an important manufacturer of military equipment, it had 
50,000 workers - less than half the number in the early 1990s - and was one of the 
largest assembly plants in Russia. By the end of the 1980s, the factory's situation 
worsened especially with the hardening of budget constraints in 1992-93. At this 
time, the two founders of the Uralmash organised crime group (as distinct from the 
factory, but which adopted the same name) offered a loan to the plant in return for
54 A positive outcome of the decline in industry was the great improvement environmentally 
Goskomstat 1999d, 33).
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use of Uralmash facilities. The plant would keep nominal ownership, but the 
brothers would get a cut in its profits. Acquiring parts of a legitimate plant elevated 
their criminal status (Handelman 1994). The plant faced ruin as military orders 
dwindled. Despite its managers' reluctance, the factory was partially privatised. 
Factory shares were sold for a very low sum of money (Nelson and Kuzes 1995) and 
the plant temporarily shut down because of failing earnings. It stopped paying 
salaries and sent workers on unpaid holiday although officially they still worked.
The plant's managers set up small firms on the plant's grounds, many of which were 
controlled by the Uralmash criminal group. They employed the plant's workers and 
made large profits from selling off its assets, only a tiny proportion of which were 
reaped back into the plant. However, with a change of director, the factory 
successfully rid itself of its tarnished image and, in 2000, production levels 
recovered and skilled employees saw their wages rise. Respondents directing small 
firms elsewhere in the city began to notice that they were struggling to keep their 
specialist workers, who were moving back to Uralmash owing to higher salaries. 
Later that year, the plant's director was murdered. This event was portrayed in the 
media as a tragedy for the city.55 The interplay of forces such as the reduction of 
state subsidies, penetration by organised crime, opportunities for the unregulated sale 
of the factory's assets, a workforce that remained despite low or no pay, changes in 
the directorship and fluctuations in the economy, meant that the factory's fate 
remained unclear.
55 For more information on his death, see Moskovskii komsomolets-Ural (13-20 July 2000).
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Compared with the region as a whole, a relatively large proportion of the population 
in Ekaterinburg worked in small business.56 However, the size of the SME sector 
fluctuated during the 1990s, indicating its instability.57 According to a recent study 
conducted in one district in the city, out of the city's 6000 registered private firms, 
approximately only 40% were engaged in business activity, and only 200-300 
submitted accounts to the authorities (World Bank 1999). This suggests that caution 
is needed when discussing the size of the new private sector. In particular, small 
firms that were non-operational might be registered for reasons connected to tax 
evasion and money laundering (Amot 2000). Another 7000 were registered as 
individual small businesses. They were mainly related to trade and about 40% were 
engaged in household services such as apartment renovation, construction and other 
services (World Bank 1999). Incomes in small business were considerably smaller 
than in larger enterprises.58 For these reasons, certain kinds of worker, discussed in 
chapter 4, did not perceive the new private sector to be an attractive arena for 
primary employment. The frequent collapse of small firms and change in 
management made employment unstable. The unregulated nature of many firms in 
the sector meant that employees were unprotected from workplace abuses and 
worried about its criminal atmosphere.
56 In 1998,17% of Ekaterinburg's population worked in small enterprises (Goskomstat 1999d, 20-1).
57 The number of people employed in small business in Ekaterinburg fell in 1991, 94-5 and 1998 
(Goskomstat 1999d, 21). By the end of 1999 the sector had recuperated to a position slightly in 
excess of its pre-1998 financial crisis level (Goskomstat 1999f).
58 The average salary in 1998 is R852 compared with R1241 in larger enterprises.
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3.2 District-Level Differences within the City
There were considerable differences between districts within Ekaterinburg. Figure 
17 ranks the seven districts in the city according to five indicators, the smallest 
number indicating the highest ranking. Chkalov and Ordzhonikidze Districts had the 
highest production levels, yet average wages there were among the lowest in the city, 
barely above the subsistence minimum. The three largest industrial enterprises in 
the city were located in these two districts. El'mash and Uralmash factories were 
found in the Ordzhonikidze District and Khimash factory was in Chkalov District. 
These machine-building factories were very large and had parts of districts named 
after them. The low average wages in Chkalov District could be explained by the 
fact that the Khimash factory was the only large enterprise in the District and wages 
paid there were low. It was the most distant District from the city centre, taking 
between one and two hours to get there by bus. As a result, the District's residents 
were at a disadvantage because well-paid work opportunities within the District were 
few and far between and transport to other districts was expensive, unreliable and 
travel took up considerable time. By contrast, in Oktyabr' District wages were high 
because of the profitable meat-processing enterprise located there, and the District's 
proximity to the city centre. The lack of new state housing in the city meant that 
movement to more prosperous districts was only an option for those who could 
afford to purchase the privately constructed luxury flats or pay rent.
During the 1990s, the situation in several districts changed. For example, average 
wages in Zheleznodorozhnyi District were among the lowest in 1990, whereas, in 
1998, they were second highest. This improvement might in part be attributable to
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new opportunities to trade in the large clothing market located there. The population 
in all districts of Ekaterinburg grew between 1998 and 1999, but growth was 
smallest in Ordzhonikidze District. This could be partly due to low incomes in the 
district and its notoriety as the crime centre of the city. The overall ranking of the 
districts shows that it was advantageous to live in the city centre, Lenin District.





































Lenin 10 0.294 1355 0.1420 0.4815 22.4196
Zhelezno-
dorozhnyi
12 0.283 1328 0.10018 0.1638 7.2503
Oktyabr’ 17 0.297 1480 0.3808 0.1314 1.7462
Kirov 21 0.199 1208 0.1840 0.2216 2.5925
Chkalov 24 0.296 1139 0.1622 0.1107 0.7339
Verkh-Isetskii 26 0.035 1202 0.10078 0.0738 1.2231
Ordzhonikidze 30 0.260 1043 0.7165 0.0426 1.7867
These findings suggest that people had not become more mobile but continued to 
live and work in the same district much as they did in Soviet times. Where people 
lived in the city had a direct bearing on their ability to make a living.
3.3 The Impact of Politics on Businesspeople's Livelihoods
Political management of the economy in the city was evident in the arbitrary use of 
tax as an administrative tool to which some were subjected and others relieved, 
licensing, quotas and the preferential allocation of contracts and tenders. In a survey







carried out in 1999 on SME, in Ekaterinburg and 15 other towns in Sverdlovsk 
oblast, bureaucratic regulations were ranked as the second biggest problem for 
entrepreneurs (Amot 1999, 19).65 In chapter 5, respondents confirmed this finding 
that local state controls and corrupt practices were a key impediment to their 
business.
The persistence of patronage relations among the city's elites is illustrated by the 
example of private media firms. Media was a crowded, competitive market in the 
city and firms often66 depended on state officials and politicians for financial 
resources and stability. For example, 'Studio 41' television station had close ties with 
city Mayor, Arkadii Chemetskii, who provided two floors in a building for the 
station staff and held 15% of the station's stock. Chemetskii could intervene directly 
in the business as he did the day after the financial crisis of 17th August 1998, when 
he asked the station not to give credence to rumours that many regional banks were 
on the verge of bankruptcy (Russian Regional Report 5(24), June 2000). The station 
also had links with organised crime, as it was dependent on firms controlled by 
crime groups purchasing advertising on the station. For these reasons, local 
journalists do not believe the station to be independent.
3.4 The Impact of Changes in the Workplace on Households
At the regional and municipal levels, the state was responsible for providing a range 
of services, such as culture and welfare, previously provided through the workplace.
65 Finance was the highest ranked problem, cited by 77% of respondents.
66 For example, Anatoli, the director of 'Radio Ct and a handful o f other successful radio stations in 
the region, has made a concerted effort to stay clear from patronage relations with either the mayor or 
the governor. This is possible if the firm is not financially dependent (109).
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Some privatised enterprises cut back on their social function. Oleg Victorovich,
financial director of a joint stock spirit factory, noted,
In the pre-perestroika period, more social support was provided. We gave 
holiday passes to the factory sanatorium. The factory had its own pioneer's 
camp. Half the town was in the factory's residential fund. After privatisation 
and auctioning of shares, the whole social sphere stopped and today what a 
person earns is what he has. We don't provide material support. (79)
Other enterprises continued to provide services at a cost to employees (Goskomstat 
1999d, 93-5). The ideology, that the enterprise provides, continued (Ashwin 1999, 
Humphrey 1998) and in practice, the enterprise often remained the focus of 
provision including, health care, retirement assistance, childcare, transport, food and 
transport subsidies and credit.
Some enterprises funded from the state budget employed entrepreneurial initiatives 
to finance services that the state could not provide. For example, prior to
fkHperestroika, the Sverdlovsk House of Concert Organisations in El'mash, then the 
Palace of Culture, belonged to the closed Kalinin defense factory. In the early 
1990s, these cultural organisations became the responsibility of the Sverdlovsk 
oblast Ministry of Culture. The institution was now made up of 154 creative 
employees and 220 service personnel. Most resources were received in bartered 
goods and services. The organisation was given one million roubles per quarter by 
the state that it received, not as cash, but in the form of repair workers on the account 
of another enterprise, which owed taxes to the state, or as construction materials, 
obtained by barter. In addition to the core staffs' small budget salaries,68 the director 
tried to provide additional work paid in cash. He paid the organisation's non-budget
67 Interview with Victor Vasil'evich, the new director of the House of Concert Organisations.
68 Two unskilled employees, who had moved to the organisation from Uralmash factory, had incomes 
in July 2000 of R762.
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workers from the money he made renting rooms in the building on a permanent basis 
to private businesses, such as hairdressers, which provided him with a constant 
income with which to pay his employees' bonuses and material help. The 
organisation was also in the process of constructing a banya (sauna) complex and 
dining facilities that would be hired out for private functions. Income from these 
sources also had to pay for the organisation's necessities because the state budget 
only paid the budget sector employees' salaries. He negotiated with the manager of 
the cafe on the premises, which owes the organisation rent, that the cafe fed the 
organisation's employees for three months free of charge to pay off its debt. He 
loaned employees money when they needed it, and depending on the employee's 
material situation, would give money for medicine. Every year, employees received 
a 'thirteenth salary1, a bonus at the end of the year, paid out of the money earned 
through private enterprise. A further benefit in the employee's contract was a rise in 
basic wages scale depending on the salaries' fund. Prior to holiday leave and on 
condition that s/he had not received reprimands, the worker received 100% of his 
monthly wage plus a further 100% second monthly salary and holiday pay of three 
paid non-working days (29)
Thus, the organisation displayed a mix of old and new practices - taking on new 
entrepreneurial opportunities to compensate for the lack of cash in the state in order 
to continue the Soviet practice of social provisioning to employees. Workers moved 
into the organisation, often from factories in the locality, despite wages that are 
below the subsistence minimum, because of its strong collective and director who 
looked after them. These Soviet values continued to be important to workers who 
perceived society becoming increasingly individualistic.
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3.5 The Role of State Provisioning of Services in People's Livelihoods
In Soviet times, children belonged both to the family and the state and the state
sought to make childhood a category through which it could exercise its ideological
influence (Rockhill 2002). The state monitored family relations and took part
responsibility for children's upbringing through a network of organisations including
the kindergarten, pioneer organisations and Women's Councils (81). The director of
the orphanage (priut) in Talitsa explained,
In Soviet times children were constantly engaged in social affairs. We had 
Komsomol,69 Pioneers. We had a big choice because there were many free 
of charge groups where you could learn to sew, knit, and dance. We had free 
of charge musical schools. Now it all costs money. (81)
7 nIn the 1990s, there was a decline in childcare provision and take-up and a 
withdrawal of other state-run activities for children.71
Although Ekaterinburg had a leading record with regard to education provision 
(Goskomstat 1999d, 111), demand for education was outstripping the modest growth 
in places in the city, as people looked to education as a passport to job security and
77upward mobility. Education costs were a heavy burden on families owing to new
69 Communist Union of Youth.
70 The number of pre-school institutions in Ekaterinburg fell from 629 in 1990 to 341 in 1998. In 
1990, there were 108 children per 100 places and in 1998, 64 children per 100 places (Goskomstat 
1999d, 34). This dramatic decline in the take-up of childcare provision is largely attributable to the 
rising cost of sending children to kindergarten.
71 In line with national level trends, there has been a fall in number of libraries, clubs and houses of 
culture, cinemas and visits to museums and the theatre (Goskomstat 1999d).
72 Student numbers peaked in 1997 and since then dropped off (Goskomstat 2000d, 60, Goskomstat 
2000b, 188). Secondary specialist institutions (technical colleges) are surviving although there are 
fewer graduates (Goskomstat 2000c, 35). Mirroring national trends (Goskomstat 2000b, 181), there 
has been a growth in higher education (Goskomstat 2000d, 62), a demand that has been met by the 
creation o f eighteen private educational institutions. The material condition of schools is 
deteriorating, and the numbers of academic staff in the oblast's education institutions has declined 
(Goskomstat 1999b, 116).
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payments required of parents for the upkeep of the school. Private schools offering 
courses in economics, business, accountancy and law have expanded rapidly. In line 
with the Russia-wide development of private education, there were thirteen private 
schools in the city (Goskomstat 1999d, 35). Under-investment in education was 
having a detrimental impact on the profession. Many students in the Pedagogical 
University were deciding against pursuing a career in teaching because of its low 
pay.73 Teachers were moving to private academic institutions where the salaries 
were higher74 or engaging in additional private teaching.
Money spent by households on utilities was six times more in 1998 than in 1993, 
more than doubled on education and more than tripled on health. People have 
forgone purchasing other services, such as culture, tourism and household goods and 
repairs (Goskomstat 1999d, 88). The rising cost of these services had consequences 
for households' budgets and, ideologically, signaled the demise of some of the main 
aspects of the Soviet system of subsidies.
Pensions constituted a large share of the state's social budget75 and, as table 7 
showed, their values were raised to above the subsistence minimum in 2000. 
Households with members eligible for retirement pensions benefited from this cash 
income. This benefit was paid more predictably than other benefits, discussed 
below, and wages. The importance of pension payments to households and the tiny
73 A group discussion with students in the Foreign Languages Faculty revealed that less than a third 
wanted to go into teaching. The majority intended to look for jobs as translators and interpreters, and 
some also expressed the wish to use their languages to find work outside Russia.
74 Interview with Galina Nickolaevna Babich, director of the Department for Foreign Languages at 
the Urals Pedagogical University.
75 In June 2000, the average pension was R708 (Goskomstat 2000c, 96). As a percentage o f the 
subsistence minimum, pensions were higher than the subsistence minimum in 1998, then dropped 
below the subsistence minimum in 1999, then recovered by June 2000 (Goskomstat 2000c, 96).
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provision of residential homes for older people (Goskomstat 1999d, 40) meant that 
inter-generational support was important in many families.
3.6 The Role of State Social Assistance in People's Livelihoods
State social benefits were status rather than poverty based.76 This was due to the 
historical role of the benefits system as a way to reward those who had suffered for 
the Soviet state as well as the difficulties of implementing means testing. There 
were at least 29 categories of people entitled to benefits including veterans, the 
disabled, victims of Chernobyl, veterans of labour, industrial workers during 
wartime and families with many children, covering 30% of the oblast population. In 
addition, the oblast and city administrations were responsible for providing 
assistance to poor families in the form of social subsidies and grants and aid in-kind, 
including food, clothes, shoes and medicines77 although in practice, they were 
frequently unable to do so. Child assistance had not been paid in the city since 1997. 
The oblast Ministry of Social Protection failed to meet its commitment to achieving 
cash payments of child assistance in the city by April 2000. The prices of goods 
offered in lieu of cash payment could be three times higher than in the market and 
ordinary shops because goods are obtained by barter as tax payments. The city
"70 , ,
authorities also failed to pay financial assistance to eligible households, consistmg
76 Recently, the Sverdlovsk administration has instituted a poverty-oriented strategy entitled 
'Protection of Sverdlovsk Oblast Population for the period up to 2015', which has as one of its aims 
moving to a needs-tested targeted system of benefits to vulnerable groups (personal communication, 
DFID).
77 'On the Cost of Living in Sverdlovsk Oblast', No. 15-OZ (04.195) amended on 31.12.99 (revision 
No. 49-OZ).
78 They receive free travel on town public transport, and some receive free tickets to the circus and 
theatre on public holidays. All children up to one year old receive R100 per month. Poverty-stricken 
families are supposed to receive a payment of R200 per year and 10-20% reduction in the price of 
holiday camps.
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mostly of single mothers, parents with invalid children and families with many
children (64). Natalya, the head of the Department on Family and Child Problems in
the Socio-political Committee of Kirov District, stated,
This assistance has been delayed by several years and is paid in food and 
items. Due to the fact that things cost considerably more than they would 
cost in other shops, it is not advantageous to take them, but people still do 
because they know they won't get the money. (76)
3.7 New Social Problems
There had been a rise in new social problems. Jakov Sylin, Chairman of
Ekaterinburg City Duma noted,
In the 1990s lots of social problems appeared and the government wasn't 
ready to manage them. (116)
For example, the increase in homelessness pointed to the vulnerability of certain
middle-aged men who are excluded from support networks and family and
marginalised from the labour market. For single men, homelessness often resulted
from a string of interrelated events such as imprisonment, heavy drinking, loss of
work, marriage breakdown and the deterioration of friendship ties. In the past, there
was a wide network of hostels where homeless people could find work. The night
shelter (noch'lezhka) in the city was the sole shelter of its kind in the oblast, created
in 1997, in response to rising numbers of homeless men. Its director stated,
It's quite likely that if the transition to a new economy and politics had been 
softer there would have been less homeless and beggars. (44)
Statistics compiled from the users of the shelter indicate that the majority of
homeless people were men between the ages of 40 and 50 years, who were either
single or whose relations with their wives and children had broken down. The
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reasons for losing their homes included family break-up, imprisonment and 
swindling by organised crime and property agencies (44).
Abandonment of children has increased in the 1990s79 - a symptom of dislocation, as 
it was in the 1920s (Ransel 1978). Employees in district-level Guardianship 
Departments saw the rise in the number of births to younger women as part of the 
explanation for increasing child abandonment (74). Official statistics confirm that 
the proportion of births to younger mothers in the oblast had grown (Goskomstat 
1999a, 64), as has the number of births outside marriage.80 The increase in 
abandoned children was also linked to the rise in alcohol and drug mis-use and poor 
access to reproductive health services (66).
The dearth of organisations representing broad-ranging concerns was mentioned
earlier. There were 3000 public organisations in the oblast registered at the Ministry
of Justice, 2500 of which were located in Ekaterinburg.81 Maiya Mikhailovna
Innokent'eva, head of the City Administration Department for Work with Religious
and Public Organisations, stated,
Traditionally... the whole burden of solving social problems has fallen on the 
state. Now there are so many social problems that the state cannot cope with 
them. NKOs at the moment are not helping to solve these problems, and are 
playing a fragmentary and decorative role. (108)
Despite welcoming the emergence of independent social organisations, 
administration officials criticised their dependence on state funding and their leaders’
79 In Chkalov District, the number of children in the District's care had between 1997 and 1999 more 
than doubled. In Kirov District numbers of children in state care had also increased (74).
80 The number of births outside marriage is higher in the oblast than nationally (Goskomstat 2000b, 
98). In Sverdlovsk, they make up 33.37% of all births (Goskomstat 1999a, 64).
81 Vera Aleksanprovna Sokolkina, President Urals Associations of Women, Regional Duma, 
Legislative o f Sverdlovsk Oblast, Committee for Economics and Politics, budget, finance and taxes.
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ambitions. For their part, the leaders of public organisations held that co-operation 
with the local administration was ineffective. They argued that there needed to be a 
"demonopolisation" of socially beneficial activity so that they could take on some of 
the functions (Dissanayake, Geller, Zyrina 1999).
This section has shown that the state and former state enterprises continued to be 
important employers in the city. People's livelihoods continued to be dependent on 
enterprises located in the district of the city in which they lived. The SME sector 
appeared to be relatively healthy, but faced considerable constraints due to the lack 
of liquidity, economic instability and local state regulation. Households continued to 
rely on the enterprise for social provisioning, especially since the state's capacity has 
reduced. They have taken on a greater burden for health, education, utility and 
childcare services. The state was unable to pay benefits, except for pensions. The 
withdrawal of the state as a safety net contributed to a rise in social problems such as 
homelessness and child abandonment.
4. The Implications of Rapid Social Change for Respondents
4.1 Respondents' Livelihoods
Workers bore the brunt of economic decline and the lack of liquidity. This was 
manifest in job insecurity, wage arrears, in-kind wage payments, low wages that
82 NKOs are criticised as being a tax evasion front for work that an organisation really does. They 
appear before elections, having been created for the support of a political candidate in return for a 
business favour.
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were barely enough to live on and a dearth of opportunities to improve their
situation. At the privatised spirits factory in Talitsa, salaries were delayed in 1998
for four months. Until 1999, employees were paid 50% of their salaries. Although
the factory management stressed that employees had the choice to take their salary
in-kind or wait to be paid later (79), in practice, employees such as Gregori, said,
We were forced to buy items from the factory shop [in lieu of their salary] 
because our families had to eat... buying food in the factory shop was not 
advantageous because everything is more expensive than in a [normal] shop. 
(80)
People suffered from delays and in-kind payments of social benefits. Anna, a single 
mother, noted,
Since 1997,1 haven't received any assistance as a single mother. They don't 
pay me this assistance because the state doesn't have money. The state owes 
me R3500. Now assistance is R130. Sometimes they offer us items instead 
of financial assistance. In winter, they offered me boiled sausages and of 
course I refused. Some people take them but it's those who live really badly. 
(92)
Some of the other bizarre in-kind goods provided in lieu of benefits included men's 
underpants, washing-up liquid and out-of-date porridge oats.
Respondents needed money to access a greater range of services. Although in 
theory, people were entitled to free and comprehensive medical services, in practice, 
informal payments and connections determined access to them.83 Medical staff, paid 
low salaries, expected an informal payment for good treatment and the provision of 
medicine. Very little medical treatment was free of charge and resources were 
depleted to such an extent that a patient had to purchase some of the items needed by
83 For two years, it has not been possible to obtain contraceptives free of charge in the oblast (84). 
Informal payments allowed queue jumping for medical treatment (67).
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the doctor for the examination. The costs of medicines and medical services were 
rising, the medicines that were subsidised are shrinking and there had been an influx 
of unaffordable imported medicines. There was a belief in the importance of 
education as a means of advancement in today's economy, but it had become an 
increasingly large expense for households with children and young people.
Since formal employment and state social provision no longer guaranteed 
livelihoods, people turned to informal strategies. For the small proportion of rich 
households, informal activity, involving interaction with corrupt state officials and 
organised crime groups, was an unavoidable strategy to circumvent the impediments 
to business caused by state bureaucratic control.
By contrast, for resource-poor households, additional work was a means to 
compensate for low formal incomes. A small number of people supplemented 
incomes through additional work in Soviet times, but as chapter 4 shows, the need to 
do so had become much more widespread and urgent. However, access to additional 
work depended on factors such as age, gender, education and employment status. 
Moreover, additional earnings varied considerably: some were extremely modest in 
scale and did not substitute for the loss of an adequate Soviet-era salary. 
Furthermore, while additional income-earning opportunities improved over the 
1990s for those with marketable skills, others said opportunities had shrunk.
Abstinence was a frequently mentioned household strategy to make small incomes 
go further. Respondents economised on a range of products including certain foods, 
clothing, shoes and house maintenance. They stopped sending money to poorer
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relatives, no longer traveled or entertained and stopped making long-distance phone- 
calls to friends and relatives. Women sometimes stayed at home to engage in 
childcare rather than pay to send children to kindergarten.
Chapter 4 shows that a household’s composition and structure was important to its 
success and the resources it commanded. There was a high number of extended 
households among poorer respondents. These households played an essential 
supportive role to individuals who are unable to get by on their own. These 
households were extended often because of grown-up children staying at home. 
Young people included first-time job-seekers. Moving out was unaffordable for the 
majority of young people and their work was often low-paid. Household members 
of retirement-age propped-up these households, contributing their pension and, often, 
a cash income. Single person and single-parent households were particularly 
vulnerable because, as chapter 6 elaborates, in addition to the risk of low money 
incomes, it was hard to manage without a double set of kin networks. Nuclear 
household forms by contrast, tended to be more successful at securing a living 
because of two incomes and a double set of networks.
Although as chapter 6 shows, social networks always played an important role, they 
assumed extra significance in post-Soviet conditions of insecurity. Now that people 
were unable to obtain many resources through the state, they turned to friends, 
relatives and work colleagues. People without access to networks faced the threat of 
exclusion from vital procurement opportunities, as chapter 6 shows. For those in 
business, personal connections in the state administration were essential in starting
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up and maintaining viable businesses. They minimised risk in business activity by 
cultivating new horizontal networks promoting trust.
4.2 Respondents' Attitudes and Beliefs
People's attachment to the state was contradictory. On the one hand, people still 
expected the state to act as a protector. On the other, state officials were thought to 
be the biggest crooks and betrayers.84 People had been disconnected from the state's 
paternalistic protection. "Everyone is on their own" (kazhdi sam po sebye) was a 
commonly heard exclamation and referred to the belief that state and community 
support structures had broken down and that people had to rely on their own 
resources to survive. People were disappointed about how society has lost its sense 
of sociality and has become more individualistic. Yet, the frequency with which this 
comment was made suggested that many people continued to believe that the state 
should come to their rescue.
The way democratic change had taken place discredited the reform process. A 
frequently cited illustration of people's negative view of politics was the Governor's 
residence. In 1997, Eduard Rossel spent $10 million on the residence in the city 
centre at a time when people were not getting paid their wages. People found this 
insulting not only because economic conditions had grown more difficult for most 
people, but also because politicians' control over wealth had been achieved in the 
name of so-called democracy. People had perceived relations with the state in terms
84 This resembles Sarah Ashwin's description of the factory workers' relationship to their enterprise 
directors and line managers. Workers continually disappointed by had fathers/mothers' who fail to 
live up to their parental role (1996).
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of an ‘us-them’ conflict during Soviet times.85 Democratic change confirmed the 
perception that two sets of standards existed - one for ordinary citizenry and another 
for the privileged elite. The belief that elites sold off national wealth for personal 
gain fostered great cynicism in the transformation process, heightened distrust in 
political institutions and promoted the view that nothing had really changed. The 
amorality of officials was confirmed by their two-faced character - yesterday's 
devout communist leaders had become today's democrats.
Successful entrepreneurs were equally disparaging about the state, but were at pains 
to defend themselves against the negative stereotype of 'New Russians'. Chapter 5 
shows how by creating internal hierarchies of 'good' and 'bad' entrepreneurs, 
entrepreneurs aimed to deflect attention away from their own success and the means 
by which they achieved it.
5. Conclusion
This chapter began by describing the neo-liberal structural adjustment programme 
implemented to bring about 'transition'. It described how contrary to reformers' 
expectations, the new market system did not develop spontaneously at the local level 
alongside the legislated macro reforms. Some economists now recognise what 
sociologists had long pointed out, namely that, reform priorities should have
85 Sarah Davies has shown that populist language during the 1930s and early 1940s was equally 
disparaging about the state (1997, 81-2).
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included promoting the rule of law, competition between enterprises and new 
employment opportunities and paid more attention to the role of social norms.
The second section, focusing on reactions to macro level reforms at the regional 
level, sought to demonstrate the role local economic and political elites played in 
determining the outcome of the reform process. It pointed out that in order to remain 
viable, it was essential for people who have pursued livelihoods in business to 
maintain close connections with politics. It also described how, given the region’s 
high levels of industrial production and a diverse economy, the population's standard 
of living is surprisingly low.
Moving on to the manifestation of change at the city level, state and former state 
enterprises provided employment for the majority of the working population and 
continued to channel access to social services. By contrast, the SME sector failed to 
be the engine of growth reformers anticipated largely because of structural 
constraints. The state’s relinquishing of responsibility for the family meant that 
households shouldered an increasing burden of the costs of education, health care 
and utilities.
The final section sought to show how respondents circumvented the failings of 
formal structures in ingenious ways in the city. The result was the reproduction of 
high levels of state corruption, widespread involvement in the expanding informal 
sector, the continuance of Soviet-style enterprises and increasing dependence on 
household resources, including the networks that flowed into it for daily survival.
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The following two chapters examined the range of livelihoods evident in the city. 
Chapter 4 categorises respondent households into five groups based on their 
economic status. It establishes the most important factors determining which 
households ended up in which category. In other words, the chapters assess the main 
resources and constraints, which formed the 'winners' and 'losers' of rapid social 
change and the livelihoods they adopted.
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Chapter 4: Livelihoods of Survival and Security
Market economy, no market economy, capitalism, socialism... I just want 
everyone to be good, for people to be people, so that people aren’t divided 
into rich and poor. (122)
(39 year old divorced and unemployed architect)
Two frogs fell into a pot of sour cream. One thought, fI am never going to 
get out of this' and sank. The other beat its legs until the sour cream became 
butter. I am neither of these. I am the frog who paddles very slowly and 
takes a gulp every now and then. (10)
(40 year old single female theatre employee)
1. Post-Soviet Social Differentiation
Using these frogs' differing responses to being trapped in pot of sour cream as a 
metaphor for responses to economic reforms, most people, like Olga, viewed 
themselves as managing to keep afloat in spite of plummeting living standards and 
increased insecurity. This chapter addresses households that kept afloat and risked 
drowning. The rich households, which turned the sour cream into butter, are the 
subject of chapter 5. Is it accurate however, to dichotomise households into the 
small number of successes and the rest? The first quotation above refers to the 
widening gap between rich and poor and the development of the widespread belief 
that humane, social relations have been replaced by much more brutal ones.
The organisation of this and the following chapter is based on the premise that, in 
Ekaterinburg, it is more accurate to present a picture of a big gap between the rich 
and the rest than a spectrum of economic strata. The wealthy were a small number 
with very high incomes and conspicuously ostentatious lifestyles. Those in the
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group below them would be considered 'middle class' in Britain but, in Ekaterinburg, 
were far from being the poorest, yet struggled to earn enough money to buy their 
children clothes and went without certain foods. Figure 2 (p. 43), plotting the range 
of per capita household incomes among respondents, showed the extent of inequality 
in the distribution of wealth, the absence of a middle income stratum and 
considerable income diversity among the rich. This picture of a large gap between 
the rich and the rest mirrored a trend in Russia of rapid income polarisation in the 
1990s.1 In 1998, the richest 10% of the population were earning thirteen times more 
than the lowest 10%, while in 1990, they earned 4% more (Silverman and 
Yanowitch 2000). Most of the population experienced rapid impoverishment in the 
early years of reform and, in the months following the 1998 financial crisis, there 
was a narrowing of the share of middle income-eamers (Tikhomirov 2000).
Moving now to the households that are the focus of this chapter, sociologists have 
shown that a focus on employment alone does not explain how people survive and 
ignores the role played by social networks and state support in ensuring material 
survival. In line with this, they argue that in response to economic reforms people 
have shifted the focus of their livelihoods from the enterprise to the household, in a 
process of household involution described in chapter 1. Two household survival 
strategies that are identified are 'defensive' strategies that rely on "routines of the 
Soviet period", and 'entrepreneurial' ones that involve the "desperate grasping" of 
new forms of trade, service and petty commodity production for lack of alternatives 
(Burawoy, Krotov and Lytkina 2000, 47). This chapter addresses livelihoods based
1 Soviet society did have inequality. There was an impoverished stratum comprising particularly rural 
dwellers; a large middle stratum that comprised white-collar workers such as teachers, doctors, 
engineers, cultural workers as well as blue-collar workers and the peasantry; and an upper stratum that 
included nomenklatura and enterprise directors (Shlapentokh 1999).
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on survival and security and asks how accurate the above depiction is of responses to 
the new social context.
The chapter first introduces the five economic positions in which household 
respondents were located. It then describes how employment, household 
composition and structure, belt-tightening measures, access to land and additional 
work affected households' economic position. The chapter concludes with a 
discussion of how identity was affected by the adjustments people made to the way 
they made their living.
2. Households' Economic Positions
Respondents were divided into five groups according to their economic status, but 
not just their monetary income (figure 18). Households' economic positions were 
shaped by a combination of interacting factors that include employment, income, 
gender, education, skills, household size, composition, social networks and personal 
identity. As mentioned in chapter 3, the wider institutional context also influenced 
household position. According to their fortunes, households could move upwards 
and downwards between these positions.
Figure 18: Distribution of Households According to Economic Position








Position 1: Barely getting by 
These households were characterised by considerable impoverishment and 
disconnection from the labour market and social networks. They may have had no 
income or a small and/or irregular income of less than half the subsistence minimum 
per household member. Members experienced the continual deprivation of food and 
other essential services. Some of these households were in a weak economic 
position during perestroika. The withdrawal of support from the state and/or the 
breakdown of marital/kin relations during the last decade prompted their further 
downward movement.
Position 2: Scraping by 
These households experienced impoverishment but they ploughed on. Survival was 
a constant, exhausting struggle through short-term adjustments in household 
practices and engagement in low-paid or irregular work. Income was between half 
the subsistence minimum and the subsistence minimum. Between 80-90% of 
income was spent on food. There was no money for larger purchases or emergencies 
and without savings, these households commonly lived in a state of debt, borrowing 
money from one to pay back another. Long-term planning was not possible. The 
households were likely to have a high ratio of dependants to providers. After 
experiencing a decline in incomes in the early 1990s, some households saw their 
economic position improve in 1996 only to see it deteriorate again in 1998.
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Position 3: Coping
Income was between the subsistence minimum and the regional average monthly 
income per capita (R2094). Between 50-80% of income was spent on food. Income 
was irregular and households could fall to position 2 permanently or temporarily. 
These households could not afford to save or plan long-term.
Position 4: Securing a living.
Largely by diversifying their livelihoods or successfully moving into the new private 
sector, these households achieved an adequate income level. They earned between 
the average per capita monthly income and an income three times that size. Some 
months they were able to put a small sum aside towards larger items. Households in 
this group had savings ranging between $US250-2000.
Position 5: Prospering 
These households are the subject of chapter 5 and accumulated wealth, although 
their livelihoods may have been precarious. Income was at least three times larger 
than the average monthly income. Households were organised according to conjugal 
relations and were stable but likely to exhibit unequal gender relations. Some 
households fell following the 1998 financial crisis to position 4, a proportion of 
which were able to recover. Many of these households moved up to position 5 from 




This section identifies six distinct paths based on an analysis of the continuities and 
changes in respondents' employment during the 1990s. It builds on the observation 
made in chapter 1 that sector of employment shapes households' economic positions 
and it adopts the definitions of different work sector outlined there.
The majority of the poorest households engaged in state/privatised enterprise, 
although they also engaged in individual labour activity and the new private sector 
(figure 19). Engagement in the new private sector is greater in the richest deciles - 
as employees in deciles 6 and 8 and as firm directors in 9 and 10. However, 
employment sheds little light on how households fared unless it is addressed in 
conjunction with additional income-generating opportunities and informal incomes 
available at respondents' main place of work or outside it.
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Figure 19: Employment Sector of main 
income-earner 
by household income (/i 83)
g  30% —
□ new private sector enterprise
directorship
□ individual labour activity
■ new private
□ state/privatised
docile 1 decile 2 decile 3 decHe4 decile 5 decile 6 decile 7 decile 8 decile 9 decile 10
Income category of household in ascending order (l=poorest)
As mentioned in chapter 1, Grogan measured the likelihood of different people 
ending up in different labour market sectors and found that education, gender and 
age correlate with work sector. People with a higher education were less likely to go 
into privatised enterprises and were less likely to become unemployed than those 
with secondary education (2000). Figure 20 shows that among my respondents, 
higher education in industry-related disciplines was common in the two uppermost 
income deciles. Higher educational qualifications were also found in the lowest 
income deciles although these were likely to be in unmarketable subjects in the 
humanities. Specialist education was found most commonly in the middle and low- 
income deciles.
109
Figure 20: Education level o f main incom e-eam er ^  university/institute











decile 1 decile2 decile 3 decile 4 decile5 decile6 dedle7 dedle8 decile 9 dedlelO
Income category of households in ascending order
Grogan argued that women preferred state sector employment even though the 
gender wage differentials were greater than in the non-state sector. My women 
respondents were less likely to move between jobs than men and less likely to move 
into non-state enterprises.
Figure 21: Distribution of Emolovment Paths bv Household Posil ion
l(7 !ll) 2 («16) 3 (nl8) 4 (nl9) 5 («19)
(i) immobility 2 3
(ii) stay in job + additional work 4 5
(iii) move
(a) within privatised/state/budget 6 6 2 1
(b) into admin., public service 0 1 2 4
(iv) self-employment 4 2 1
(v) new private 4 6 7 18
(vi) piecemeal work 3 2
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Figure 21 shows the economic consequences of the different employment paths that 
my respondents took. It is striking that the majority of households that fared better 
were located in the new private sector, while the majority of those that fared worse 
moved within privatised and state sectors. Only 6% of respondents were in the same 
job they were in a decade ago. These paths (i) to (vi) are now discussed in turn.
Path (i) Immobility 
This path was characterised by respondents remaining in the same state/privatised 
sector job that they were in prior market reform. That only five respondents pursued 
this path mirrors Grogan's conclusion that worker flows in and out of employment 
are high. These households were in the lowest two economic positions, with 
incomes below the subsistence minimum. Employment was in state or privatised 
machine-building factories and education and cultural institutions. Chapter 3 noted 
that, although wages in industry were rising, there were large differences between 
branches in industry, with those in ferrous metallurgy faring considerably better than 
those employed in machine-building. Respondents in budget sector cultural 
institutions experienced a noticeable fall in wages in comparison with the average 
wage.2
These respondents were immobile because they lacked the resources allowing them 
to move to better-paid jobs. Their education was low.3 The option of moving into 
the new private sector was unattractive because they could not offer professional 
services and, as a result, employment there would lack the stability of the 
budget/state sector and have lower status attached to it. The trade-off between
2 See figure 14, p. 71.
3 The two teachers have a higher education, while the remainder has a school or specialist education.
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material need, met by taking on unskilled work, and social status maintained by 
continuing in state sector job, is a dilemma discussed later in this chapter. For 
respondents without attractive alternatives, social provisioning by state and 
privatised enterprises and the friendships at the enterprise compensated for low 
incomes and provided positive reasons not to move.
Four of the five respondents had additional earnings4 although they were 
considerably lower than their main incomes. Additional work was attributed little 
economic importance because of lack of time and preference for going without, 
rather than working hard in a menial job for a small amount of money.
Olga has been working for twenty years in the theatre, a short walk from the flat she 
had lived in all her life. Her income was below the subsistence minimum and 
smaller than the average retirement pension. Even so, she decided that the best 
alternative open to her is to stay in the same job. Her low income was stable and she 
had the security of knowledge that she would be paid at the end of the month. She 
believed that her work was "khalyava5 - good money, little time and little work"
(10). She could eat a decent meal with meat for RIO in the theatre canteen, which 
was cheaper than in the shops, and she received R500 as holiday pay and two months 
additional pay at the end of the year. Her friends and work colleagues at the theatre 
provided essential support such as cheap haircuts, gifts of food, information and 
emotional support. She did not want to move to the private sector because she was 
approaching forty years and, with only a school education, thought it was too risky.
4 These are tutorials and teaching overtime, editing work for a friend's journal, selling milk, overtime 
theatre lighting work.
5 This word is slang and means getting something for nothing, or at someone else's expense.
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She said she was frightened of change and wanted a long, calm life. Her strategy of 
holding on to as many of the resources from Soviet life as she could was rational 
given her situation.
Path (ii) Remaining in the same state enterprise job in combination with well- 
paid additional work
Respondents in this group were found in positions 3 and 4 and comprised budgetary 
sector professionals, who continued to work in the jobs they were engaged in prior to 
1990 in spheres that paid very little such as health care, education and the creative 
arts. Their opportunities for well-paid additional work increased in the second half 
of the 1990s. As skilled professionals, their main work provided good opportunities 
to diversify into informal, well-paid additional work based on their skills, education, 
qualifications and reputation. These respondents' ability to cope or secure a living 
was a result of a modernising local economy discussed in chapter 3, particularly in 
the second half of the 1990s, when demand for a range of services among prospering 
groups in the city grew.
Six of the nine respondents in this group had a higher education,6 a higher proportion 
than was typical in positions 3 and 4, and than in lower positions. This fits with 
Grogan's observation that having a higher education was an advantage in the state 
sector (Grogan 2000, 57). Eight of the nine respondents' main and secondary work 
was in accordance with their qualifications and skills. Their work skills were offered 
as services that people were willing to pay for privately. The fact that the additional 
work was skilled meant that it did not have the negative connotations that running
6 The exceptions are a cobbler who finished school and two actors with a specialist education.
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from one unrewarding, unskilled job to another tended to have. Additional work was
a welcome new opportunity in due recognition of their valuable talents that went
unrecognised by the state. For example, Karina, a psychotherapist believed that her
services should be provided at a cost:
In 1996,1 started to provide private fee-paying therapy alongside my work in 
the polyclinic. The head doctor [at the state polyclinic] believes that the 
psychotherapist is an ordinary doctor who works free of charge. But among 
professionals, it is thought that psychotherapy should be paid for because of 
the qualifications required for the work. (67)
Some forms of additional work that people engage in existed in Soviet times, 
although as chapter 3 pointed out, they have acquired a new imperative. For 
example, teachers taught overtime and gave extra tuition in Soviet times, although 
opportunities for this supplementary work in private schools and on long-distance 
learning courses were greater than before. Other additional work opportunities were 
novel. The psychotherapist mentioned above worked at a local polyclinic officially 
earning R670. Over the previous six months she received R6000 per month by 
providing private counselling to 'New Russians' (67). This example shows that for 
this group, income from secondary employment was higher than that obtained from 
main work. Oleg, who called himself a poet, but earned money as a journalist on the 
local administration's television channel, also spoke good English and was able to 
take on additional translation jobs. 'New Russians' paid him R700 for translating the 
instructions on their technical equipment and, recently, a Moscow publishing house 
asked him to translate some American literature. These additional earnings brought 
in R2000 per month (124). Denis, a cobbler, earned four times his salary (R500) 
making and repairing shoes privately (43).
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Because of the public nature and high social value accorded to their professions, they 
had access to a wide network of weak ties. For example, skilled actors were well 
known in the city. They were called upon to produce television and radio 
commercials and to stage social functions. Kostya, who earned R900 in the state 
theatre, obtained additional work as an image-maker for a politician in the 
forthcoming elections and earned SUS2500. He saw this work as a means to 
continue the theatre work he loved (85).
Path (iii) Movement within the state and privatised sectors 
As figure 21 indicates, this was the most common path and two types of workplace 
were discernible: state and privatised sector enterprises and the local state 
administration.
Path (iii)(a) Employment in state and privatised sector enterprises 
The location of twelve out this group's fifteen respondents in the bottom two 
economic positions indicates the difficulty this group had making a living.
Mirroring oblast trends noted in chapter 3, whereby workers rather than being made 
redundant, left of their own volition, respondents in this group were compelled to 
leave previous jobs because of low pay and wage arrears and moved into other, often 
struggling, enterprises. These respondents, the majority of whom were factory 
workers in the machine-building industry, experienced a decline in the value of their 
salaries and the worst wage arrears of all respondents. For example, Tatyana, like 
her brother, and her father before her, went to Uralmash factory where she worked 
for 27 years as a lathe operator. Chapter 3 described the difficulties faced by 
Uralmash as state orders for military equipment diminished. Tatyana noted,
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After perestroika, there weren't any orders and they continually cut the 
workforce and didn't pay wages. Sometimes they paid half the wage, 
sometimes two-thirds, sometimes the minimal wage. Then they stopped 
paying wages completely. (28)
She found work as a minder in a kindergarten and then as a warden in the 
Engineering-Pedagogical Institute. Shortly afterwards, a teacher at the institute 
recommended her to a friend who worked in the House of Concert Organisations, 
described in chapter 3, which is where she had been working as a caretaker, earning 
R700, for the past two years.
Lacking attractive education qualifications7 and skills, factory worker respondents, 
like Tatyana, moved into low-paid jobs with few additional income-earning 
opportunities. In 1998, the Nizhni Tagil tank and railway carriage production 
factory stopped paying its workers. After three months without payment, Elena's 
husband moved to Nizhni Tagil metallurgical plant where he worked for a year. The 
plant paid its workers less and less. Often he was paid in fish, milk or macaroni, 
which they had to sell among their relatives and acquaintances. He returned to the 
railway-producing factory. He was not paid for eight months during which time they 
lived on Elena's salary. In 2000, her husband was receiving his salary every month 
and had received four of the eight months' salary arrears (18).
Many factory worker respondents along with some pensioners believed life was 
better in Soviet times. They lived comfortably on a Soviet salary and travelled 
regularly with holidays to the Black Sea, Leningrad, Moscow and Ukraine, provided 
by the factory. Tatyana continued,
7 Of the fifteen respondents in this group, eleven have a specialist and two a school education.
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Before, in Soviet times, we lived better: we respected each other and there 
wasn’t the kind of drunkenness we see now. We believed [in a better future]. 
It wasn't all bad. There was good as well. So, it shouldn't all be thrown 
away... Before, we felt the care and help of the state - kindergarten, free 
healthcare, education and summer holidays. Now we don't. It's not in the 
state's interests to help us. No-one needs us. (28)
The acceptance of low-paid work and the perception that life was better in Soviet 
times was often dismissed by others as resulting from an inability to adjust to 
present-day market conditions, a point raised in chapter 6's discussion of people's 
lack of sympathy for the poor. However, rather than symptomatic of Soviet 
mentality, Tatyana's predicament was a result of a new economic problem - the 
decline in the machine-building industry and her status as worker within it. Her 
response was a novel rather than Soviet one. After having always worked in one 
place, she found successive jobs in various enterprises using the limited skills that 
she had. Her predicament was all the more difficult because, as a manual labourer, 
she was dependent on local enterprises for employment, which, in Ordzhonikidze 
District, had suffered a dramatic fall in production output and wage levels, during the 
1990s.8
While Tatyana stayed on at Uralmash for some time despite the non-payment of 
wages, others left the cash-struck industrial and cultural sectors and moved into 
entrepreneurial activity. However, their negative experiences of entrepreneurial 
activity, discussed in path (v), demonstrate the vulnerability of those with few 
resources making such a radical change in employment path. Some single mothers, 
who faced considerable obstacles combining childcare and work, chose work in the 
depressed sectors funded directly from the state budget, despite very low pay,
8 See figure 17, p. 86.
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because of childcare provision. Anna accepted work in the defence factory despite 
the part payment (R450) of wages and arrears, because of the high standard and low 
cost of the enterprise kindergarten. As a single mother, she paid R150 (as opposed 
to R800) per month.9 Important factors were the factory's proximity to her home and 
a boss sympathetic to her problems as a single mother who had "worked all his life 
in a women's collective" (21). Her acceptance of low-paid state sector work was a 
rational response to the rising cost of childcare, not a remnant of a Soviet mentality.
This group stressed how life has become harder with the decline in living standards 
following the August 1998 financial crisis. Rumours about wage rises in the 
Uralmash factory left workers hopeful that the economic upturn would spread to 
their factories resulting in higher incomes and stability. Three respondents employed 
in food production enterprises in Chkalov and Kirov Districts had seen their salaries 
rise as a result of improvements in factory production.
Path (iii)(b) Movement into state administration 
Becoming a bureaucrat is a very Soviet strategy for upward mobility (Pickup and 
White 2002). Public service salaries increased significantly in comparison with 
average wages (Tikhomirov 2000,195) and, as in Soviet times, the perks of the job 
were an advantage to this work. Its economic benefits were evident in the fact that 
all six respondents were coping or securing a living.
Respondents who have moved into the state administration and state security forces 
were young. They intended to stay there throughout their working life because of
9 Municipal kindergarten cost more for single mothers (R450) than at the enterprise.
118
the work's stability, future security10 and reasonable pay. They also enjoyed 
privileges such as access to holiday facilities and sanatoria and good childcare and 
health services. While those in public office were forbidden from engaging in 
additional work, informal opportunities for earning extra money were plentiful. For 
example, Sergei earned R3500 working in the Chkalov Department for Social 
Protection, organising children's holidays. He made an additional larger income 
organising holidays unofficially. Good blat networks allowed him to secure a place 
for his daughter at university (50). These positions also provided entry into 
influential networks. For example, working within the militia made it possible to do 
favours for others, solving vehicle-related problems such as obtaining car licenses, 
driving permits and exemptions from paying fines. Igor met his closest friend, a 
Uralmash crime group member who owned a car park, when he approached Igor for 
help to obtain a license. He later lent Igor $US 15000 to buy a car (54).11
Path (iv) Movement into self-employment 
Six respondents, located in positions 3 and 4, engaged in self-employment. Self- 
employment was based on the use of previously acquired skills. Three popular 
forms of self-employment were trading in home-grown vegetables, taxiing, and 
construction work.
With the onset of market reform, some respondents who had gardened during Soviet 
times, had access to land, labour and transport, came to depend more on this activity.
10 One 25 year old respondent said that the fact that he would receive a pension after twenty years of 
service meant that on retirement he would still be young enough to find other work while receiving a 
pension.
It is difficult to see how Igor expects to pay back this sum through his official salary. One can 
speculate that the loan was given in expectation of future favours, or that Igor will use the additional 
work planned during his holidays, to repay part of the loan.
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For example, in Soviet times, Ludmila and her husband worked in the local poultry 
plant on the outskirts of Ekaterinburg and sold vegetables at the market in 
Ekaterinburg. They had grown vegetables for sale to supplement their income since 
1975, a practice Ludmila learnt from her mother who also used to grow vegetables 
for sale. Ludmila had to take early retirement due to ill health and her husband had 
been fired from the poultry plant for drinking at work. As a husband and wife team, 
their livelihood focused on trading in home-grown vegetables and creating other 
related moneymaking ventures. They sold vegetables in Ekaterinburg three times
1 9per week relying on their car to transport produce to market. Ludmila's husband 
also used the car to provide a taxi service for workers finishing their late-night shift 
and in return they gave him animal feed stolen from the factory, which he sold on in 
the winter when it fetched a higher price. In the spring her husband went around the 
countryside buying up the first potatoes from individual households, which he sold 
for a high price in Ekaterinburg. During the previous two summers, they had 
travelled to Chelyabinsk (a neighbouring oblast) where they bought cherries for 
resale in Ekaterinburg. In their early fifties and without formal employment, 
Ludmila and her husband had little alternative but to invest their resources in the 
vegetable trade. Their success was due to their trading experience, contacts in and 
around the oblast and resources.
Self-employment was a chosen route for this group because continuing to work in 
the enterprise was no longer an option. Finding another job was problematic because 
they were over the age of forty and enterprises preferred to take on younger people.
12 At peak season, Ludmila earns R2500 per week from the sale o f cucumbers (R15 per kilogram). 
Two large, gas-heated greenhouses allow them to lengthen the growing season. They grow aubergine, 
peppers and tomatoes, which they sell two months earlier than other vegetable sellers. They have a 
large greenhouse devoted to cucumbers and two fields o f potatoes.
120
People who provided an informal taxi service typified this predicament. Five male 
respondents used their car as a taxi. These men were in their fifties and were either 
previously drivers employed by the state or had lost their previous manual 
employment. After expenses, they made R3-6000 per month. Drivers either drove 
around busy areas looking for people who needed a lift or worked from a particular 
area, such as the airport or in the square outside the Uralmash factory, where they 
paid a protection 'roof to the group controlling the area. One downside of taxiing 
was the bribe-taking road inspectors.13 In addition, costs of petrol, car maintenance 
and parking were high.
A third common form of self-employment involved setting up a brigade of workers 
offering specific services. Two examples were unemployed men who set up a 
brigade offering services in construction, decorating and repairs and, actors 
supplementing low budget sector salaries by organising party functions. Victor was 
a crane specialist on the railways who lost his job in 1991, and found a job in a 
private construction firm. When in 1994 the firm collapsed, four employees formed 
a construction brigade. For the first two years, they did well despite competition 
from bigger firms. In addition to the brigade construction work, he started a venture 
on the side, erecting garden fountains. However, the problem for the group was the 
unpredictability of work. As a group of four men, they lost clients who were not 
prepared to wait for them to finish other orders. Periods without work brought 
financial difficulties for Victor and his family because his wife, working as a nurse, 
earned a small salary (R500) (23).
13 A speeding fine was R82, but drivers paid a bribe of R40-50. One road inspector said only young 
inspectors take money in this way because there are other less risky ways to make money (54).
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These three different routes into self-employment - trade in home-grown produce, 
taxi driving and forming a brigade - show that one determinant of seizing 
opportunities to earn money was prior personal or familial knowledge of the activity. 
In addition, they had access to state resources that could be used for private gain 
such as animal feed, carpentry materials and acting props. Having been forced out of 
work within enterprises, over forty years old and without marketable skills, the 
opportunities for engagement in official reasonably paid work were limited. Men 
dominated this activity. Women kiosk and market traders discussed in the following 
chapter, and couples who grew food for sale were two exceptions.
Path (v) Movement into new private sector employment 
Thirteen of the seventeen respondents that moved into the new private sector 
occupied positions 3 and 4. They had marketable skills and work experience. 
Examples among respondents included skilled electricians earning from R4000- 
11200 per month, reporters/producers earning between R2000-9000 per month, bank 
employees earning R4000 and personnel in security, metals brokering and office 
equipment firms earning between R4000-8000 per month. High salaries were the 
result of a boom in office and private construction and renovation, financial services, 
private security and the creation of an independent media. Official incomes were 
often smaller than real ones, as a portion was paid cash in-hand.
Over half of these respondents found work due to a combination of personal 
connections and skills. A small number of young and elderly people relied on their 
work skills alone in obtaining private sector employment.14 New private sector
14 Respondents who got work primarily because of their skills include a seamstress, several journalists 
and a marketing manager, all in their twenties, and a pensioner with extensive accounting experience.
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employees have been characterised as under the age of 40, male and well-networked
(Grogan 2000). My respondents broadly fitted this description. Men spanning their
twenties to forties dominated this group. They moved into the private sector as a
result of dissatisfaction with their income in a previous state sector job. Often the
impetus for their move was that they valued their breadwinner role in the family
highly and sought to earn a better income in order to fulfil that role. For example,
Lyuba and her husband lived with their two daughters and granddaughter in Rezh.
Lyuba worked in a bank (earning R3000) and her husband had recently started
working in a private firm in Ekaterinburg (earning R11000), a job that required a
four-hour daily commute.
My husband gets more than I do. My husband would feel uncomfortable if 
he earned less, but as it is, everything is normal. He started working in 
Ekaterinburg because at his old work he received less than me. He believes 
that a man should earn more money than his wife. The wife mustn’t be the 
breadwinner. I also believe that. A woman should work for pleasure and not 
set herself the goal of providing for the family (55).
Young educated and professional women15 and first-time job seekers whose
influential parents arranged work for them using their contacts were also figured in
this group.
Path (vi) Reliance on piecemeal irregular work 
The five households in this group fared worst of all and were found in the bottom 
two economic positions. The outcome of their attempt at new private sector 
employment turned out very differently from those who followed paths (iv) and (v). 
Reliance on individual labour activity paid little and provided no security. 
Expenditure was very small but nevertheless beyond households' means. Typically,
15 Educated young women are evident in new professions, such as media, advertising and banking 
services.
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this path involved a failed attempt at entrepreneurial/new private sector activity 
followed by an inability to get employment.
Respondents engaged in trade or worked for friends in newly established small
firms. Many were excited and optimistic about commerce when it first appeared in
the early 1990s. Trade promised better pay and was a novel activity. The depressed
condition of state cultural and industrial institutions acted as a further incentive to
leave their state sector jobs and join friends in their fledging firms. A minority
voluntarily left jobs. For example, Anna had a promising career in a state export-
trading organisation when, in 1991, she gave it up to go into commerce with her then
husband, renting out premises for bars.
I began to engage in private business absolutely spontaneously, clearly my 
emotions overwhelmed me. In general, I like everything new in life... It 
seemed to me that private business was profitable especially compared with 
state pay (21).
However, the majority of this group's respondents, who went into trade and small 
firms, were forced out of their former jobs. Those working in the art and culture 
sector, often with a higher or specialist education, were compelled to leave their jobs. 
The men from this group experienced a dramatic change in employment status, 
becoming labourers on construction sites or machine-operators on the railways. 
Women turned to journalism and secretarial work.
Their experience of the new private sector was overwhelmingly negative. As a 
result, over the last few years, especially after the August 1998 financial crisis, 
returning to the state budget sector was seen as a favourable option. Respondents 
gave a variety of reasons for negative experiences of employment in the new private 
sector. A change in management led to staff redundancies. Work conditions within
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the private sector for manual workers involved very long hours and physically 
strenuous work. Workers were cheated out of their pay. Small firms collapsed 
frequently. Employees experienced indefinite periods without work or money, 
during which they relied on kin or sat at home doing very little. A firm's success 
could lead to sacking of hired friend-employees and their replacement with more 
professional workers. This caused resentment and the break down of friendships. 
Men, dissatisfied with the way they were treated, lost their jobs as a result of conflict 
with management. The criminal atmosphere within private enterprises left many 
workers uncomfortable and insecure. For example, several respondents, working 
within cultural institutions, mentioned that their workplace was a cover for illegal 
smuggling or money laundering.16
Some people, with professional identities and higher education, found it particularly
difficult to seek lower status work and sat at home with little income. Although
Marina realised that her qualification meant very little in today's economy, in
practice, she did not look for unqualified work.
There was a time when living was very difficult. It was when I had no work 
whatsoever. I was in an awful mood. At a certain point, I understood that I 
had to refuse my ambition, forget that I have a higher education and start to 
engage in any low-qualified and non-prestigious work. (12)
Marina had a university degree in art history and worked in the Ministry of Culture.
After losing her job, she made various failed attempts at working in the new private
sector. After a long period without any work, she found employment three days a
month as an interviewer for a marketing firm earning R750. Her inability to find
more regular work was due to a number of factors. Her negative experiences left her
16 Using institutions as a front for laundering and illegal trading activities was mentioned in relation to 
a number of organisations such as 'Goskino', the city's House o f Concert Organisations (described in 
chapter 3), and several academic institutions.
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disillusioned about what the new private sector had to offer. As an educated person, 
she was reluctant to seek unskilled work. She realised that few employers are 
prepared to hire her as she was in her mid-forties. She had not been able to find 
work through her network of'intelligentsia' friends and she felt that working for 
friends spoiled friendships. She lived alone and was without kin who could find her 
work and was increasingly reluctant to turn to friends for help because she was 
painfully aware how much she was already indebted to them.
To sum up, employment paths (i) and (ii) involved remaining in the same job but the 
outcome of this decision differed because, in path (ii), individuals were able to use 
their professional skills, public status and personal connections to find well-paid 
additional work to boost household income significantly. For those following path 
(ii), the decision to stay in the state/privatised sector allowed households to secure a 
reasonable standard of living, which would otherwise have deteriorated 
considerably. Those who followed path (i) experienced a fall in their households' 
economic position, but given their lack of resources and the risk associated with new 
private sector activity, clinging to the stability of state/privatised sector employment 
was a realistic option.
This section outlined three diverging experiences of commitment of all resources in 
the new private sector. For well-connected and skilled workers in demand, the new 
private sector was an opportunity to secure a good standard of living (v). For older 
people closed off from the labour market, self-employment was one of the only 
options for making a living (iv), while, for individuals relying on irregular and 
piecemeal work, it signalled marginalisation from the labour market (vi).
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4 The Role of Household Characteristics in Shaping its Economic Position
This section begins by addressing how the composition of the household influences 
its economic position. Other activities are addressed, besides primary employment 
that household members undertake to respond to the pressures brought by market 
reform. The importance of the adjustment of spending and saving practices, links to 
the land and additional work are also considered.
4.1 Household Composition
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Figure 22 indicating the proportion of pensioners, children and working-age people 
in each income decile, shows that respondent households were the biggest in the 
richest and poorest groups. The number of children in the two lowest income deciles
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was a cause of impoverishment, while in the uppermost decile it was an effect of 
prosperity.
Although large households were prone to poverty, households could also be too 
small. Single-member and single-parent households were vulnerable to isolation, 
since in addition to the risk of low money incomes, it was hard to manage without a 
double set of networks, as chapter 6 shows.
4.1.2 Elderly People's Contribution to the Household
Were elderly people a support or burden to the household budget? Logically they 
could be either, as families with younger working pensioners were likely to be richer 
while families with older non-working pensioners were likely to be poorer, since 
they not only had to support the non-working pensioner, but also had to pay medical 
bills. Among respondents, pensioners boosted households' incomes significantly.17
Figure 23: Income Contribution of Pensioners by Household's Economic Position
1(»11) 2 («16) 3 («18) 4 (nl9) 5 («19)
Households with pensioners 2 7 7 3 2
Households with working pensioners 1 4 2 3 1
Kin-based households with pensioner as a 
main contributor
1 2 1 2 1
As figure 23 indicates, pensioners were most frequently found in deciles 2-6. 
Pensioners worked in just under half of cases. Two-pensioner households, in which 
members had professional skills and continued to work, could live in relative 
stability. Some of the employment transitions, made by respondents of retirement-
17 A sociologist at the Urals Pedagogical University has stated, "the position of pensioners is more 
advantageous in comparison with other categories of workers" if paid regularly (Petrova 2000, 270-1).
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age, included a professional army officer becoming a private security firm manager, 
an accountant in a Moscow statistics firm moving to a privatised food processing 
firm, a furniture-maker in a state enterprise taking on private carpentry orders and a 
factory director becoming a small private construction firm director. These 
examples aside, pensioners commonly followed employment path (iii)(a). Although 
this employment was low-paid, two pensions, one or more salaries and possible 
access to a garden created better security than that experienced in many younger 
generation households.
Pensioners' incomes and pensions often played an important role supporting younger 
generations, thereby putting elderly people under considerable stress. Figure 24 
shows the importance of pensioners' contributions to younger generations in 
economic position 1-3.18 Pensioners' contribution to households in position 4 was 
less.
Figure 24: Inter-generational Flows of Support Within and Between Households by
Economic Position
K itll) 2 (nl6) 3 («18) 4 («19)
Older —► younger 7 9 8 7
Younger —> older 1 3 4
Equal between generations 3
No support 3 4 3 7
This suggests that pensioners' contributions helped households struggling to keep 
afloat but did not lift households in positions 1-3 into the security of position 4. 
Reliance on elderly parents or grandparents was a desperate livelihood response. 
Elderly people wanted to live out their final years in peace without responsibility for
18 Support, such as the purchase of nearby accommodation, help with domestic tasks and financial 
support, flowed from children to elderly when the later are no longer able-bodied. However, 
instances o f such support were outnumbered by flows of support from older to younger generations.
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children and grandchildren. Likewise, younger generations expected to support their
parents in their old age and would have preferred not to rely on them for support. In
Nadia's three-generation household, the pension contribution was larger than wage
contributions. Nadia was 77 years old and supported her daughter, son-in-law and
granddaughter. She was the only worker, earning R700 in the theatre, in addition to
her pension of R690. Her daughter's husband received an invalidity pension
following a serious illness19 and her daughter had been in hospital for several
months. The medical costs were a great strain. Her granddaughter was studying at
an institute. Nadia preferred to live out her years calmly with space to herself but
knew that this was not an option.
In my years, I would like more peace. I have to cook for a big family, and 
that's already difficult for me. They may turn the music on loud, and that 
annoys me, but I can't say anything, although inside I worry. (31)
Nadia's household illustrates how in extreme cases, elderly people propped-up kin in
the face of illness and unemployment. Her pension and wage provided the bulk of
the household income and she was also responsible for feeding the family and
tending the garden.
4.1.3 The Burden of Children and Young People
The rise in childcare, education and health-related costs discussed in chapter 3 were 
a burden on households with children. Women spent long periods out of 
employment to engage in childcare,20 which resulted in the loss of an income-eamer. 
The decision for women to stay at home was economically rational in the sense that
19 Nadia was arranging him a job in the theatre as a fireman (R300). She owed his illness to anxiety 
from staff reductions at the factory where he previously worked.
20 One fifth of households in positions 1-3 had suffered from a reduction o f income size, at least partly 
due to the fact that the mother was staying at home in order to look after children.
130
it was difficult for them to find work that paid more than the cost of childcare. 
However, this decision was also the result of the way in which women and men re­
interpreted the responsibilities of motherhood and fatherhood when the state had 
withdrawn its provision to the family, a point discussed in chapter 3.
The cost of education for households with young children was a particular burden. 
Informal charges levied included payment for repairs and the upkeep of the school. 
Bribe payments sometimes guaranteed enrolment and good examination results. 
Other likely payments included school security and fees. One respondent, Masha, 
was preparing for her son's enrolment at school. After the stress involved in 
ensuring he got a place in a good school, she spent a week shopping round the 
markets, second-hand clothes and pawnshops to find the cheapest items required by 
the school. She wrote a list of the required purchases (see following page), 
emphasising that it was an "ordinary school" (3), and others demanded more money.
Masha’s List; Items needed for Vanva to Start School




Shoes (2nd hand from a friend) 400
Sports uniform 350
Shoe bag 30





Payment for the upkeep of the class 50
Books 300
Other Items to buv in the near future
Ice skates, skis, sports equipment 2000
Other Items thev have not bought
Long day group (monthly, for working parents) 250
Music school (monthly) 250
TOTAL 6315
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The cost of preparing Masha's son for school was the equivalent of approximately
nine weeks of her husband's income. Elena, a mother of two noted:
There is a problem with enrolling in school with good teaching because all 
parents want their children to study in good schools and, for that reason, 
schools organise competitions for the best children. They take on children 
whose parents do something concrete for the school. Parents may do repairs 
in the school, buy a television or a fridge for the school (73).
As young adults, children were a burden on households. Students in higher 
education usually depended on their parents financially. Competition for non-paying 
places at university had become increasingly intense in some departments because 
the share of fee-paying students (dogovorniki) was rising21. The collapse of 
vocational training and the administrative allocation to jobs has increased 
dependency of young people on their parents (Clarke 2000, 220). Rosa, a manual 
worker, said that the main source of her discontent was that her son "at the age of 26, 
still hasn't sorted himself out with a family and normal work" (28). He depended on 
his mother financially and they did not get on. First-time job seekers and young 
people face problems getting a job because they do not have well-connected close 
kin whom they could rely on for information. Young people rarely moved out of the
O')household because of problems in obtaining accommodation.
10*11) 2 (wl6) 3 (nl8) 4 («19) 5 (wl9)
Households with adult children 1 7 5 5 2
Adult children living separately23 1 1 3 3 4
Adult children working 1
Adult children not working 1 7 3 2
Adult children in higher education 1 1 4 2
21 At the Urals Pedagogical Institute, '’dogovorniki' pay about R20,000 per year and make-up about 
half of every department. The university tries to keep the number of places for non-fee paying 
students stable as is stipulated by law (50/50) but nowadays it is increasingly difficult to enter without 
bribes used to attain non-fee paying places (16).
22 Typically young people move out when they inherit their grandparents' or partners' grandparents' 
fiat.
23 Children that live separately due to divorce are excluded.
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Figure 25 shows that dependency of working-age children on parents was most 
evident among households occupying position 2. In all seven households with adult 
children, none were working. The small proportion of households with adult 
children in position 5 reflected the young age of these households, but also, adult 
children lived separately and had gone into business or moved abroad.
4.2 Household Structure
Figure 26: Household Structure by Gender o f the Main Income Contributor
1 («11) 2 (Ml6) 3 (Ml8) 4 (m!9) 5 (m19)
t ? 8 ~ t $ 8 s t ?  8 t 5 8 »■. t ? 8 »
Conjugal 3 1 2 0 2 0 2 c 9 1 6 2 11 3 8 C 16 4 11 1
Conjugal + kin 2 1 1 0 4 4 0 c 4 3 0 1 3 C 2 1 0 0 0 0
Kin 2 2 0 0 5 5 0 c 3 2 0 1 1 1 0 c 1 0 1 0
Single adult 6 4 2 -  5 5 0 - 2 2 0 - 4 1 3 - 2 1 1 -
K e y
t  to ta l  n o . o f  h o u se h o ld s
$  a  w o m a n  is  m a i n  f i n a n c i a l  c o n t r i b u t o r
S  a  m a n  i s  m a i n  f i n a n c i a l  c o n t r i b u t o r
~  a  m a n  a n d  a  w o m a n  c o n t r i b u t e  e q u a l l y
4.2.1 Conjugal Households
A recent Russia-wide study noted that the number o f nuclear households - father, 
mother and their children - has "markedly decreased", while there has been an 
increase in extended households in which the spouses live together with one or both 
grandparents of one of them (Zbarskaya 2001, 8). In connection with this, figure 26 
shows that households in positions 4 and 5 tended to resemble a nuclear household 
structure whereas in the lower economic positions they constituted a minority. The 
table also shows that men were the main breadwinners in conjugal households across 
economic positions.
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There are several reasons why men were the main breadwinners in conjugal 
households. To begin with, the expectation among male and female respondents was 
that men should earn more. Chapter 6 points to respondents' belief that while 
women should work for enjoyment, men were the 'natural' breadwinners. In 
response to a question about the size of income households needed to live 'normally', 
the answer was often given as a wage for women and one double that size for men. 
Also, as mentioned earlier, men respondents were more prevalent in the well-paid 
new private sector jobs, and as chapter 5 notes, outnumber women in business. The 
rigid definition of gender roles was most visible in households where the husband 
was employed in the new private sector. In seven of the ten conjugal households that 
have followed path (v), consisting of seventeen households in all, wives stayed at 
home to engage in childcare while husbands worked. This was due to the youth of 
this group and the expense of childcare for people employed in the new private 
sector.24 Relying on one income was a strain when the husband's new private sector 
income was small or irregular. In this situation, the wife could supplement her 
husband's income through informal work.25 Nearby female kin played an important 
role collecting children from school and cooking their dinners when their mothers 
worked. When men could provide for the family single-handedly, they sometimes 
insisted that their wives stayed at home.
Except where women stay at home, the conjugal unit was in a strong economic 
position because it was likely to have two income-eamers, which created greater 
income stability. The dual income was partly due to conjugality, because as chapter
24 Private sector employees paid R1500 for childcare - approximately as much as a woman could earn.
25 Flexible forms of work included tuition in the evenings, knitting and sewing, trading cosmetics to 
friends. Child-minder work in a kindergarten earns little (R120) but one's child was fed free of 
charge.
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6 shows, an individual had access to wider work opportunities through his/her 
partner’s networks. At the same time, a livelihood that provided income and social 
status was also likely to promote stability in marital relations. This was so among 
respondents who, following employment path (ii), combined a main job with well- 
paid additional work. Seven of the nine households in this group were conjugal.
Conjugal households fared less well when they were reliant on income from self-
employment as described in employment path (iv). The instability of entrepreneurial
activity made it difficult to reconcile with obligations to dependants. A dual income
whereby the other income came from stable regularly paid employment compensated
for self-employment’s instability. However, when self-employment was the main
income source, households were vulnerable to economic shock and fluctuations in
demand for their services. For example, Sasha worked as an informal taxi driver and
his wife sewed leather skirts, which she sold at the market. His wife took out a large
loan in dollars, but after the 1998 financial crisis, the amount she had to pay back in
roubles quadrupled in size. Her mother moved in so that they could rent out her flat
and their son was without work. The debt strained intra-household relations
according to Sasha,
Because my wife has big debts, she has to work an awful lot and she of 
course, can't devote much attention to the house... She tries to escape from 
her difficult thoughts about her debts but she doesn't manage to do that for 
long because her creditors phone her very often and remind her. I am already 
not talking about the effect on sex -  all thoughts only about debts. (65)
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4.2.2 Kin-based households
Kin-based households were predominant in economic positions 2 and 3 and were 
commonly in a weaker position in the labour market. Eight of the twelve 
respondents who moved between low-paid manual jobs in the state and privatised 
enterprise sectors - path (iii)(a) - were single mothers and women supporting 
extended households dependent on one low income. The most common form in the 
bottom two positions, constituting 19% of households, was three generations of 
women living together. In these households, women were often nearing or at 
retirement age. Women were the main income-eamers in 86% of extended 
households in positions 1-4. The youngest generations rarely included young men 
because sons were more likely than daughters to move out, get married and find a 
first job (Grogan 2000) or migrate.
Kin co-residence could contribute to and be a consequence of household 
impoverishment. Kin co-residence was a consequence of impoverishment because it 
was a way to support kin who could not live independently. It contributed to 
impoverishment because kin obligations left little time or resources for furnishing 
other ties and could bring down the economic position of household providers. In 
addition, as mentioned earlier, parents played an important role in creating the 
younger generations' livelihood or fostering dependence. Households reliant on 
older generations' income were unlikely to furnish the information to help younger 
generations find work because they were likely to have a weak position in the labour 
market and few resources that could be used to others' advantage.
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4.2.3 Single Person and Single Parent Households
Figure 26 shows that the majority of single parent and single person households were 
located in the bottom two economic positions. People living alone were often reliant 
on piecemeal, irregular work. Without a partner and often without kin in the city, 
they had a smaller network through which to find work. These respondents could 
get demoralised by their predicament and give up hope of improving their 
situation. Several respondents mentioned how bandit groups targeted people living 
alone with the intent of seizing their property for resale, which could lead to 
homelessness, as chapter 3 showed. Two respondents said they were forced by 
bandits to leave their flat and a third received threats from bandits who had visited 
his home on several occasions.
4.3 The Adjustment of Household Practices
As chapter 1 mentioned, the failure of formal employment to guarantee livelihood 
security meant that household members increasingly resorted to making adjustments 
at the household level.
26 Official regional statistics show that people living alone spend more on alcohol (Goskomstat 2000e, 
62) than any other household type. Heavy drinking is a problem facing men living alone. Wives of 
heavy drinkers in three instances were able to help their husbands recover from alcoholism.
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4.3.1 Belt-tightening
Rising prices and low incomes meant that household members initiated belt- 
tightening measures to make money go further.27 The adjustment of spending 
patterns by buying food at the wholesale market in large quantities, by preserving 
vegetables purchased in the autumn when they are cheapest and by spending time 
comparing prices helped to make money go further. People bought fewer goods in 
shops28 and economised on a range of products including food, clothing, shoes, 
house maintenance, entertainment and travel. Results from the household budget 
survey undertaken over three months during the course of 2000 show that across 
economic positions 1-4, the largest expenditure was food.29 The exchange of gifts 
between kin and friends, primarily of clothing and vegetables and fruit took place in 
most households. The proportion of expenditure allocated to alcohol,30 tobacco, 
transport and medical and communal services was considerable. Oksana and her two 
daughters were located in the bottom economic position and lived off her two 
cleaning jobs.
Now we can’t even go to the dairy products shop. Meat - we never eat. I buy 
bones at the market and use it to make soup as a substitute for meat. We eat 
potatoes, buckwheat with stock cubes... We spend almost 100% of our 
income on food but it's not enough, we are underfed, we go hungry. (42)
27 Research has suggested that economising is associated with women in the sense that women spend 
time looking for the cheapest goods, and women cut back on their own needs in order to give more to 
the family (Whitehead 1990).
28 For example, most people buy clothes in the second-hand clothes commission shop and the market, 
and accept hand-me-downs from friends. Friends knit and cut each other's hair.
29 In contrast to Clarke (1999), expenditure on food was slightly lower in September when households 
used gifts of home-grown food.
30 While in smaller towns and rural areas, cheap homebrew is drunk, people in Ekaterinburg are more 
likely to drink beer, vodka or cognac, which costs considerably more.
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When they needed money, they took household possessions to the pawnshop.
Oksana received help in the form of loans and old clothes from work colleagues who 
knew about her family's economic difficulties.
The consequence of heavy reliance on household resources was that eventually they 
ran down. When possessions broke or become old they are not fixed or replaced. 
Health suffered. For example, a handful of respondents lamented no longer being 
able to afford dental care. The depletion of resources affected the ability to maintain 
or create social networks. People were embarrassed to invite a guest to their home if
'X 1they felt it is shabby. Concerns about appearance could restrict mobility.
Households allocated less to investment in their children's future education and 
health, thereby jeopardising long-term opportunities. Alternatively, they coped with 
much less to provide children with opportunities later in life.
4.3.2 Land and Links to Rural Areas
Were households producing more of what they were consuming to lower 
consumption costs? Chapter 1 mentioned that theorists and ordinary Russians alike 
often suggest that the garden goes a long way in explaining survival.
Figure 27: Access to Land by Economic Position
l ( n l l ) 2 (nl6) 3 (wl8) 4 (nl9) 5 («19)
Own land 4 5 7 7 8
Access thro’ kin 2 4 4 4 4
31 For example, Tanya was invited to do some additional work in Moscow. At first she refused the 
offer because she was ashamed of her appearance. She felt she did not have suitable clothes for a trip 
to Moscow. In the end, work friends gave a little money and helped find cheap but fashionable 
clothes and donated some of their own.
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37% of respondents owned land and a further 22% had access to a plot through 
relatives. Figure 27 reveals that there was no significant difference between access 
of the richest and the poorest. This suggests that in the city, chance and tradition 
explained the use of land. The poor did not seek out access to the land anymore than 
the rich did. There was no suggestion among respondents that their farming 
activities had become a more important source of food in the last ten years.
Those struggling hardest to get by did not have access to land for reasons of ill 
health, age, cost of transport, lack of time and lack of access. People living alone, 
working and young people did not see subsistence production as a livelihood option. 
Time taken travelling to and tending a garden was time away from more highly 
prioritised income-generating work. People had to travel for several hours to get to 
their plots, often having to spend the night and incurring expense (local train, bus or 
petrol).
The need for a garden was reduced by the availability of fruit and vegetables in the 
city's markets from the former Soviet Republics. There was a saying: 'summer is 
short, but at least there is not much snow'.33 The difficult climatic conditions meant 
that only certain crops were grown: potatoes, carrots and cabbage.34 In addition to 
the short growing season, the industrial character of the region meant that the land 
was polluted, although many people maintained that home-grown crops were
32 See figure 6, p. 46.
33 It is known to snow in the summer months. During 2000, a spring freeze destroyed already planted 
potatoes. Overall however, the harvest in 2000 was considered good while in 1999, was poor.
4 Red tomatoes and a wider variety of vegetables are only an option for those who have invested time 
and money in building a greenhouse (made out of plastic sheeting over a wood construction).
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healthier than those bought in shops. The Colorado beetle was a pest rife in the area 
that destroyed potato crops.
Past experience strongly influenced use of the garden. Households without a
personal or family history of gardening did not consider it important.
Overwhelmingly, elderly people tended gardens as a form of relaxation from urban
stress; somewhere people could “get energy” and "come to their senses" (15). It was
a connection to their peasant pasts and a form of psychological security against fear
of hunger. For Nadia, who grew up in a peasant family in Poland, the land was
much more than the fruit and vegetables that it produced.
For me the garden - it's somewhere I can let off steam. I talk with the land - 
after all, I am a daughter of peasants. But of course, it's a support - 1 don't 
need to buy fruit preserves, vegetables, onions. (31)
Viewing subsistence production as a survival practice for city dwellers ignores how 
their actions are embedded in non-economic, historical and cultural norms and 
practices.
For many urban households, links to rural areas, through kin living outside the city, 
were important. Respondents' country cousins provided them with occasional gifts 
of sacks of vegetables and offered a refuge to which they could send children when 
money ran out in the city, for example due to unpaid salaries, when women engaged 
in additional work, or when children were ill.
35 Clarke also finds that the land acts as a form of psychological security (1999). Some old people are 
said to grow more potatoes than they could feasibly eat or give away because having lived through 
famine and during the war years, they believe potatoes will 'protect' them.
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4.3.3 Saving and Spending
The meaning of 'saving' and 'planning' during Soviet times was markedly different 
from what it involves today. Shortage of the most basic foodstuffs in Soviet times 
meant "access to goods and services was far more important than the means to pay 
for them" (Ashwin 1996, 22 italics in the original). Respondents understood the 
concept of planning their budgets to mean the earmarking of money for the future as 
in Soviet times when "people saved, planned their lives, put money aside for old 
age" (88).
That ability to plan future security was swiped away. After experiencing several
financial crises (e.g. late 1991, October 1994, August 1998) during which bank
savings accounts became worthless, people learned that it was pointless to try and
save. Leonid lost all his savings in 1991. When his mother died two years later, he
inherited her savings-bank books, which had R900 and R2500 in them. Leonid
explained how with the R900,
I took this money and bought a litre of Spanish wine and two oranges and 
said to myself, 'there, mother's inheritance'... Last summer I wanted to get 
the R2500 from the other book. Recounting in today's money, I had five 
roubles and 22 kopeks due to me. I kept the book as a keepsake. (13)
Many respondents recounted how savings, with which it was possible to buy a car in 
Soviet times, now bought a loaf of bread.
Wage arrears and the irregularity of informal work added to the instability of 
households' financial situations. Anna, a single mother working in a state defence 
factory never knew whether her wages or arrears would be paid:
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I don’t receive my earnings regularly. I can't plan. I can calculate only how 
much I spend. My daughter and I try to survive on however much there is. 
(21)
Denis, a cobbler earned R500 officially and depended on private orders.
We don't plan our budget. I have the kind of work where planning is 
difficult. We don't live on my salary but on my additional work. It's difficult 
to plan additional work. (43)
This uncertainty deterred people from trying to save. Those in position 4 who were
able to save some money did not put it in the bank, but converted it into American
dollars which they kept at home or bought goods for the home. Tatyana, whose
household was in position 3, commented,
I came to understand that it is pointless to save money - it depreciates in 
value. And so I started spending the money I had, buying all the essentials 
for the home. (28)
Alternatively, spare money was loaned to others as a way of securing support from 
others in the future. The household budget survey revealed considerable fluctuations 
in income over the course of a year and pointed to the important role of loans in 
tiding households over. When households did not have sufficient money, they 
limited themselves to the bare essentials. Households in economic position 1 and 2 
which permanently did not have enough money for food restricted their spending to 
items such as flour, sugar and macaroni to store for future use so that "when the 
money runs out, we live on the stores put by at the beginning of the month" (68).
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4.3.4 Additional Work36
The role of additional work in the household budget varies across economic 
positions. Its prevalence and share in household budget was greater in positions 3 
and 4 than 1 and 2. Over half the respondents in positions 2-4 engaged in additional 
work.37
For people in economic positions 1-3, who were unlikely to have marketable skills, 
additional work played a small role and consisted of irregular, piecemeal 
assignments or low-paid work. For men in these economic positions, popular forms 
of additional work included paper delivery, car washing, house and car repairs, 
gardening, construction work and collecting empty bottles. For women, they 
included sewing and repairing clothes, knitting, haircutting, washing floors, sorting 
out good from bad vegetables at a produce depot, selling vegetables on the street and 
selling cosmetics. People bought services like plumbing, minor household repairs, 
and hand-knitted clothes on an informal basis through acquaintances or, 
alternatively, money was not exchanged, the work being seen as a form of 
neighbourly help. These forms of additional work always existed and did not 
represent new opportunities.
36 Respondents distinguish between different forms o f informality during Soviet times: pilfering 
goods from work (cheating the state); informal work outside the purview o f the state (khaltura); the 
acquisition of prestigious, deficit goods by blat\ illegal speculation and smuggling of goods and other 
forms of 'underground' activity (such as building private housing and restaurants); and men's 
additional income-generating moonlighting work (shabashka). For this work, accounts were settled 
with customers cash in hand, that is, without paying tax. Holding two jobs in Soviet times carried the 
risk of being sued and imprisoned should the authorities find out. People were not meant to have more 
than one job although it was possible, with permission, to earn money through working overtime.
37 Only those who have earned an income from additional work in the previous three months are 
included.
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People in lower economic positions perceived additional work as a last resort
engaged in reluctantly to get a little extra money in a crisis. Nadezhda explained,
If there is absolutely no money, then my husband or I goes and works 
additionally. (68)
Victor explained,
... at those times when I had absolutely no work, my son and I would collect 
empty bottles from around town and get R15-20. (46)
The need to take on additional work represented for these people how their lives had
deteriorated. Rosa, who supported her infirm mother and daughter who studied,
worked as a floor cleaner earning R250 to supplement her R500 income as an
accountant at the theatre.
I don't like the work. I get-up at five o'clock in the morning and at seven I 
finish, return home, cook breakfast, feed the family and leave for work at the 
theatre. I have always done additional work since perestroika because I have 
been catastrophically short of money. (34)
Many people did not secure additional individual labour activity over the course of
the year although their material predicament necessitated this. People were
disinclined to search for additional work but accepted it when they came across it.
Several respondents from households in positions 1 and 2 observed that additional 
work opportunities had shrunk. This could have been due to a large pool of workers 
prepared to do unskilled work. Boris, a factory worker, said that it was possible in 
1998 to earn the equivalent of his monthly wage working for two nights unloading 
railway wagons. Now "additional work is rare" (68) and paid less. Two weeks prior 
to our meeting, he had helped his boss build a sauna and for two days work he 
earned R100, one twelth of his factory wage. Vladimir, also a factory worker, 
provided a different example of how additional income opportunities have dwindled.
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Before, it was possible to collect titanium barbed wire and sheets of titanium 
from around the outside of the factory. Now they have put the place in order, 
introduced security and are producing less so it has become more difficult to 
take... (69)
There were fewer opportunities to pilfer goods in depressed workplaces since 
resources had already been taken.38
By contrast, respondents with marketable skills and educational qualifications,
located in positions 3 and 4, perceived additional work as a way to improve their
standard of living. Additional work was likely to be in accordance with professional
skills and as such, was more rewarding. For example, Irina and her husband worked
as lecturers in the Urals State University. Since the mid-1990s, new opportunities
had opened up for them to engage in additional teaching on summer schools,
commercial long-distance learning and lecturing in private universities. As a result,
their standard of living had improved:
I regard this additional work as a necessity, but because it is connected to my 
main work, it also brings me pleasure. But if my main work provided me 
with enough money, of course I wouldn't do it... When additional earning 
appeared in 1995, it became easier [to live]. Although, additional work saps 
a lot of my strength and I spend much less time with my son. (11)
5. Livelihoods and Identity
Different kinds of people viewed themselves and what happened to them differently. 
The following chapter looks at the entrepreneurial elites' self-justificatory ideology
38 Walking around Nizhni Tagil, the second biggest city in the region, I noticed the plaques on all the 
statues were missing apparently, because they had been stolen, melted down and sold on.
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of entitlement to the fruits of the market. This section looks at how manual workers, 
professionals and women view their options.
5.1 Manual workers
For manual workers, the world 'turned upside down' materially and socially.
Natasha and her husband both finished school and worked all their lives in the
factory. Now Natasha stayed at home and her husband delivered newspapers:
Before, on one salary, my husband could buy a car, and now we can't even 
buy sausage because it's too expensive. (7)
"No-one needs me" (ya ni komu ni nuzhna/nuzhen) was a frequently mentioned
exclamation among these workers and referred to their drop in economic status and
inability to contribute through their work to society. Natasha continued,
For my husband, work is very important - if there isn't any he goes into 
decline [i.e. drinks] from the boredom. Work is earnings and stability (7). 
Victor, a former miner, commented,
Our generation was different. We lived with other understandings. I felt I 
was a representative of the country. (46)
Older workers reminisced about pre-1970s barrack life which was "based on mutual 
understanding" (23), and was a time of egalitarian values when, even though they 
had very little, people lived together in a friendly manner "like one big family" (7). 
Workers nostalgically described how they watched the one television together in the 
corridor and invited each other in for food. Workers, whose present-day life had 
become bleak and without opportunities for improvement, and whose future was 
bound up in the uncertain fate of the factories, had the greatest capacity for 
reinventing a golden socialist past.
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5.2 Professional workers
People located in position 4 who had one well-paid job using professional skills
viewed their options over the last ten years most favourably. They were prepared to
travel whether it involves daily commuting from smaller towns in the oblast or
longer-term migration to the city or to Moscow. For some, improving their
prospects involved enrolment on a fee-paying university course in accountancy,
business ethics, management, or marketing. They believed that the ability to change
jobs to acquire promotion and a higher salary signified adaptation to today’s
environment. Stas was 28 years old and enrolled on a marketing course at the Urals
State University alongside his job as a marketing manager in an air conditioning
firm. After a failed attempt in 1993, to engage in trade, he worked in marketing for a
small publishing firm and then for a chain of shops. After completing his university
course, he planned to get work experience abroad.
My management course teacher said that in England they have the strongest 
management school. He believes that it’s in England's blood... I want to 
move to Moscow because I believe that there is a higher quality of work 
there... I want to work with super-professionals. And those people more 
often are in Moscow or St. Petersburg. The Urals are only now starting to 
grow. (22)
The positive value attributed to 'western' values was an effect of success. Less 
upwardly mobile people were more cynical about 'western' influence. Symptomatic 
of the state of crisis in Russia, respondents held the view that the city saw the worst 
end of'the west' in the form of bad American films and poor-quality clothes from 
Turkey. The implied criticism was not directed at 'the west', but at their leaders who 
neglected investment in Russia's cultural heritage and at Russian factories that were 
incapable of making fashionable clothes.
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For respondents unable to secure one well-paid job, a reoccurring dilemma was the
tension between maintaining work status and ensuring material survival. Which they
prioritised influenced their economic position. Combining jobs was the most
realistic way to maintain an adequate standard of living and retain a professional
status. Most positively, people who engaged in additional work using their
professional skills viewed it as an opportunity to improve their standard of living and
a reward for personal initiative. More often, it was a way to support adult children's
young families. For example, Oksana had worked at the state film studios
('Goskino') since the early 1970s. 'Goskino' had not paid her salary for over three
years, and she continued her filmmaking thanks to international funding (R8000 per
month). She had extra work teaching history in three schools, thereby allowing her
daughter to participate in the extra-curricular activities free of charge. She gave the
income to her elder daughter because her daughter stayed at home with a young child
and her son-in-law did not have a regular income. Oksana commented,
I work all the time and I practically don't have a private life. I even work 
nights. I work more than before. Before I earned little. Now I earn a little 
more, but all the same, I can't afford myself anything extra and I can't say that 
I have time to relax. It is difficult for me because if before I didn't sleep I 
didn't feel the tiredness, now I do. (123)
Teaching allowed Oksana to financially support her daughter's young family and 
continue her professional work, but it took its toll on her health.
Professional workers without marketable skills did not have the option of combining 
jobs using their skills. They could prioritise survival of a professional identity over 
material survival because better-paid work was likely to involve low-status menial 
activity that compromises their social status. One common response was to stay in a
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state sector job and thereby retain a professional identity. Some employees exhibited 
patriotic feelings towards working in the state defence and metallurgical industry and 
in research and academic institutes. They continued to work in the same place 
despite the fact that most employees had left and their wages had shrunk. Similarly, 
some of the city's cultural sector employees saw their creative contribution as 
preserving Russia's rich cultural and intellectual heritage in spite of lack of 
investment by the state.
In these cases, a discourse of professionalism was a strategy to come to terms with 
life's difficulties. Their expectations from work were high and yet their 
qualifications were worth very little in today's economy. They retained the belief in 
their entitlement to interesting work, but as a result faced long periods without work 
or small incomes. For example, the only source of income for Mikhail, an art 
historian, was his piecemeal lecturing at the Urals State University that paid R15 per 
hour. He refused to go through the demeaning process of actively looking for 
alternative work and did not go to the Unemployment Service because they would 
not be able to find him work that used his skills (15). Natalya recounted how she 
applied for a job as a domestic worker. After the interview, she broke into tears 
because, as an engineer, with a higher education she was expected to do housework, 
which was humiliating and required her to lower her status and become an ordinary 
employee. Although she did not get the job, she said that she would never again 
apply for unqualified work that required working directly under a boss (128). Some 
professional people said they found it difficult to come to terms with new market 
conditions after working in Soviet times when frequent changing of jobs was
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frowned upon39 and when people believed that they no longer needed to work for a 
boss because they worked for their country. One architect likened market reform to 
a press slowly crushing him and the market as an immoral arena to which he was 
psychologically unsuited.
Men who invested in their professional over and above their income-generating
identity could experience instability in conjugal relations. For example, Oksana’s
husband had recently moved out because he did not provide for the family. She and
her husband had become like "two boxers in a ring":
There are people who after the change in the economic situation were able to 
quickly adapt - they have several jobs, try to survive. But my husband is a 
romantic with his head in the clouds [vitat' v oblakakh]. He doesn't notice 
that the children starve and says, 'so let them eat less'. He doesn't want to do 
additional work. He works very slowly and conscientiously ([dobrosovestno). 
The fact that he is proper and honest means that it is very difficult for him to 
adjust to contemporary conditions... (42)
Conflicts in the home arose because women were dissatisfied with men's income- 
generation. Nearly half of the men lived alone who prioritised their professional 
status to the detriment of their material status, a testament to women's unwillingness 
to accommodate men who did not meet their breadwinner expectations.
An alternative strategy was to reappraise work, sacrifice high expectations and take
on low-qualified and non-prestigious work. Satisfaction from work and personal
skills was irrelevant. Income was primary. Individuals with families were most
likely to come to this conclusion. Rosa, a widow, explained,
I can't say that I like or don't like my work. When you are already forty years 
old, you look at work as a resource for earning money and not as a place 
where you go to with pleasure. (34)
39 As one woman put it,
"It was considered that 'letuni' [literally, flyers or volatile people] were untrustworthy" (6).
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This study concurs with Clarke's argument that pay was a central motivation for 
employment decisions. People who moved to higher salaried jobs were higher 
educated and younger, and were more likely to be men while those who stay in low- 
paid jobs or move to other low-paid jobs do so because they lack better alternatives 
(Clarke 2000, 197). However, people who saw their work and social status decline 
and faced few opportunities to move into better paid work stayed in low paid jobs 
because the small financial benefits from changing work were outweighed by the 
loss to personal identity and social status.
5.3 Women as Housewives
Men and women have negotiated how the new responsibilities resulting from the
withdrawal of state provision were distributed in the household. Some women
respondents noted that their greater responsibility for childcare made power relations
in the household more unequal. Dima and Masha, who have two children, decided
that Masha should stay at home rather than look for work because the cost of
kindergarten40 was as much as she could earn. Masha had originally looked for work
only to find that employers made it clear that they were unwilling to give her time
off work to look after sick children. Despite supportive loving relations between
them, Masha noted,
Without a doubt, who earns how much money influences the relations in the 
family - especially when people argue and face disagreements and especially, 
when one person sits at home and the other earns money. My husband thinks 
that he feeds the whole family. I also consider that I feed everyone. I try, I 
only engage in my family. But my husband considers that he does even more.
40 They would have had to pay the full cost o f the kindergarten (R1500) because Dima works in a 
private firm.
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Particularly, when we argue, he says that he feeds me and for that reason 'sit 
down and be quiet!' (3)
Recently, she became depressed as a result of staying at home, family members'
illnesses, a burglary and continual money worries. In a recent letter she wrote:
... I have had a terrible depression. I have been thinking that I am already 
old, ugly, stupid, needed by no one, and unable to do anything, and have 
achieved nothing in life. I have been shouting at the children, arguing with 
my husband (it's a wonder that we haven't split up). I have exhausted 
everyone with my hysterics, have been crying and hating the whole world 
(4/09/01).
The following month, she found a job as an administrator in the university. The pay 
was very low, but the timetable was flexible and she felt better because she 
conversed with others. Not long after, she had to give up the work because her son 
fell ill. In the end, she sent her son to her mother in the countryside and resumed 
work. This example shows how women experienced loss of identity and lack of self­
esteem as what was made out to be a 'choice' to leave work for the home, was in fact 
forced on women who valued work.
Tension in conjugal relations could arise when the wife wanted to work rather than 
stay at home or when the man was unable to provide sufficiently for the family. 
Marina and Kostya had been having a long-running argument about when their son 
could go to kindergarten. While to begin with, Kostya had said he wanted only his 
wife to raise their child, he had since lowered the age threshold to seven and then 
four, thanks to her reasoning that the child needed to be among age-mates. Marina 
commented,
This kind of position - husband working and me sitting at home with the child, 
absolutely doesn't suit me. I am not free, I am dependent. I have to ask him 
for money all the time. It degrades me. But it's not only about money. He 
considers that as long as he earns money, I have to do everything else. 
Everything depends on me - the child, shops, cleaning up, washing, cooking of 
food, the dog. It's very difficult to make my husband help me around the 
house. He thinks he isn't young or healthy (19).
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She was humiliated by their unequal relations and remembered how they were much
more equal when they first lived together, when they both worked, made decisions
jointly and shared domestic tasks. Kostya did not tell Marina how much money he
earned, a problem exacerbated by the irregularity of informal additional work. He
controlled the money and gave it to her to buy necessities when asked. Marina
resented the fact that she had been stripped of any decision-making.
My husband plans the budget. He hands out money to me for shopping, he 
decides what should be bought and why. He doesn’t include my wishes in 
his plans so that I have to boil over in order to acquire the necessities that I 
need. (19)
Within wealthier households, women's case for working was weaker because the
husband was able to provide materially. For example, Lydia and her husband were
located in position 4 due to the fact that her husband migrated to Tyumen where
salaries were much higher, and brought second-hand cars back to Sverdlovsk for
resale. He insisted that his wife stay at home:
Now I am a housewife - my husband doesn't allow me to work, he wants me 
to sit at home... I can’t say that my husband provides for us in sufficient 
measure, but we have enough money. For now this situation suits me... but I 
miss work. When my husband decided that I had to sit at home, I argued 
with him for a long time. I didn't want to because I have a sociable 
character... But then I agreed because my husband was in a position to 
provide for me... I do everything that he wants only so that the home is 
peaceful and quiet and so that there aren't scandals. My husband is very 
jealous and for that reason I calmly sit at home in order not to give him 
reasons for jealousy. (63)
She settled for this arrangement because she considered it better than living as she
did before, as a single mother. Women whose husbands were able to provide for
them financially make a trade-off between loss of status and autonomy in exchange
for some measure of peace and security in the family.41 Women's dissatisfaction
41 Deniz Kandiyoti calls this a 'patriarchal bargain' (1988).
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with staying at home and their husbands' low incomes was more visible in the low 
economic positions. Four of the six housewives in positions 1-3 were looking after 
young children and said that they argued with their husbands about their husbands' 
failure to bring in an adequate income, and two had contacted their husbands' bosses 
to express their anger.42
6. Conclusions
Using a wider conception of work than employment alone, this chapter looked at the 
effect of a diverse range of livelihoods on households' economic positions. In line 
with Grogan, it suggested that there was a broad correlation between education, work 
skills and past experience and the ability to move out of the state sphere and into 
private enterprise activity as an employee or self-employed entrepreneur. 
Furthermore, it demonstrated that in order to understand which households were able 
to secure a living, and which were coping despite small wages and which were not, it 
was important to address access to additional income-earning opportunities and the 
non-monetary support and services that workplaces did or did not provide.
To return to the theory mentioned at the beginning of the chapter - that households 
survive by retreating from the work sphere and drawing increasingly on household 
resources - the evidence provided here was mixed. Households that experienced 
considerable impoverishment could not rely on 'defensive' strategies such as 
cultivating crops or mutual help as described by Burawoy et al. (2000). Urban
42 Two women were looking after older invalid children and these conjugal relations were more co­
operative.
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livelihoods required engagement in income-earning activity and could not be based 
on mutual support or subsistence production alone. Subsistence plots played a 
limited economic role in the city. However, examples of household practices that 
were important included kin co-residence, increased reliance on elderly household 
members, belt-tightening, giving loans and spending money rather than saving, 
increased dependence on self-employment and additional work.
Furthermore, household involution was not the only path pursued among 
respondents. There were opportunities for relatively young, skilled and educated 
people, particularly men, to take on well-paid jobs in the new private sector, to 
combine jobs, to attain new qualifications and to migrate. These entrepreneurial 
strategies were not 'defensive' but involved proactively offering services based on 
marketable skills. These people would in a more favourable economic context have 
constituted the middle social stratum. However, during the last ten years, they joined 
the ranks of the poor, and through initiative, hard work and networks, some managed 
to improve their standard of living or provide support to dependent kin.
For less fortunate respondents, a low economic position was the result of low-paid 
and/or irregular employment. Respondents with low incomes clung to the minimal 
security that an official state sector job continued to guarantee them. Many 
respondents, who had engaged in private enterprise activity, returned to 
state/privatised sector employment. The most precarious livelihoods belonged to 
those with very low or no incomes, who tried to find piecemeal work on a daily 
basis. They were without marketable skills or qualifications that allowed them to
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take up market opportunities. Their marginalisation from the labour market was 
exacerbated by the fact that they are isolated from kin and without conjugal support.
Living with grown-up kin was a mutual support strategy for households in economic 
positions 1-3. In households struggling to get by, elderly kin played an important 
contributory role as pensioners, possibly as income-eamers and, to a lesser extent, as 
child-carers and gardeners. Kin-based households were commonly located in 
positions 1-3 because they were unlikely to comprise two-income earners and 
struggled to support infirm, elderly or economically inactive dependants. The 
youngest generation was either in education or faced difficulty finding a first job. 
This younger generation's dependency was compounded by the fact that other 
household members were unlikely to help them start to make an independent living. 
Reliance on kin co-residence was therefore a cause and consequence of 
impoverishment. Dependence on kin was a consequence of impoverishment because 
it was a desperate way to support kin who were unable to live independently when 
individuals would otherwise have preferred to live separately. It was a cause of 
further impoverishment because obligations toward dependent kin within the 
household drain resources.
Finally, practices of survival and security were not simply either a reproduction of 
'routines of the Soviet period' or new market practices based on 'trade, service and 
petty commodity production'. Respondents continued to engage in practices that 
were familiar to them using resources they had always used. Many of today's trade 
and service activities evolved out of the Soviet period. However, the meaning and 
consequences of these strategies is novel in the market context. For example, in the
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case of self-employment, for middle-aged respondents with few alternative options, 
this work took on a new imperative and became a primary livelihood strategy. One 
consequence of this was that while some households were able to improve their 
standard of living, reliance on self-employment could create economic insecurity, 
adding to pressures on conjugal relations. In another example, a female respondent's 
decision to move from employment in a new small firm to a defense factory, where 
her pay was less than half the subsistence minimum, appears rational when the 
drawbacks of employment in the new private sector and the withdrawal of universal 
childcare provision are taken into account. Thus, to straightjacket people's strategies 
in terms of a Soviet versus market or modem versus anti-modem dichotomy limits 
our understanding of the rationale behind people's livelihood choices and the new 
economic and political constraints that shape the context in which they act.
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5; Livelihoods of Accumulation
1. Introduction
The subject of this chapter is a highly differentiated group of entrepreneurs. Most of 
them belonged to position 5, prospering households. They displayed a spectrum of 
incomes. At one end, there were two small service firm directors who occupied 
position 41 while at the other, there were very rich directors of several large firms.
As discussed in chapter 3, many had accumulated wealth in the early 1990s in the 
legislative and regulatory vacuum that arose from the collapse of the administered 
economy. Their activities centred on the exchange of goods between factories and 
trade in formerly unobtainable consumer goods. Engagement in some sectors of the 
regional economy proved particularly profitable. These included trading in the 
metals, machine-building and mining equipment from the region's large factories and 
construction.
This chapter looks at entrepreneurs' origins and livelihood strategies. After giving a 
brief overview of the evolution of private enterprise in the city, the chapter shows 
five paths followed by different kinds of entrepreneurs and the importance of the 
context in which people were embedded in the beginning of the 1990s. These paths 
do not provide a complete picture of the entrepreneurial landscape in the city, but 
nevertheless, were distinct paths evident among interview respondents.
hn addition, the shuttle-trader saw her income fluctuate. In the winter when she made profits from 
the sale of winter coats she was in position 5, but in the summer fell to position 4 (59).
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The second section looks at the problems and challenges entrepreneurs faced and 
how they responded to these difficulties. The section argues that entrepreneurs 
sought informal means to get around these difficulties, and it looks at the 
consequences of this informality. Finally, it examines changes in entrepreneurs' 
identities and argues that entrepreneurs' outlooks were gendered and based on an 
ideology of entitlement to the fruits of the market.
2. The Emergence of Entrepreneurs and Private Enterprise
Petty trade existed in Soviet times on a limited scale. For example, at a formal, legal 
level, traders could sell home-grown produce at the central market, where they paid a 
fixed sum and in return were provided with weighing scales, a service counter and 
access to on-site medical services.2 As a result of the state's increasing tolerance of 
illicit economic activity in the 1970s discussed in chapter 7, there were some 
informal trading opportunities in Soviet times at the flea market,'Shuvakisha', 
located on the outskirts of the town where traders sold deficit items out of suitcases. 
Traders paid bribes to the militia to turn a blind eye to their 'speculation', failing 
which, they risked confiscation of their wares or even a prison sentence. Women 
often engaged in these forms of trade. Other forms of trade included business within 
the Komsomol and trade between factories.3 These were usually engaged in by men.
2 See Lyuba's story in chapter 4 by way of example (57).
3 Enterprises that faced shortages in the supply of goods entered into informal bilateral barter relations 
with suppliers. This system was organised by regional party officials and enterprise ‘pushers’ or 
intermediaries know as tolkachi.
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The legalisation of trade prompted by Gorbachev's reforms,4 brought out into the
open various forms of trade. A general mood of excitement and expectation
prevailed in the early 1990s. Trade was seen as an easy way of making money for
many people. Alesander, a broker, commented,
I think that trade is the easiest thing in the world. It's the simplest way to 
earn money, and for that reason in the beginning of the 1990s, the whole 
country was trading. It was profitable action. (118)
There was a surge in the number of small trade and retail businesses in the city 
between 1991 and 1993. Hawkers traded their wares on the streets. Shuttle-traders 
began travelling abroad and bringing back goods, which they sold in markets and 
kiosks appeared. To begin with, there were no trading houses, shops or mini­
markets. Middlemen mediated between enterprises, taking a percentage from 
suppliers' profits for finding buyers. Organised crime groups became powerful 
economic actors, as chapter 7 indicates. They took over control of previously state- 
run market places5 and created new market places by occupying areas of land.6 
Apart from rackets in market places, they provided protection 'roofs' for enterprise 
directors and formed links with the authorities and entrepreneurs. Factory directors, 
with new control over property, worked with middlemen to sell-off resources and 
make large sums of money. As chapter 3 outlined, regional state officials and 
powerful industrialists ensured that they were in advantageous positions to 
manipulate the privatisation processes and to control newly privatised enterprises 
(Glinkina, Grigoriev and Yakobidze 2001,239). A new group of influential 
entrepreneurs was swiftly formed as a result of the sale of light and heavy metals,
4 One of the first moves was the authorisation of private co-operatives - small entrepreneurial 
businesses run by an individual or small group - in 1986.
5 For example, Uralmash seized control o f the Central Market.
6 For example, the Afghantsy (Afghan war veterans described in chapter 7) occupied Taganskii Ryad 
where people started trading.
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precious and semi-precious stones, through various types of export quota and thanks 
to contacts in Moscow and in the ministries. Financial operations dealing in hard 
currency, which were the basis for new commercial banks and insurance companies 
in the region, also emerged at this time (Rizhenkov and Lukhterkhandt 2001,168).
Respondents' accounts indicated that after a period of'wild distribution' at the 
beginning of the 1990s, the opportunities for making 'easy' money through 
intermediary activities came to an end in about 1994. Those who had amassed 
economic power continued to secure their positions in the economic and political 
arenas. The livelihoods of many entrepreneurs were destroyed by the August 1998 
crisis. Chapter 3 described the instability of the small business sector. After a 
decline in 1998, the oblast's small business sector recuperated to a slightly bigger 
size than pre-crisis (Goskomstat 2000f).
Figure 28: Respondent Entrepreneurs' Gender, Sector and Size of Business
Sector Enterprise size : 
small medium large
Total no. of 
respondents
No. of women 
respondents
Trade/retail 7 1 8 5
Services 4 3 1 8 2
Industrial production 1 3 2 6 1
Large-scale research has shown that women and men in business have a higher 
education and come from top and middle management positions in state enterprises. 
Commonly, women in business are between 30-39 years while the age bracket of 
men is much wider (Samartseva and Fomina 2000). All but four of my respondents8
7 Small enterprises are taken here to have less than 50 workers and medium-sized enterprises, less 
than 250 workers.
8 Those without a higher education engaged in trade.
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had been to institute or university.9 The age range was wider among my women 
respondents with three in their thirties, one younger and four older. Nine men were 
in their thirties, four in their forties and one in his twenties. Men went into business 
directly from state enterprise jobs in the late 1980s or early 1990s, while women 
were more likely to enter business in the early to mid-1990s, and often via 
employment in a new private sector firm or bank.
The Soviet economic order influenced the entrepreneurial activity in which women 
and men engaged. Studies have shown that women entrepreneurs were primarily 
engaged in less socially valued work spheres traditionally characterised as female 
such as science, consulting, health care, retail trade and services (Roshchin and 
Roshchina 1994, Babaeva and Chirikova 1996, Goskomstat 1997) and based on their 
domestic responsibilities such as childcare, education, clothes-making, and fruit and 
vegetable production (Khibovskaya 1995 cited in Satre Ahlander 2001). My female 
respondents were located predominantly in trade and to a lesser extent, in services 
and men in light and heavy industrial production and services. Nation-wide, male 
entrepreneurs were twice as likely to start their own business (Goskomstat 1998) and 
their businesses have grown larger than women's (Samartseva and Fomina 2000). 
One Sverdlovsk study found that women's businesses were small in terms of the 
number of people employed and the scale of activity (Amot, Samsonova and 
Yagovkina 1999). My men respondents' businesses were bigger than women's and 
the majority of men had a larger income from entrepreneurial activity than women, 
reflecting the profits to be made in the different sectors in which women and men 
engaged. It was estimated that nationally, women run 18% of small businesses
9 See figure 20, p. 110.
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(Gvozdeva and Gerchikov 2000). In Ekaterinburg, approximately one third of the 
36,000 private enterprises were run by women (93).
The literature on gender and entrepreneurship in Russia has focused on women's 
specific style of trading (Bruno 1997) and leadership (Chirikova and Krichevskaya 
2000). Men's main motivation for engagement in entrepreneurship is said to be 
profit while women focused on self-realisation (Gvozdeva and Gerchikov 2000).
This chapter shows that both women and men's main motivations were economic, 
but suggests that the ways they justified moneymaking were gendered.
3. Five Livelihood Paths
3.1 Komsomol leaders
One distinctive group engaging in 'biznes' was former Komsomol members who, in
Soviet times, occupied leadership positions at district, city and regional levels, which
promised prestigious political careers in the Communist Party. Segei was a former
Komsomol leader and now engaged in money lending and construction.
We began from the Komsomol. In the Komsomol at that time, there were 
many good people. Climbing the rungs of a career ladder, they worked in the 
Party and following that, in the organs of power. The enterprise director 
worked in the district, town or oblast administration. (91)
This up-and-coming young political elite benefited from the transformation in the
Komsomol that took place in the early 1990s and the organisation's direct link to the
state administration. Although the Komsomol collapsed, it was reincarnated in the
form of non-commercial organisations designed to support young people's
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enterprise. In addition, while the organisation was formally disbanded (Weaver 
1992), informally, Komsomol contacts were retained.
On the eve of perestroika, Komsomol leaders and their member friends were well 
positioned to seize opportunities of market reform. In Soviet times, Komsomol had 
been pivotal in giving young communists a rapid start in accumulating wealth. From 
the 1970s, the Komsomol had created its own 'business empire' (Gustafson 1999, 
119) with a large network of organisations, which owned property and was involved 
in business activities ranging from youth tourism to computer software development. 
Male student members earned large sums of money working on construction sites, 
money which, in the early 1990s, they used as start-up capital when developing their 
own businesses (118). Komsomol members engaged in commercial activity in 
scientific technical organisations for young people, which enjoyed tax reprieves. In 
the 1970s, involvement in these business activities provided training, capital and 
property for entry into private business and banking in the early 1990s.
In Ekaterinburg, the disbanded Komsomol was reincarnated as two organisations - 
the Russian Union of Young People and the Russian Union of Young People's 
Enterprise (91).10 These organisations were earmarked and supported by democratic 
politicians as important for the development of a young and talented business elite. 
Many businessmen respondents identified Komsomol members as the first to have 
left the factories and entered the private sector. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, 
they began to engage in young people's enterprise and created Komsomol co­
operatives. Komosmol leaders set-up new enterprises and offered work to specialists
10 These organisations continue to receive money from 'sponsors', including the state, and co-operate 
with the Sverdlovsk government and the oblast's Committee for Young People's Affairs (91).
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working in factories. A government order gave all entrepreneurs that worked 
through the Komsomol a two-year tax reprieve (91). These and other privileges 
meant that importing previously unavailable foreign goods was particularly lucrative.
Komsomol members' success in business was often a direct consequence of 
connections to the political elite and trading privileges bestowed on them by the 
administration. These contacts in a range of state institutions were important for 
getting started in business and continue to be important to their activity. Sergei 
stated,
There are people who can't find their way into the leadership's office. They 
stand in queues for months at a time. I come and they open the door and say 
to me "Seriozha, come in. What's the problem?". I have connections in the 
administration, in the militia, everywhere. Without connections now, you're 
simply going nowhere. (91)
In the past, participation in the Komsomol leadership signified the first step into the
political elite. Now the Komsomol represented a springboard for talented young
people into business. It was the source of influential networks that straddled the
economic and political arenas that were crucial for engagement in business activity.
These networks were gendered in terms of their formal content and the informal 
relations attached to them. In the formal sense, the top echelons of the Komsomol 
were male (Riordan 1989, 23) and the Komsomol was based on traditional gender 
roles.11 Informally, men invited their male friends into business with them. Women 
were generally not thought by male entrepreneurs to have the skills required for 
business and were excluded from men's business circles (Meshcherkina 2000).
11 For example, one of the primary aims of youth housing projects in which only men participated, 
was the correction of slippage of gender roles within the family by helping restore male authority 
(Pilkington 1994, 96).
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While six men respondents mentioned the role of Komsomol networks in providing 
then with opportunities to go into business, none of the women in business did so. 
Unlike men, women did not have access to Komsomol business networks and many 
businessmen operated with an ingrained prejudice against working with women, as 
chapter 6 shows.
3.2 Factory Production Managers
Had this group continued along their Soviet career trajectory, they would have 
become the future factory production elite. They were exclusively men in their 
twenties and thirties, and all had a higher education. They had all attended Urals
19Polytechnic Institute, graduating from the faculties of Radio-technology, Physics- 
technology and Engineer-construction. At the beginning of the 1990s, they had 
commonly been working in the factory for several years, as technological specialists 
or managers in charge of shop floors. They were motivated, young, skilled and with 
good networks in the factory directorate and the Komsomol.
Between 1989 and 1993, their first step into private sector activity invariably 
involved manipulating relations with the factory and their access to resources within 
it.13 For example, as chapter 3 noted, Uralmash factory managers and specialists set 
up private firms within the premises of the factory (126). They sold disused factory
12 The Urals Polytechnic Institute is one of the most prestigious centres for preparing engineer- 
technologists (Rizhenkov and Lukhterkhandt 2001,193).
13 There were many concrete examples of this. Entrepreneurs used a factory workshop and its labour 
force (e.g. programming software into computers in the defence factory, or setting up a private trading 
business in factories, using the factory's resources and hiring its labour). Entrepreneurs also bought 
equipment from one factory very cheaply and sold it on to another with a mark-up price. Stealing 
factory produce was also common practice in the early 1990s, often with the consent o f the factory's 
criminal 'roof or the enterprise directorship.
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products through these firms to countries such as India and China, making very large 
profits. The factory directorship accepted just 2-10% of the takings from sales (129).
Chapter 3 noted how the collapse of a centrally planned economy created new spaces 
that were filled by intermediaries making profits from exchange. Many respondent 
entrepreneurs gained their first experiences of market activity in brokering. In 
Soviet times, brokerage involved the search for buyers and exchange of factory 
goods for difficult-to-find inputs. Brokers were often relatives or close associates of 
factory managers or local government officials (Humphrey 1999b, 35). In 
Ekaterinburg, they had left the factories and were offering their middleman services 
as representatives of small firms. Through connections with factory directors and in 
the state administration, middlemen could sell state or privatised factory property 
that had either been stolen or that they bought very cheaply. Because of generous 
quota allowances and licenses issued by the state, they could sell these goods on to 
other factories locally or internationally. Large initial profits were made through tax 
exemptions, hard currency payments and the large volume of cash in circulation 
before steep inflation began in 1993. They reaped profits by selling factory materials 
in Ekaterinburg, imported through informal channels and, by exploiting the 
discrepancy between the rouble and lower value currencies in former Soviet 
Republics. Although some were uncomfortable engaging in these intermediary 
activities because of their illegal, unplanned and unstable nature, these initial trading 
experiences signalled the beginning of a new life that operated according to different 
principles from those they had known in the Soviet factories. The profits they made 
provided the start-up capital for other ventures.
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At this early stage and above all else, personal connections mediated access to 
resources for moneymaking. Four kinds of contacts played distinct roles. Firstly, 
factory directors provided access to factory goods, premises, labour and capital. The 
close links between economic and political power in the oblast14 meant that factory 
directors provided links with officials in the state administration. Personal contacts 
with state officials brought about tax exemptions, import privileges and export 
quotas. Secondly, organised crime groups provided some entrepreneurs with access 
to stolen factory goods, protection and overseas trading contacts. Thirdly, 
Komsomol contacts provided an organisational context through which they could 
obtain tax relief,15 start-up capital, access to brokering opportunities, links with other 
branches of the state administration and contacts with other aspiring specialists 
turned businessmen. Fourthly, horizontal friendships from the institute and the 
factory were important because business activity was considered too big a challenge 
to face alone. By going into business together, a group of three to five men could 
combine professional skills, contacts and reduce the impact of risk of failure.
After 1993, the scene became more differentiated. Some entrepreneurs continued in 
brokerage and developed successful brokering firms linked to the oblast's metals and 
defence industries. For Aleksandr, the improvement of the local economy since 
mid-1999 meant an increase in business (118). The majority followed routes into 
commerce and a minority entered production. One trigger for this move away from
14 James Hughes has noted that in the provinces, political and economic elites are inter-linked. The 
political elite is recruited from administrative officialdom and the economic managerial stratum 
(Hughes, 1997).
15 For example, buying up large quantities of equipment at very low prices from factories where 
people had worked or had connections and selling them on to another factory with a mark-up price 
under the tax-free umbrella of the Komsomol involved little work and made large sums of money 
(101).
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brokerage was the lack of liquidity in large factories. Entrepreneurs did not want to 
rely on state/privatised industry. Commerce involved investing capital accumulated 
from intermediary activities in buying large quantities of items from other parts of 
Russia or from abroad for resale to consumers in Ekaterinburg.
Some respondents moved into production, with the support of a sponsor, and 
engaged in activities related to food, pharmaceuticals, computers and domestic 
appliances. One trigger for this shift was increased competition amongst traders.
This allowed entrepreneurs to create a competitive hold over the market. One group 
started trading in salt in 1995, an untapped market that provided cash when there was 
little in circulation. They were earning US$500,000 per year and for two years had 
no competition in the Urals market. In 1997, competition appeared and they were 
forced to lower their prices and so they decided that it would be more profitable to 
buy equipment and set-up a plant. They bought unrefined salt, produced, packaged 
and sold it and business became profitable again. They had a written agreement with 
the salt mine to take their whole production of salt (101). The advent of trading 
houses from 1996 onwards gave traders a further push from intermediary activities 
into production.
1994 was a difficult year for many entrepreneurs. With hyperinflation, money 
’melted’. Producers faced particular problems. For example, in the two days, that it 
would take to send money through the bank to the factory for an order of raw 
materials, the amount of raw materials that could be purchased with that money had 
reduced significantly. Many of the producers, whose main client was the state16 or
16 Examples include a firm producing medical equipment for state hospitals and a firm producing raw 
materials refining equipment in state factories.
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who were engaged in very competitive markets, switched to the production of other 
goods. Andrei, whose firm assembled computers, switched to producing and trading 
in domestic appliances because computers had become a competitive and crowded 
market, while the demand for domestic appliances, especially washing machines and 
refrigerators, was growing (98). At this stage, businesses rarely specialised. Traders 
would sell-on anything that would bring a profit17 and producers made a diverse 
range of marketable goods to keep afloat. Some producers moved into other 
moneymaking activities, while continuing in an unprofitable niche, on the premise 
that their perseverance, accumulated experience and expertise would reap dividends 
when the economy recovered. Diversification enabled them to generate the income 
needed to continue their niche production.
1995 brought further economic slump. Entrepreneurs dreamt up ways for making 
money such as pyramid investments. For example, Konstantin had followed events 
pertaining to the ‘MMM’ pyramid investment association, which defrauded more 
than one million Russians of their savings. He used the 'MMM' example to generate 
cash. He sold share vouchers in a ten-story residential building, the money from 
which he used to buy soft drinks and trainers in Moscow. The profits from their sale 
enabled him to return people's money after a year but without interest. An infamous 
scheme was instigated in the region by a group of engineers. Through advertising on 
television, the radio and in the press, people were invited to buy shares in 'Uralskii 
PeVmenf, a venture that planned to build fifteen Russian dumpling bistros. It 
promised high returns to investors within a year. 10,000 people rushed to buy shares 
and in 1995 construction began. By 1998, construction had ground to a halt; the
17 For example, one entrepreneur was involved between 1993-5 in the trade of a range o f consumer 
goods including clothing, shoes, perfume, western chocolate bars, soft-drinks and caviar (101).
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venture's founders had disappeared and are believed to be in Switzerland and 
Canada. People lost their money and their share certificates are now worthless.
The manipulation of barter chains was another moneymaking strategy. For 
entrepreneurs, barter became a way to obtain money in a cash-starved economy 
(LaRefi and Roses 1999). Skilled entrepreneurs constructed long barter chains to 
acquire goods that they thought they could sell-on for cash. Long chains of debtors 
required trustworthy exchange partners with items to exchange. Personal 
connections with large factory enterprises relying on barter transactions to continue 
production were particularly useful. Middlemen dealers were known as 'the boys' 
(malchiki) because barter was engaged in by men and was seen as 'male' in its need 
for calculation, aggression and trickery (Makarov and Kleiner 1996 cited in 
Humphrey 2000).
The second half of the 1990s continued to be a 'hungry' time for many entrepreneurs. 
The August 1998 crisis destroyed many small businesses, but some businesses, 
independent of international markets, experienced a boost in demand for locally 
produced goods. Large profits were made from the sale of Russian goods, such as 
metals, on the international market for dumping prices and some firms took 
advantage of the low prices and started trading industrial produce in the west (118).
This entrepreneur-type had a particular education and professional background that 
was gender and age-specific. These male ex-industrial factory professionals saw 
themselves as "producers by spirit" (115). Men dominated management in Soviet
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heavy industrial enterprises (Moor 1999 cited in Satre Ahlander 2001) and as 
mentioned, brokerage and barter was seen as men’s business.
After 1994, there were fewer entrants into commerce and production business. The
generation below these self-made businessmen believed they had missed the
opportunities available for rapid economic advancement in the early 1990s. Dima,
now 25 years old, and working as a manager in a construction firm, noted,
Very often I wish I had been bom five years earlier because people starting 
their life, their business, at the beginning of perestroika were able to achieve 
more than me. It is possible to compare that time with the Wild West, with 
America at the end of the 19th century, when people went around with 
revolvers and there were huge opportunities to build a life for yourself. That 
doesn't happen now. After the coupon system massive quantities of goods 
were brought from abroad and free trade opened. You bought 'Snickers' 
[brand of chocolate bar] cheaply in Poland and brought them to Russia and 
sold them for three times as much. People earned money by the sack-full 
then, but it was chaos, robbery. Now we stay for a long time in work, try to 
gain experience and status. Now it is very important to make connections in 
order to be able to turn to someone so that you aren't cheated. (25)
Andrei, a successful businessman, believed that while it was possible to build
connections in the city and oblast administration in the early 1990s, it was now
considerably more difficult.
It's very hard to start up a business from scratch now. The administration is 
surrounded by powerful people, who demand money for themselves for every 
service. (98)
The difficulty noted in chapter 4, of moving from position 4 to 5, is partly explained 
by the new difficulties entering business, linked to the administrative environment.
Production-oriented activity posed difficulties for entrepreneurs because it required 
long-term investment, a risky strategy in an uncertain economic and political 
environment. It was more visible and therefore liable to control by the state.
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However, even if less immediately profitable, it was attractive because it was 
perceived as more stable and less dependent on others than trade and morally 
superior to trade as the chapter later suggests.
3.3 Organised Crime Groups and War Veterans
Both organised crime and war veteran groups in the early 1990s consisted of young 
men who saw opportunities to improve their lives and earn money. Both groups are 
discussed in chapter 7.
The Uralmash group, known as Uralmash, started in the Ordonikidze District. The 
majority of the group's leaders graduated from the Pedagogical Institute in sports
1 fttraining and the original leaders were sports champions representing their country . 
In the early 1990s, the group started collecting money for 'security1 and progressed to 
control whole markets, renting space to traders and offering loans to aspiring 
entrepreneurs. The group invested in various enterprises and, with the accumulated 
capital, bought shares in other enterprises at low prices.
The Afghan war veterans, known as the Afghantsy, were a second commercial group, 
some of whom used their skills in the field of violence and their access to weapons to 
develop their livelihoods. Members of the group were able to make profits by 
providing 'security' and creating commercial ventures.
18 Sport was a sphere linked with corruption in Soviet times because o f the wealth attached to it 
(Riordan 1978). Sportsmen made large sums of money competing internationally but had to renounce 
most o f their winnings to the state (Meshcherkina 2000,106-7).
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Both groups are almost exclusively male. The Afghantsy reflects the war experience.
By the contrast, Uralmash was formed by two brothers and their male friends from
the courtyard where they grew up. The 22 leaders of the organisation are all men
and women "participate only as members' wives and relatives" (51). The violent
extortion activities in which they were engaged made the group ill suited to women.
Pavel, a member of Uralmash, stated,
Here [in Russia] we haven't yet grown-up to the feminist idea of women in 
business. Several years ago, engagement in business was a difficult, bloody 
affair - it wasn't women's business. And now, the very same people are in 
power who seven years ago were there, so that here, the situation practically 
has not changed. I don't know how it will be in another generation. (51)
Business is thought to be male because of the criminal nature of business activity.
3.4 New Professionals
The term 'new professionals' is used to refer to those who engaged in spheres of 
activity unknown in their current form in Soviet times, such as independent media, 
advertising, promotions, public relations and marketing. An analysis of several of 
the key actors in this sector revealed a background as the elite of counter-culture 
movements, such as rock music.19 The movement emerged in the 1970s and 
continued throughout the 1980s. The Ekaterinburg rock music scene was considered 
one of the largest in Russia.20 The underground nature of their activities was 
intrinsic to the movement because all forms of organising outside the state were
19 In 1986, Anatoli Grakhov, now one o f the the city's most successful media magnates, created the 
region's Rock Club, which brought together the city's bohemia, organised concerts and published 
music magazines.
20 The city has produced famous groups such as 'Chaif, 'Urfin Dzhus', 'Nautilus-Pompilius' and 'Agata 
Kristi'. Famous composers and poets in Sverdlovsk rock include A. Pantikin and I. Kormil'tsev who 
worked with rock musicians and in cinema, theatre and television.
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illegal and rock music was banned.21 They engaged in the informal publishing of 
music magazines (samizdat) and recording of music in home studios.
They included musicians, film and theatre directors, dramatologists, artists, 
photographers and psychologists, and had a higher education. The close relations 
between the movement's leaders were evident in the continued financial support they 
provided to each other. They typically had an expansive Russia-wide network of 
friends. Music, advertising and media required expensive equipment and friends 
provided vital sources of interest-free credit. The continuing influence of the west 
was evidenced by international travel by some of the movement's elite's in the early 
1990s22 and the importance attributed to keeping abreast of western business 
practice.
The move from involvement in underground activity promoting freedom of musical 
expression into media, advertising and publishing was a natural step for the 
movement's leaders. For many in this group, the transition to the private sector came 
about as a result of a wish to do creative work they enjoyed independently of the 
state. Vasili, one of the three founders of'Fame Studio', a photographic advertising 
agency, was a musician in Soviet times. His father was a photographer, and Vasili 
had done photography as a hobby. With the collapse of the Soviet system, he 
realised that working as a musician was a dead-end job and he turned his hobby into 
a full-time profession. He believed there were two types of people - those with a 
slave mentality and those with a fighting mentality. According to him, musicians
21 In the 1980s, the Komsomol took control over the rock movement (Rizhenkov and Lukhterkhandt 
2001,199).
22 Many looked to banned western music for their musical inspiration in the 1970s.
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had a slave mentality in that they received a small salary or work for free and took 
no steps to find other work elsewhere. He changed his profession at the onset of 
market reform because he was unwilling to remain in this predicament (127). The 
rhetoric of the Soviet state making people into slaves was also expressed in this 
group's views of the family. Aleksandr, known locally as the 'grandfather of Urals 
rock', worked in Soviet times as a professional composer for theatres and film 
studios around Russia. In 1993, with the financial backing from friends in the rock 
music movement, he formed a private recording studio and record label. He 
believed,
The contemporary person doesn't need a family. It simply limits and makes a 
person inferior and unable to make free decisions. The state does this 
because it needs slaves. It doesn't need bright free personalities who stand 
out from the general masses, but cogs in the wheel (vintiki) who quietly sit in 
their cells and say nothing. (32)
This group transferred their creative skills into profitable enterprise, which was no 
mean feat considering the depressed state of cultural life. Individual entrepreneurs in 
this group maintained their fiercely independent stance. For example, Anatoli's radio 
broadcasting company held two central principles: the pursuit of profit and refusal to 
be politically aligned (109).
Several specific problems faced this group. Firstly, the provision of services in an 
unstable economy involved risk because, with a downturn in the economy, people 
economised on entertainment services. Secondly, retaining independence in a highly 
politicised economy was challenging especially in the run-up to local elections.
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Thirdly, businesses that provided advertising and marketing services faced 
difficulties changing mindsets about the operation of the market.23
Women were of secondary importance in the rock music community as a whole and 
were not among the movement's elite (Easton 1989, 71-72). Men dominated these 
new professions, although young professional women were working their way up the 
career ladder in media and journalism, as indicated in chapter 4's discussion of 
employment path (v). Young women entered new media and advertising jobs at 
management level, having gained experience and skills working in foreign firms.
3.5 Small Traders
Small traders include kiosk, shuttle, home-grown produce24 and street traders. In a 
hierarchy of entrepreneurs, these were located near the bottom. Their success was 
mixed. Young, inexperienced people who wanted to engage in private enterprise 
often decided to go into the kiosk business. Many of these businesses folded 
because of confrontation with 'bandits' who control trade, a point discussed later.
Successful kiosk traders - most prestigious among small traders - started by buying a 
kiosk and the initial goods they wanted to sell with a loan from a friend. With the 
money made from the sale of the first goods, they bought more, expanded their 
assortment of goods and paid back their loans. They could buy a second and third
23 For example, advertisers face difficulty introducing the idea that the market is demand and not 
supply-led (109).
24 Selling home-grown produce is a form of self-employment discussed in chapter 4, employment 
path (iv).
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kiosk with the accumulated profits, and eventually expanded into mini-market type 
shops. A next step could be the purchase of a shop.
Less prestigious than kiosk ownership, shuttle trading involved travel abroad to 
purchase goods to sell in Russia. Capital was needed for a first trip abroad and the 
purchase of the first items for sale and money was found through a variety of sources 
such as a bank, the sale of property or a loan from a friend or husband. The first 
wave of shuttle-traders went to countries such as Turkey, Thailand and China and 
brought back clothes. Because of the competition in clothes trading, some shuttle- 
traders switched to other items such as gold, chinaware and furniture. When it began 
in 1991, shuttle traders were unhindered by legislation, customs officials and militia. 
The work was strenuous, involving constant travel and lugging heavy bags between 
stations, airports and markets. The profit from sale was transferred into dollars and 
invested in the purchase of goods on the next trip.
The first small traders, who worked in spheres such as banking, accountancy, 
teaching and administration, had an assortment of educational and professional 
backgrounds. Successful traders were often experienced traders in Soviet times. For 
example, Svetlana, one of the first-wave of shuttle-traders, had gained valuable 
experience trading informally from the early 1980s. Her brother's wife worked in a 
shop and passed goods to them that were difficult to procure. She had always 
wanted to start up her own business, and in 1985, she borrowed money from 
acquaintances, which she had to repay at a high rate of interest. With this capital, 
she and her brother traded goods in the market such as mohair scarves, tracksuits, 
and summer dresses. This was profitable work, and the more they sold at the market,
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the more goods they could buy and thereby expand their business (59). The 
entrepreneurial basis to this activity provided training and contacts that left her well 
positioned to take advantage of new opportunities to trade openly in the early 1990s.
Parental experience of trade prior to and at the onset of market reform provided 
important knowledge, experience and contacts for young aspirant traders. Parents of 
some small traders expanded their trade in the early nineties and helped their 
children to follow suit. Larissa, now a successful gold-trader, followed in her 
parents' footsteps and said that "trade is in my veins from my parents" (58). In 
Soviet times, her mother worked for the state-trading organisation, 'Torg\ and often 
travelled outside the Soviet Union. At the same time, her father regularly travelled 
to the North to purchase untreated furs, which he made into scarves and sold in 
Ekaterinburg. In 1987, when she was 17 and still at college, Larissa went to 
Tashkent with a group of friends to bring back leather and cosmetics to sell. Her 
mother had made her first trips to Thailand in 1992 and then to Istanbul. Initially, 
Larissa travelled with her mother, and then gradually built up her own contacts in 
Turkey and Ekaterinburg and began to work on her own.
Different kinds of contacts were important to traders at the initial stages of their 
businesses. Friends in the tourist industry could provide shuttle-traders with the 
necessary documents. Many shuttle-trading women would initially travel abroad in 
groups with girlfriends. Trading parents and friends provided contacts abroad and 
information about where and what to buy. Acquaintances within organised crime 
groups were important in ensuring unreasonable demands regarding protection,
25 Blat relations with organised crime groups allowed traders to 'rent' spaces on markets at reduced 
prices.
loan payments and future business direction were not made. Friendships within the 
state administration, particularly among customs officials, ensured they would turn a 
blind eye to goods smuggled across borders.
In the early 1990s, only organised crime groups demanded money from traders, but 
after several years of trading, bureaucratic obstacles began to grow. In order to 
continue their activity undisturbed, traders had to pay bribes to an increasing number 
of state institutions. In 1994, some shuttle-traders could no longer afford to go 
abroad because of high bribes demanded by customs officials to allow the illegal 
importation of goods. At that point, some of them began travelling to Moscow to 
purchase contraband goods from migrants from former Soviet Republics who had 
established themselves in Russia. After 1995, officialdom in the form of the militia, 
the health, safety and tax inspectors paid increasingly frequent visits. Fire 
inspectors, with the power to close small businesses, come once per month, and 
collect bribes of about R100.
Motivations for trade included the thrill, economic need, staff reductions and the 
boredom of maternity leave. Although enthusiastic about opportunities to openly 
trade in the early 1990s, this group's livelihoods were precarious. The appearance of 
big trading houses in the mid-1990s, which had importation contracts with firms in 
countries such as China and Turkey and the establishment of trading immigrants in 
Russia, meant that the function played by Russian shuttle-traders was reduced.
Those traders who strove to own one or more shops had the onerous task of buying 
premises, which was expensive and involved negotiating with a large number of 
state agencies for the necessary licenses and permits.
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Despite increasing competition and fluctuations in consumer spending, some shuttle- 
traders' standard of living improved (Ivanov, Komlev and Tolchinskii 1998).
Trading activity continued to be profitable only because it was outside the realms of 
the law. Operating informally, which involved paying rent (or a protection ’roof) to 
the groups that controlled the market and paying bribes to state officials, had lower 
transaction costs than trade through legal channels, as chapter 7 discusses. However, 
without good relations with these groups, informal trading activity continued to 
involve great risk in the face of the threat of violence by organised crime, the threat 
of closure because of the failure to comply with red tape, and the struggle to remain 
competitive.
There was a common mistaken perception among businessmen that traders are male. 
Sergei, a businessman, stated "at the market there are many women among the 
sellers, but they are hired workers. For example, the shuttle-traders bring the goods, 
but it's the women sellers to sell them. You can't call these women businessmen" 
(91). Research has shown that contrary to Sergei's assumption, shuttle-traders were 
predominantly female (Iglicka 2001, 511). The experiences of respondent small 
traders, who were all women, challenged the perception that women were not 
predisposed to entrepreneurship because of the travel, risk and self-sufficiency 
involved. Small traders interacted with organised crime groups, bureaucrats and 
militia daily and regularly travelled abroad and within Russia. Their work demanded 
the ability to make and keep a wide array of'friends' and calculation about the costs 
of maintenance. An ability to assess risk was needed to act illegally and to invest in 
goods when unsure about their marketability.
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This section identified five paths followed by people who went into entrepreneurial 
activity in the early 1990s and showed the importance of access to different 
resources for each. The professional elites, from the city's powerful defence and 
metallurgical factories and rich cultural and intellectual institutions, were among the 
first to take advantage of opportunities offered by private enterprise. The context in 
the early 1990s was defined by the nature of privatisation processes. The 
interlocking of the region's economic and political elites and the lax legislative 
environment ensured that assets were redistributed according to established informal 
networks among the state administration and enterprise directors.
Secondly, the discussion highlighted how for many respondents, entrepreneurial 
activity was not novel, but a progression from Soviet era activity. They had learned 
valuable lessons from their parents' trade experience in Soviet times, through work 
experience as brokers between factories, in Komsomol young people's business 
activities and holiday work and as 'speculators'. The section identified specific 
communities from which business grew, such as the rock music movement, the 
union of war veterans, the Komsomol, heavy industrial factories, sports and 
neighbourhood gangs of youths.
Thirdly, at the onset of market reforms their ability to turn material and human 
resources into enrichment strategies was shaped by access to social networks.
Higher education was important for the horizontal connections attained from it, as 
evidenced by the shuttle-traders, the Uralmash leaders and founders of trading, 
brokering and production firms, who had been fellow students. Professional status 
provided access to resource-rich bridging networks. Komsomol, Afghanistan
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veterans' and factory directors' networks in the state administration provided special 
quotas, licenses and policies that made brokerage, trade and commerce lucrative 
activities. Professional status ensured that would-be entrepreneurs were better 
positioned to respond to opportunities for moneymaking through middleman 
activities that exploited state resources. For petty traders and new professions, 
contacts within the state lessened the obstacles to private enterprise but they did not 
provide moneymaking opportunities. For these, the wish to determine (and not have 
the state determine for them) the course of their working lives was a primary 
motivating factor for entry into private enterprise.
One main observation was the youth of entrants to entrepreneurial activity. All but 
one respondent were in their twenties and thirties when they began in the early 
1990s. Young people did not have temptingly close pensions. Some faced 
unemployment as was the case of the Uralmash youth, war veterans and petty traders 
while others aspired to be the up-and-coming elite entitled to enrichment through 
private enterprise, as was the case with the factory managers and young creative 
professionals employed in cultural institutions. Except for war veterans, most had 
higher education qualifications. Professional skills played a role. The war veterans 
used their military training to offer a reputable protection 'roof. Skills accrued 
informally, such as illegal trading, were relevant for some.
Finally, the section brought out the gender dimension of entrepreneurial activity. It 
suggested that men's privileged positions among the city's elite and the continuing 
role played by informal networks consisting of men meant that professional men 
were well positioned in relation to the redistribution of resources at the beginning of
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the reform process. Men who viewed entrepreneurship as male because of the 
qualities of bravery and risk that it required and because of its criminal nature, 
excluded women from their business networks. Nonetheless, women's livelihood 
paths, particularly as small traders, showed that they did display the qualities 
demanded by the market even if rebuffed by businessmen.
4. Informality: Challenges and Responses
One main characteristic of entrepreneurial activity was its informality. This section 
considers the reasons why entrepreneurs operated informally and the consequences 
of informal activity. Activity was informal in the sense that it was outside the remit 
of the state. The state did not provide an effective legislative system to protect 
entrepreneurs and entrepreneurs acted in an environment of uncertainty. They 
avoided detection by the authorities because of the high costs, particularly in terms 
of high taxes, of formal action.
4.1 Access to Start-up and Investment Capital
One of the first problems faced by aspiring entrepreneurs in the early 1990s was the 
difficulty of raising start-up capital. Strict conditions were applied to loans.26 The 
borrower risked losing everything if unable to repay the loan. Interest rates were 
between 180% - 250% a year. Some aspiring entrepreneurs tried to use blat relations 
with bank directors to get better loan conditions but they were not guaranteed to
26 The borrower needed collateral against which to take out a loan, a guarantor, an income, a business 
plan and an enterprise balance.
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work. Banks were considered untrustworthy institutions and a means for corrupt 
nomenklatura to make quick money and were associated with criminality. Tanya 
had worked as a bank director in Soviet times. In the early 1990s, she set up several 
private banks in Sverdlovsk and Moscow but disillusioned by corruption in private 
banking, she switched to commerce, only to be cheated out of a large sum of money. 
So, she set up her own production firm (100).
Organised crime groups were an alternative source of credit. The Uralmash group 
stated that investment in production projects was more profitable than storing capital 
in a bank because money had to 'work'. It had experts who assessed small 
businesses’ profit potential (51). The consequences of criminal groups’ investment in 
small business is discussed in chapter 7.
Several entrepreneurs admitted taking 'criminal' money. The director of one private
theatre relied on 'sponsorship' from criminal group members. He found them
generous people and did not inquire about their business (70). Entrepreneurs with
larger businesses frequently admitted to having friends and acquaintances among
criminal groups but said they preferred to take loans from banks because of the
negative repercussions that criminal investment would have for their reputations.
Zhenya, a medical equipment production firm director, said that while the difficulty
in the beginning of the 1990s was preventing the criminal from taking your money,
the difficulty now was to prevent the criminal from giving you money. In response
to the question whether he accepted their money, he answered,
It's difficult for me to answer the question whether I can refuse a bandit who 
asks me to launder dirty money through my firm. If I have enough spiritual 
strength to refuse, then that's how I act. (121)
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His ambiguity was deliberate. His comment that he refused when he had moral 
strength suggested that sometimes he did not have sufficient moral strength and 
succumbed to accepting bandit money out of business pragmatics.
Aspiring entrepreneurs who had borrowed money from criminal groups found that 
the criminal groups made unreasonable demands on the direction of their business. 
Three men took out a loan from Uralmash from whom they rented a kiosk. As well 
as paying back the loan with interest, the Uralmash 'roof increased from twenty per 
cent, to 30% and then 40% of their profits. Despite this, the business was still 
profitable. Then, Uralmash demanded that they take out another loan to expand into 
a bigger kiosk. However, they refused because they had no guarantee that Uralmash 
would not throw them out and leave them with a large outstanding debt. As a result, 
they lost the business (130). Criminal groups had destroyed entrepreneurs' 
businesses when loan conditions are not met. Denis's kiosk was burnt down because 
he could not meet the loan repayment conditions and consequently, his shoe-maker's 
business was ruined (43).
Over half aspiring businesspeople relied on rich friends and former employers for 
interest-free loans. The downside of reliance on friends was that outside Moscow, 
they were not sufficiently resource-rich. A smaller number struck deals with a rich 
person who invested in the venture and, in return, became a founder with company 
shares. After ten years of business activity, two generations could be in business, 
and kin loan money to each other. Lilia owned a small boutique. Like most 
entrepreneurs with small firms, she thought that borrowing money from kin and 
friends was the most practical option.
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When I tried to turn to my client who was also the director of a bank with the 
request for privileged credit, or better credit conditions, he refused me. For 
that reason, when I need money, I borrow from my friends, or my son who 
also has a relatively stable business. (99)
There was considerable risk in borrowing money, and a financial crisis could ruin 
livelihoods and leave individuals with large debts. Entrepreneurs in this position 
were forced to divert resources from developing their business to clear debts.
Cash shortages in the economy, described in chapter 3, such as hyperinflation in 
1993-1994 and reliance on barter in 1994-1996, presented severe difficulties for 
entrepreneurs in obtaining cash. Barter exchange could leave people with goods that 
were difficult to sell, as well as costs associated with storage, finding buyers and 
transporting the goods. In addition, people could have to deal with an unknown
77person, with risk of being cheated or associating with criminal groups.
4.2 Access to Premises
A further obstacle to starting up or developing a business is the difficulty of 
obtaining premises. Intermediary and trade activity in the early 1990s did not 
necessitate access to premises. Trade necessitated access to storage places in 
cellars and small warehouses, often located in the markets and around the railway 
station. However, storage was problematic because a protection 'roof had to be paid 
and there was a high risk that bandits or workers would steal goods. Entrepreneurs
27 For example, in the case where B's debt to A was transferred to C to cancel out a debt that C had to 
B.
28 For traders engaged in the smuggling of contraband goods, the preference is not to work from a 
property because to do so would make their business more visible.
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engaging in production reached informal agreements with factories to rent or take 
over factory workshops with the promise of rent and worker payment should the 
venture take off. Thanks to Mayor Chemetskii's decision to allow lower floors of 
apartment buildings to be converted into shops, homes could be turned into shops.
Since the early 1990s, bureaucratic procedures relating to property for business use 
have increased. The time and expense involved in bribe payments has made the 
hurdles to business entrance higher than before. Influential connections in the oblast 
administration were an essential prerequisite to obtaining permission to build a shop. 
Sasha, the owner of a chain of mini-market shops selling jeans, obtained permission 
to open a shop in a state-owned building of historical importance in the city centre 
because his father worked in the Federal Government offices in Ekaterinburg and 
was on informal ’you' terms with Governor Rossel (9). However, without 
sufficiently strong personal connections at high levels in the administration, bribes 
paid to different branches of the state, in expectation of receiving permission to build 
or open a shop, could be paid in vain as chapter 6 shows.
4.3 Cheating: Theft and Fraud
In the early 1990s, entrepreneurs faced a high risk of being cheated. The weakness 
of the legal system left businesspeople vulnerable to theft, the violation of contracts, 
and being sold poor quality or counterfeit goods. Entrepreneurs with little 
experience of the market were easily cheated. A common form of cheating was 
handing over money in expectation of goods that were then not given.29 For
29 In Russian this is referred to as 'kinut' cheloveka na den gz\
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example, Stas started trading sugar from Ukraine for sale in Russia in 1993-4. He
and his partner were cheated because they went through an intermediary to find the
contacts in Ukraine to sell them the sugar. Stas recalled,
It was a time when there weren't so many laws and taxes. Then people made 
themselves something out of nothing. I didn’t manage to make something of 
myself because I wasn't experienced. We were set up and we lost a lot of 
money. Not knowing the risks of business, it is difficult to build something 
real. Acquaintances are very important in business. We are used to trusting 
people but they cheated us. (22)
Realising that he did not have the contacts or experience necessary for working in
business, he decided to become an employee in a private firm and enrolled on a
management course at Urals State University.
Theft was rife. Employees embezzled money and informed bandits about how to 
break in to a firm's safe or warehouses. Vladimir's linoleum business ran into a 
stream of theft-related problems. His business began through the sale of linoleum 
stolen from a local factory. The business experienced a number of setbacks as 
resources were stolen from warehouses. In 1998, the safe was broken open and all 
the money taken, the warehouse was broken into several times and a large quantity 
of goods taken. A store-man was informing other thieves who were looting their 
business, but they could not identify the culprit. Many entrepreneurs explained their 
misfortune as Vladimir did, with the phrase, "We were too trusting for serious 
business" (111). In reality, there were no sanctions against theft and fraud. 
Vladimir's business suffered losses of US$150,000 and had US$500,000 of debts. 
One of the owners stole cash, leaving the others to deal with the problem. Their 
financial predicament grew worse. Since the money was not theirs, their survival 
depended on borrowing from some people to repay others.
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A common way of being cheated was purchasing poor quality goods. In 1995, 
Konstantin and a group of friends bought $US200,000 of caviar, which turned out to 
be rotten. This catastrophe lost them practically all the money that they had made 
(101). The temptation to buy cheaper counterfeit items was great especially when 
money was short. When entrepreneurs said, "ensuring quality requires colossal 
moral strength" (100) they referred to the difficulty of resisting the financial 
incentives of fraudulent practices.
With the prevalence of fraud and cheating, entrepreneurs relied on alternative ways 
of engineering trust in their economic activities. Entrepreneurs confined activity to 
personalised exchanges. One mechanism for creating trust was to invest resources in 
cultivating horizontal ties with potential partners. Whereas in the early 1990s shuttle- 
traders travelled abroad to pay for goods and bring them home, some had 
successfully established trustworthy relations with suppliers abroad and no longer 
had to go in person. The suppliers' trust in their Russian trading partners was 
evidenced by the way they dispatched goods before receiving payment. The 
arrangement saved the Russian traders time and expense. Even if they did not have 
the money, their trading partners abroad trusted them and were prepared to send the 
goods on credit. Larissa brought jewellery and furniture into Russia and had 
established trusting relations with Turkish partners so that she could order the goods 
and send the money. In another case, Lilia, a boutique owner, explained,
The Danish firm has already informed me that my order is ready, that they
are sending it, and that I should send the money. (99)
The clothing supplier and the Russian buyer trusted each other like partners.
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Secondly, to avoid being sold sub-standard goods, entrepreneurs avoided buying 
very cheaply. Instead, they invested considerable time checking the quality of goods 
and the reputation of a potential partner. Information about another person was 
sought through trusted informants with experience of dealings with that person, as 
chapter 6 shows.
Thirdly, businesses emphasised the importance of developing honest reputations as 
people who fulfilled responsibilities to partners. A good reputation allowed 
interaction with successful, reputable firms. Ruining the reputation of a partner by 
publicising their malpractice acted as a deterrent against breaking agreements. 
Chapter 6 discusses how this threat deterred cheating in an environment where 
business operated through horizontal ties. Nevertheless, the interests of the well- 
intentioned partner were not necessarily saved by their integrity. Powerful actors 
used slandering to destroy competition. Slandering an honest competitor's reputation 
reinforced the idea that nothing and no-one is to be trusted, thereby further hindering 
the development of the market.
Reliance on personal social relations for conducting business was not a foolproof 
way of avoiding being cheated. Trust engendered by personal relations presents an 
increased opportunity for malpractice (Granovetter 1985,62). Among respondents, 
malpractice between trusted people was evident in relations between co­
directors/founders of firms. Conflict between firm directors led to partners taking 
customers and money (126) and deserting the firm when it faced problems (111).
The absence of legislation relating to intra-firm relations meant that courts did not 
help settle conflicts when partners split up owing to disagreement (32). A danger
192
was that intra-firm disputes between partners were solved through violence. 
Aleksandr, the recording studio director decided to found his firm alone to eliminate 
the danger of confronting differences of opinion, so as to work "calmly" and avoid 
the risk of "banditism" (32). However, according to my data, the instances of 
malpractice among entrepreneurs in trusting relations were few and far between, 
testament to the importance attributed to reputation, honesty among trusted partners, 
and the power of the sanction of violence.
The sanction of violence was a further method to ensure that contracts are honoured. 
Engagement in business without ’enforcement protection’ was almost impossible, as 
chapter 7 shows. Organised crime groups ensured debts are repaid, favours 
delivered for bribes paid to officials and contracts enforced. However, reliance on 
violence as a penalty for the violation of agreements was problematic because 
conflict was resolved not in the interests of fair or honest entrepreneurship but in 
favour of the side with the stronger enforcement protection. Successful 
entrepreneurs no longer faced violence personally because they hired their own 
private protection firms. By contrast, street level racketeers threatened small-scale 
entrepreneurs' businesses.
4.4 An Obstructive State
The state was considered a formidable hindrance to private enterprise. According to 
respondents, the state "strangles", "stifles", "crushes" and "destroys". "State 
bureaucracy is something frightening". Officials were "arrogant" and "swindling". 
Entrepreneurs continued "in spite" of the state. The list of problems the state
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presented to entrepreneurs included mindless bureaucracy, changing and new laws, 
bribery and corruption and the difficulty of obtaining permits and licenses. When 
starting up a business, entrepreneurs were hindered by lengthy bureaucratic 
processes that involved dealing with numerous departments.30 Entrepreneurs 
resented the fact that they worked while officials did nothing except endlessly 
formulate paperwork and decisions in order to benefit from the fruits of 
entrepreneurs’ labour. Entrepreneurs felt that they worked without state support only 
to find that the state "hoovers" (vityagivaniy deneg) as much of their profits as 
possible. Many agreed with the principle of taxes to support the less fortunate, but 
claimed to feel "moral discomfort" (109) knowing that taxes paid would be used to 
line officials' pockets.
An obstructive state heightened the need to act informally. Entrepreneurs' biggest 
complaint was the high taxes the state expects them to pay. All entrepreneurs 
responded to this problem by having an official and unofficial story about how their 
business operated.31 Most entrepreneurs complained about how the state forced 
them to act as criminals and that evading tax was a prerequisite to business survival. 
A range of tax evasion and money laundering techniques was employed. They 
centred on unrecorded and Active operations and false accounting. Businesspeople 
used cash transfers and moved cash around subsidiary enterprises. They split up 
businesses that employed a smaller number of workers and had fewer customers to 
avoid detection.32
30 Estimated to be anywhere between twenty and 40.
31 The so-called 'chomoe naV is the cash that cannot be traced in financial documents and is not 
registered to avoid paying tax. It comes from the word 'nalichnost” -  cash in hand or 'nalichka'.
32 People pay fewer taxes by making their businesses appear smaller than they really are. Natasha and 
Vladimir formally have three workers, but in reality, thirteen. Another woman has 60 shops, but gets 
around paying taxes by putting all these shops in friends' and neighbours' names.
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Entrepreneurs considered it quite simple to get around the tax inspectorate. For big
businesses able to afford good lawyers and accountants who knew ways to get
around the law, the tax system was no longer a serious impediment. However,
ensuring that profitable business took place away from the prying eyes of the state
left entrepreneurs vulnerable to the whims of state officials, who could find a
number of reasons to shut a business down should they be so inclined. For this
reason, entrepreneurs who had accumulated capital said they were tired of being
forced to act outside the law. The state could easily find evidence (kompromat) to
destroy a firm but condoned grey activity as long as businesses maintained good
relations with the state and did not create "enemies”. Businesspeople claimed to
yearn to act within a stable system that protected their interests through the rule of
law and where they paid reasonable rates of tax and behaved in a civilised and
proper way. Konstantin avoided paying tax but this created instability.
I would like us to have a correct tax code because I am fed-up of living 
incorrectly, weaving around the law33 because if you don’t do this you pay all 
taxes and straightaway close your enterprise. Now, I pay money, not the 
amount required, but how much I consider needs to be paid. But I would like 
to work honestly according to rules. I already have several production firms 
and I wouldn't want to risk them, because they can take them away from me 
if they wanted. I would like to live calmly. (101)
For smaller businesses, time invested in getting round the state diverted resources
away from investment in output.
Competition for privileges promoted particularistic local state interventions in 
business that fed bribery practices. Businesspeople developed innovative strategies 
to gain favour in the state. For example, the director of a computer firm described 
how without kin connections within the state, his firm had to make these contacts
33 The verb vikrutit'sya which literally means to extricate oneself, through twists and turns, is used 
often to describe the way businesspeople use all means at their disposal, even if  not lawful, to get by.
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from scratch. Giving the vice-mayor's son a computer was one small gesture. Other 
initiatives to gain influence included client-like support to candidates in elections 
and creating public organisations.34 Entrepreneurs spent resources on political 
information and ties at the cost of improving outputs.
This suggested that entrepreneurial success was determined not by economic
performance, but by the strength of political ties which provided access to state
resources. This situation bred uncertainty as the legal and bureaucratic system might
change according to who had power over the state at any particular time. As a result,
entrepreneurs were deterred from long-term investment in their business. Aleksandr,
the music composer, lamented,
In our country you can't plan your business more than one year ahead 
because in that period, the kind of changes can come about that reduce any 
good idea to nothing... I plan something and then the new president changes 
everything and a new tax code is introduced. Or the new president of the 
Central Bank introduced new monetary conditions. (32)
There were a few cases of entrepreneurs going against the grain by using the law to 
challenge state officials' bribe taking. In these instances, entrepreneurs had the 
backing of an organisation linked to the state35 or had links with higher state officials 
in Moscow. Andrei, the director of a domestic appliances firm, challenged the local 
tax inspectorate's power on three separate occasions with information obtained by 
consulting, through personal contacts, the better informed tax inspectorate in 
Moscow (98). For most entrepreneurs, challenging inspectors was not feasible.
34 Many existing public organisations in Ekaterinburg were created to support politicians. Deputies 
display an interest in organisations with large memberships such as pensioners' and war veterans' 
organisations. Through their influence over enterprise directors, politicians control workers. 
Enterprises finance candidates' support funds and workers are instructed to vote for certain 
candidates.
35 The Foundation for Women's Enterprises agreed with the committee that regulates government 
organs' actions that when an inspector visited any member's business, the inspector would be required 
to name the violation and sign a certificate (93).
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Operating at an informal level and paying the necessary bribes and protection 'roofs' 
made more sense financially than operating legally. According to Svetlana, a market 
trader, the cost of blat relations with organised crime groups and bribe payments was 
40% of the official tax she would have had to pay on goods bought. These blat 
relations remained more cost effective only for those who had contacts (svyazi) 
"everywhere" - among the militia, state inspectors, and people who controlled the 
market (60).
It was harder for small businesses to get round red tape. For example, shuttle-traders' 
businesses became non-viable because of the cost of bribes to customs officials. 
Small businesses did not have the expertise or personal contacts in the state to avoid 
relatively unimportant district level state officials. They were forced to divert 
resources to negotiating with an inordinate number of officials at different levels in 
state structures who might contradict one another. They were less likely to have 
access to political information about bribe paying and as a result might find 
themselves steeped in fines owed to the state after having paid bribes, which failed to 
deliver the agreed services.
In sum, this section argued that entrepreneurs acted informally because of the high 
cost of conforming to the state's formal requirements for private enterprise activity. 
Entrepreneurs developed a number of methods to remain outside state control. State 
institutions were complicit in this process, operating arbitrarily according to a formal 
and informal system. The section suggested that a consequence of these informal 
practices was the lack of long-term investment in business. Businesses were 
reluctant to invest in property (investment, workers, machinery, and innovation) if
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they feared that these rights might be usurped. In the event that their capital was 
seized, entrepreneurs were in a weak position to claim it back because of the 
informal level on which they operated. Informality made it difficult for businesses to 
develop into new markets. Entrepreneurs avoided formally advertising their 
activities and relied on personal connections to reach new customers or partners, 
thereby limiting their potential for growth. Despite this, the financial benefits 
outweighed the transaction costs of formal level activity.
5. Responses to Identity Change
This final section considers how entrepreneurs adjusted to the transformation of their 
identities and how these adjustments were gendered. Derogatory jokes about 'New 
Russians' as boorish and dim-witted abounded in society. They were said to live 
well, but their dishonest activities meant that they lived a short life. Their tasteless 
conspicuous consumption was central to this negative image. They were said to be 
fat because they enjoyed eating and flew to Moscow for the evening just to dine at a 
good restaurant. They drove expensive foreign cars with tinted windows and had 
intellectually-challenged long-legged women on their arms. The neighbours of one 
rich gold-trader said that she had a pet lemur and that her husband would frequent 
prostitutes in the garage when he was supposedly cleaning his Mercedes.
Some of these trademarks of'New Russians' rang true. The gold-trader mentioned 
above commented,
I love expensive nice things. I can afford to buy a collection of shoes. I have
a watch that costs 1000 dollars. I can afford to buy my husband an expensive
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tie. I like big American cars. My first car was a jeep that cost 35000 dollars. 
Now that I have a governess for my daughter, I have more time to go to the 
fitness club, visit the expensive cosmetics salon, go to the solarium and have 
a massage... (58)
One banker’s hobby was travelling around the world with a group of friends visiting 
hunter-warrior tribes. Last year, they had been to Papua New Guinea and Brazil and 
they were planning to visit ’the Highlanders' in Scotland (130).
However, most entrepreneurs were at pains to defend themselves against this
stereotype. For example, they would differentiate themselves from big business.
Anatoli commented on the transformation from 'bandits' into powerful industrialists
in a typically disparaging way:
Now once again the situation [following the 1917 Revolution] is repeated. 
Many left for the West. Many lost work because they weren't needed by 
society. Again, the lower classes are going into power. They travel in 
expensive cars, throw their money around and consider themselves very 
highly. Today's situation is similar to that post-revolution. There are strange 
moral values. Huge Senegalese black people guard nightclubs in London. 
Imagine these people starting to manage the factories. That's what's 
happened in Russia. There are no normal people. Imagine what happens 
when these Senegalese are already factory owners and it is suggested that 
they resume their positions as security in the nightclubs. They don't want to. 
It is also difficult to put our New Russians' in their place. (109)
Anatoli was a powerful media magnate whose business - owner of twelve radio
stations in the region - could ostensibly be described as big. He used the semi-
mythical category of New Russians' to argue that those in 'big business' were
uneducated, without morals and had attained economic power through brute force.
He likened the manner through which these New Russians' attained power with the
Bolshevik leaders' seizure of power following the 1917 Revolution. By creating
internal hierarchies of 'good' and 'bad' entrepreneurs, entrepreneurs aimed to deflect
attention away from their own success and the means by which they achieved it.
Respondents criticised New Russians" lavish lifestyles and emphasised how they by
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contrast, did not display their wealth. They attributed their success to the fact that 
they resisted rushing out and spending money on the latest Mercedes or office 
interior and instead, ploughed profits back into their businesses.36
Entrepreneurs stressed that they had got to where they are by merit. Explaining the 
reasons for their success, men defined a set of entrepreneurial values they associated 
with masculinity. They recalled the dilemma they faced at the beginning of 
perestroika: whether to stay in the state sector factory, receive a fixed salary and 
work 'from bell to bell' for the rest of their lives or work in the new economy and 
determine their own fortune. That "boyish notion" (121) of the market bore fruit and 
none regretted their decisions. They attributed their success to their personal 
attributes. Business attracted people "with brains" who "can realise themselves" and 
"use their creative energy". They must be active, curious, and resourceful. 
Entrepreneurial activity required the ability to communicate and develop a large 
circle of friends. Unlike men, who emphasised their active and considered decision, 
women discussed this move in more pragmatic terms.
Independence from the state was intrinsic to this new masculinity. Entrepreneurs' 
self-image was based on the notion that they had the ability to adjust to new market 
conditions and did not have to rely on the state to provide for them. They justified 
their wealth in terms of their strong work ethic. Concomitantly, others' poverty was 
a result of laziness. Zhenya commented,
The poor and lazy are those who live off their parents' pension, those who
live off the government, those with the wrong mentality. (121)
36 Some said they had bought all the large consumer items they needed in the early 1990s and were 
discouraged from purchasing more large items by property tax, which required accounting for a large 
disposable income.
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A strong individualist tone was present in entrepreneurs’ explanations of a person's
fortunes. Aleksandr stated,
All unpleasantness in life is due to the lack of a well-oiled brain. You are 
first and foremost guilty. (32)
Chapter 6 considers how this individualism has affected social networks. This
contrast drawn between energetic and creative people engaging in private enterprise
and lazy people who were dependent on others was a central criterion by which
entrepreneurs distinguished between the 'middle' and 'lower' classes. Grisha stated,
The middle class is made up of people who don't just go to work but launch 
something, think something up, organise something, find ways of earning 
money - entrepreneurs who acquire something through their own work. (115)
Businessmen emphasised the long hours they work. They pointed out that they had 
not had a holiday since the beginning of market reform. Working hard was a new
'VImasculine quality distinct from Soviet working practices. Andrei commented,
I have no free time. If a man says he has a hobby then he isn't a professional. 
You could have a hobby in the past in socialism. When I finished work, I left 
the factory in the evening and I had time to go to the theatre or do something 
else. Now I don't have that time. As long as the stage of accumulation of the 
initial capital hasn't finished - ten to twenty years - the material wealth that I 
bring to my family will depend on the amount of time I spend at work. For 
that reason, it's essential that I work a lot and don't go on holiday. (98)
Andrei defined his identity as one of a new breed of capitalist entrepreneurs reaping
the benefits of the initial stages of transition to the market, and linked to that, as the
breadwinner on which his family depended. Entrepreneurs appeared to work long
hours and often sent their wives and children on holiday without them. Their
reluctance to take time off could also be due to the fear that leaving the firm
unattended created the risk of cheating and theft. Men implicitly assumed that
women were not able to adopt this work ethos because of their domestic obligations.
37 Kukhterin makes a similar point (2000).
201
All bar two of the married businessmen had wives who stayed at home.38 Chapter 4 
discussed the preference among some men, especially those who worked as 
employees in the new private sector, for their wives to stay at home. Among the 
businessmen respondents, the assumption that their wives should become 
housewives was even stronger because they could provide for them. They expected 
their wives' higher education to be invested in the children's upbringing. Aleksandr 
commented,
I don't like emancipated and independent women. For example, my wife 
finished the faculty of foreign languages. She could have worked as a 
translator or taught English language, but she sits at home, she's a housewife. 
She sat at home for four years with the older daughter and has been sitting 
with the younger six years. That is, she's been a housewife for ten years. But 
I know that all her education, all that she has she will give to our daughters. 
My wife significantly better prepared our daughters for life than the creche or 
kindergarten, where children are equalised, treated alike, reduced all to the 
same level. A wife provides individual education. She never had strong 
pretensions that she had to become a translator... I understand her perfectly 
-  her biological role involves putting her professionalism lower than her 
family. But the man -  he is the breadwinner. He has to earn money. For 
that reason, if he doesn't have a profession, I believe that for him, it's a 
tragedy (118).
Aleksandr distinguished his family from a Soviet family by the fact that he could 
provide for his family single-handedly so that his wife would fulfil her 'biological 
role' as mother and bring up their children. His account, which was typical among 
businessmen, shows how active this group was in constructing rigid new gender 
roles. Emphasis on their wives’ domesticity and child-caring role could be seen as a 
backlash against the egalitarian Soviet ethos. Businessmen's gender values were 
neo-traditional in the sense that they were based on a mythical notion of women's 
'natural' role in the pre-Soviet past that did not exist because as peasants, women 
worked. This neo-traditionalism fitted with economic policies described in chapter 3
38 The two working wives worked in the government archives and as an accountant in metal 
brokerage company.
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to cut public expenditure and shift the burden of socialisation from the state to the 
family.
There was a tension in business people's accounts resulting from the shift from a 
Soviet identity based on social contribution to one based on individualistic 
moneymaking. This tension was evident in the distinction made between production 
and trade. Trade was looked down upon because money appeared but no new value 
was added in the process of buying and selling. Traders were perceived as making 
money 'out of thin air' (iz vozdukha). A distinction was made between 'making' 
money (delat' den'gi), which was considered dubious morally and had criminal 
connotations and 'earning' money (zarabotivat’ den'gi), which was considered honest 
and worthy. As the media magnate's discussion above suggested, those who had 
gone into big business through buying up shares in the privatisation process were 
considered opportunistic criminals. Entrepreneurs with production firms valued their 
creative, intellectual and social contribution and considered productive activity 
morally superior to the crudity of trade. Recognising this moral distinction, a 
director of a firm that bought computer parts abroad, assembled and sold the 
computers exclaimed, "It was not just trade, resale. It was trade with brains!" (121)
Business women's accounts also revealed unease with moneymaking activity, which 
they circumvented by emphasising the moral imperatives and social contribution of 
their activity. An image-making firm run by two women emphasised how beauty 
was not simply skin-deep and how they addressed women's internal psychological 
state and self-esteem (103). Women entrepreneurs displayed pride in a national 
identity. For example, Lilia, a defence specialist turned foreign clothing retailer, was
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proud of the work she did for the country in the factory, and emphasised how she felt
she was helping Russian women by showing them how to dress well.
I enjoy not simply selling clothes, but changing the outward appearance of 
women. When I go along the street, I spot my clients straightaway because 
they differentiate themselves from the drab masses. (99)
Femininity was central to many women entrepreneurs' businesses. Lilia wanted to
rectify the image of trade tarnished by the Soviet system. This involved providing a
friendly and personal service to clients and selling better quality attractive clothes
imported from the west. Lilia continued,
None of those who work for me, previously worked in Soviet trade because 
the understanding of 'Soviet trade' provokes a negative reaction. My girls are 
all well educated. We try to teach women today to dress at once beautifully 
and business-like, not to dress anyhow. We are involved in our women's 
appearance, and this brings us pleasure. We read a lot of special literature 
about ethics, behaviour, the memoirs of Chanel and Kennedy. We don't just 
trade clothes but show women what clothes are right for them and how they 
should look. (99)
Lilia viewed her retail firm not simply as trade, but also as providing a service to 
Russian women - educating them on improving their appearance. This required 
creating a look that was neither Soviet, which signified suppressing women's 
femininity (dressing "anyhow"), nor like prostitutes (which later in the discussion, 
she said involved buying cheap clothes on the market imported from Thailand and 
China). The right look was represented by the hyper-femininity of Coco Chanel and 
Jackie Kennedy,39 which invoked an image of respectable, modest and decent 
womanhood.
39 One could speculate a number of reasons why this clothing retailer chose these two figures as 
representing the right kind of look. This retailer was exceptional among respondents because she is 
considerably older (see table 13 chapter 4). Now aged 60, the fashion of these two women was in 
vogue while she was in her early twenties. The style this fashion is famous for (pastel colours, very 
tailored suits and pearls) conjures up an image of an understated and classically dressed proper lady.
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Women presented a picture of their businesses as homely and separate from
organised crime. Work was socially rewarding and good for the spirit, as Tanya, a
confectioner explained.
It may be that physically I don't relax, but from the gratitude I get from the 
population, I relax morally and that gives me strength. (100)
Tanya saw the confectionery and cakes that she made as a way of improving the
town. She was motivated by the desire to provide an alternative to criminality and
drunkenness and to restore good relations between townspeople. Describing the
emergence of her business, Tanya recalled,
It was the time of small criminality. The crowd was very aggressive. There 
was blood under my windows. Someone had killed someone. All first floor 
windows were barred. Danger lay in wait for us on the streets. It was 
frightening to go out and stroll around the centre of town at nighttime. 
Something needed to be done about this... I, like many of the town's 
residents, wanted the situation on the streets to improve. In the centre of town 
we needed to build a shop, which could make a positive influence. Bread 
bakes, as we say, 'with God's sweetness' - there is already a positive impulse 
in it. I wanted buyers coming into our shop to hear good words from the 
assistants and feel the desire to do something pleasant... I wanted the centre 
of town to give birth to the epicentre of goodness. I wanted it to become 
fashionable to go to a girl not with a bottle but with a cake. And at last, this 
fashion has come. The coolest limousines come to us for cakes. I believe 
that I have fulfilled my mission on earth in my business. (100)
Her desire to improve the town illustrates the symbolic meaning within some
women's business. Cakes restored goodness in gender and community relations,
image making improved women's self-esteem and through stylish clothes women
discovered their lost femininity. Although as chapter 7 shows, Tanya claimed that
she decided on a cakes business because it avoided organised crime, she still paid a
protection 'roof.
Women sometimes felt uneasy about identity change when it resulted in the 
perception that she was economically more powerful than the husband. Chapter 4
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discussed the tension that could arise when men failed to satisfy the breadwinner
role. Lilia, the boutique owner, was offered a managerial post in a joint Russian
Swedish company while her husband continued to work unpaid in the state-budget
funded defence industry. She recalled,
We decided that I had to leave my work at the factory although it was a great 
shame for me. My husband couldn't compromise himself and his intellect.
All these years he has been a constructor on space subject matter. He is more 
educated than I am. Women are more adjusted to changes in life; they carry 
responsibility for the family and the children. But even when my husband is 
not paid he says that he can’t leave, can’t betray that activity he serves, can’t 
betray himself. (99)
Lilia discussed her leaving the defence factory and entry into the private sector as a 
joint decision with her husband. By contrast, male entrepreneurs discussed above 
described leaving the factory as an individual rather than conjugal decision. They 
were indebted to their wives for supporting their decision, providing a calm home 
environment and not complaining that their husbands spent so much time at work. 
While they described the decision as a brave one, Lilia emphasised the commendable 
and morally principled character of her husband for deciding to stay on at the 
factory. She played down the skills and experience her private employers saw in her 
when she was selected for the job, and instead, emphasised her husband's intellectual 
and educational superiority. She downplayed the significance of her taking on the 
breadwinner role by explaining it in terms of a natural maternal duty to feed the 
family. By emphasising her husband's good qualities, she compensated for the 
anomaly that according to today's values, she and not her husband was the more 
economically successful.
The husbands of female entrepreneurs might also feel unease at their wife's role. 
Three of the women entrepreneurs saw their marriages break up since they engaged
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in private enterprise activity, two of whom attributed this partly to their 
entrepreneurial activity. For example, Svetlana's husband left her because he was 
fed-up with the long hours and frequent travel involved in her shuttle-trading.
6. Conclusion
This chapter showed how respondents have moved into new entrepreneurial activity. It 
outlined five distinct livelihood paths evident from respondents' accounts and 
highlighted the importance of different resources attached to different spheres of 
activity. Respondents with influential networks prior to market reform were best 
positioned to adopt a risky entrepreneurial strategy. In particular, close personal 
contacts among party representatives, within the Komsomol leadership and the local 
administration and among enterprise directors, ensured that they were well-positioned 
to engage in entrepreneurial activity. Influential social networks were organised around 
the institute, neighbourhood and workplace, and mediated access to material resources, 
information and opportunities.
The chapter considered the challenges faced by entrepreneurs and the informal ways 
they responded to them. One of the consequences of the informal economy was that 
continued successful entrepreneurial activity was an option available only to a select 
few. It was suggested that as social ties between businesspeople and within the state 
became more established, the obstacles to private enterprise for aspiring 
entrepreneurs increased with the result that after 1994, it became more difficult to 
start up in business.
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After ten years of new private sector activity, entrepreneurs learnt how the market 
operated, where and when it was best to invest and who to work with. Entrepreneurs 
attempted to maintain a competitive edge by building horizontal networks, carving 
out a niche for themselves and prioritising quality and reputation.
This chapter sought to draw out gender aspects of entrepreneurial activity. It discussed 
the gendered patterns of going into private enterprise apparent among respondents. 
Women and men respondents described their motivations for engaging in 
entrepreneurial activity in a gendered discourse. Men focused on their personal 
qualities to demonstrate their legitimacy as entrepreneurs while women tended to 
emphasise the social and economic contribution of their work.
An analysis of the small number of respondents in this study, alongside findings 
from other larger studies, suggested that there were fewer women entrepreneurs than 
men and that their businesses were smaller and focused largely on small-scale trade 
and services. An analysis of respondents’ spheres of activity suggested that 
entrepreneurial women were confined to particular areas of the market, a point 
supported in other studies. Further evidence of a gender gap in access to 
opportunities for profitable entrepreneurial activity was suggested by male 
entrepreneurs' view that men dominate business. Men see dominance of business as 
a result of differing gender attributes and the criminal nature of the market. It was 
suggested that men might exclude women from their networks, a point that is 
supported by the argument in the following chapter that networks are to a large 
extent gender segregated. This image of women's unsuitability to the market did not
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match reality and women's entrepreneurial activities also involved risk, were 
physically demanding and required interaction with criminal groups. However, the 
continuing perception by men that women were not entrepreneurs suggested that the 
gender gap in market opportunities is likely to grow.
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6: The Changing Contribution of Social Networks in the 
Construction of Livelihoods
In order to start up a business in Russia, connections are very important. We 
have a saying 'Don’t have 100 roubles, but 100 friends'. I have thought up a 
new saying, 'Don't have 100 roubles, but 100 friends and you will have 
thousand roubles'. (91)
(Sergei, former Komsomol Secretary, now businessman)
After Gorbachev's perestroika, we all hoped very much that now everything 
would be built on a competitive basis, that is, that a person, a worker, would 
be valued according to his talents. But everything is still constructed on the 
basis of personal kin contacts, valuing doggy attachment (sobach'ya 
predannost'). To me this is insulting and ugly. (15)
(Mikhail, unemployed art historian)
1. Introduction
A standard answer to the question of how people adjust to rapid social change in 
Russia is that people survive or improve their situation through the use of social 
networks - mutual help between friends, colleagues, neighbours and relatives. This 
chapter considers the role played by social networks in shaping people's livelihoods 
and asks how the introduction of market relations has changed that role.
On the one hand, as the quotation from Mikhail suggested, in the early 1990s, 
ordinary people had high expectations that market reform would bring fairer 
relations based on meritocracy to replace privileged access to resources through 
networks that existed in Soviet times. Theoretical orthodoxies hold that the onset of 
market relations results in the demise of networks and the rise of individualist 
market-led forms of behaviour. Neo-classical economic thought assumes that the 
introduction of capitalistic economic relations allows people to act according to self­
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interested goals of individual profit-maximisation. There is also an anthropological 
tradition, which holds that modem market exchange where individuals act in their 
own interests eradicates reciprocal exchange relations (Mauss 1990).1
On the other hand, as Sergei, quoted above, suggested, profit motivations rather than 
eradicating social networks, can actually confirm their importance. There is a view 
among theorists that with the introduction of market relations, the former Soviet 
Union has become more, not less, embedded in social networks, with "more network 
capital under postcommunism than under Communism" (Sik 1995,17).
This chapter begins by looking at the role of social networks in Soviet times and how 
it has developed in the present. Building on two distinctions outlined in chapter 1, 
between influential and support networks and between dense and weak ties, it 
provides a gender analysis of the functions of different networks and the impact they 
have on different kinds of people’s livelihoods. Finally, it considers how certain ties 
come under strain with new demands put on them in market conditions.
2. Networks during Soviet Times
Social networks were integral to the functioning of Soviet state-planned economies. 
Given the rigidity of the centralised planned economy, informal networks were used
1 Later anthropologists argued that in modem societies, the concept of gifts is not eradicated by 
market exchange, but comes to represent the pure or moral counterpart of commodity exchange in a 
market economy (Gregory 1982, Parry 1986). To associate reciprocity with traditional societies and 
self-interest with modem societies, creates fictitious and bounded types o f society and conceals the 
relationship between these two principles in all societies.
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to grease its workings and ensure its continuance (Lomnitz 1988). They were 
important to relations between the federal centre and regional leaders and between 
enterprises for getting hold of deficit resources (Easter 2001). Economic 
ineffectiveness combined with the Communist power monopoly created a distinct 
mechanism of social integration based on informal social networks (Hann 1985, 
Kideckel 1982, Wedel 1986).
Administrative officials had great power in a state-planned economy. A person's 
position in relation to the Communist Party elite determined access to the state 
system of resource distribution. Personal connections were vital for getting a 
foothold in the party elite and ensuring steady ascension (Vorozheikina 1994). 
Among the political elite, officials exploited their position to build informal patterns 
of obligation (Rigby 1983). Patron-client relations were a substitute for blocked 
channels of interest articulation (Tarkowski 1981, 187) and created mobility in the 
Party organisation (Willerton 1979,181-2). They ensured loyalty by appointing 
friends and relatives in key administrative positions (Simis 1982, 61). These 
networks in Soviet officialdom dominated power structures at the regional and local 
levels (Rigby 1981).
Networks were vital to most aspects of Soviet daily life, for obtaining foodstuffs, 
train tickets, medical services, study places at university or specialised schools, jobs, 
cars and flats. Informal networks were a means to manoeuvre around rigid 
bureaucratic obstacles to reach required state resources (Grossman 1989). Most 
restrictions in daily life were avoidable by blat. Lyuba, who in Soviet times worked 
as an accountant in 'Torg\ the state-trading organisation, recalled,
212
I liked the work because I could get hold of everything I needed - children's 
things, clothes, food. I never stood in a queue... After work, we popped into 
the shop through the service entrance and bought everything we needed. (55)
However, blat produced a situation where workers were relentlessly subjected to 
superiors on whose arbitrary favour they depended for access to resources (Ashwin 
1999). For example, diligent managers were frustrated by being forced to take on 
superiors' relatives who plainly were unable to do the work, and were reluctant to 
make friends with employees in case favours were asked (37).
3. Networks in Post-Soviet Times
Money now played a major role in respondents' ability to access items that were no 
longer allocated administratively. For example, in areas where goods were in short 
supply - such as car purchase, housing and food - or where networks ensured access 
to quality services - such as enrolment in kindergarten and certain schools and 
obtaining medical services - money, which was marginal, had become central. 
Although money had diminished the role of networks in these areas, networks 
continued to be vital both to the rich for accumulating wealth and to the poor by 
providing a buffer against harsh market reforms. Figure 30 in appendix 1 shows the 
functions of networks in people's lives and how they varied according to wealth.
3.1 Accessing Services, Goods and Food
Figure 19 shows that although many of the above-mentioned services could now be 
purchased, people nevertheless continued to rely on contacts to obtain goods and
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services ranging from train tickets and transport to childcare and good-quality
medical care. Gifts of food played an important role, especially when some of the
poorest households ran out of money altogether. Vanya, who lived alone, recalled,
Last winter, when I had absolutely no food and no income, friends brought 
me food, tea and sugar. I have one friend who constantly brought food and 
his parents brought vegetables. It's very important to have real friends. (24)
Olga recalled,
There was a time when I didn't know what I would eat that day. But I have 
wonderful friends that helped me survive these years. They brought me food, 
invited me round to feed me, gave me clothes and so on. I lived through this 
beggarly existence for seven years. It's a miracle for which I am indebted to 
my friends that I didn't die. (10)
3.2 Finding Work
For people struggling to secure a living, the main problem was no longer where to 
buy goods but how to get well-paid work. The role of personal connections in 
getting a job has increased over the transition period (Yakubovich and Kozina 2000) 
and is especially important in the new private sector (Grogan 2000). In one study, 
almost two-thirds of respondents found employment through personal connections in 
the new private sector (Clarke and Kabalina 2000). Of all my respondents who 
moved into their present job in the last ten years, 69% found their jobs through 
personal contacts. In many cases, this meant that friends either provided 
information about a vacancy or recommended a friend to their boss. However, as 
figure 30 shows, among wealthier respondents, more distant and influential blat 
relations were used to place kin and friends in well-paid work, which as one
2 This excludes people without employment, self-employed and those with their own firms. If 
additional work is included as new work, this figure is higher.
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respondent (who was frequently asked to use his influential networks to find friends' 
children work) noted, could be a constant nuisance (72). By contrast, the table also 
shows that approximately the poorest one-third of households did not receive help 
from friends in getting work or that the help provided low-paid or piecemeal work.
3.3 Loans
At a time of flux, networks based on reciprocal norms generated much-needed co­
operation within a closed group of people.3 Mutual help (kogda ludi pomogayut 
drug druga /  vzaimopomoshch *) imbued indebtedness designed to ensure future 
security. Given that many households did not have a budget on which they could 
depend for subsistence, people relied on networks for monetary loans. Prevailing 
uncertainty made helping others when one could even more important as a form of 
insurance. Gregori stated,
I always give [money] on loan when I am asked if I have money at that 
moment. I think that without mutual help, it is difficult. (80)
As the quotation suggested, by helping others when they could, people stored up 
future support as insurance against difficult times.
Loan had taken on new significance in exchange relations. Figure 30 suggests that 
people commonly tried to send small amounts of money to close relatives and turned 
first and foremost to family when money was urgently needed, such as in a medical 
emergency. Loans among kin were likely to resemble gifts and not require 
repayment. The final section of this chapter suggests that the expectation that loans
3 Coleman calls this trust-creating process 'closure' (1988). According to Walter Powell, networks are 
a flexible form of organisation most suited to uncertain conditions o f change (1990).
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between kin were gifts could strain resource-poor kin relations. Within mutual help 
relations between friends, loans were a form of support that accrued a debt that the 
donor trusted would be repaid at an unspecified point in the future. This chapter later 
suggests that irregular incomes meant that donors faced greater uncertainty as to 
whether the loan would be repaid. Loans from more socially-distant people - for 
example, large loans between people engaged in business - were likely to demand 
repayment in a specified short period. Chapter 5 discussed the importance of loans 
for business in a context where access to credit from banks was limited. In this sense, 
the increased role of money fits into the existing framework of norms governing 
reciprocal relations.
3.4 Creating Business Opportunities
Moving now to the role of networks in business circles, at the onset of market reform, 
well-established networks among the political elites, no longer restrained by the 
Communist Party, were able to use their access to state goods for profit in the private 
sector. Chapter 3 showed that the collapse of the centrally-planned distribution of 
goods and the weakness of the state regulatory regime new semi-legal power 
bestowed on already established local networks to act independently of the centre in 
redistributing state resources and property. Former nomenklatura became an 
important part of the new economic elite through their informal networks.4 Many 
came from former economic departments of the obkoms (oblast committees of the 
Community Party). In Ekaterinburg, while obkom officials lost their co-ordinating
4 The question o f the origins of the new economic elite has received considerable analytic attention. It 
has been argued that the new elites came out of the old communist elites who successfully 
transformed their political power into economic power. See for example, Hanley, Yershova and 
Anderson (1995), Kryshtanovskaya (1995), Kryshtanovskaya and White (1996). For a differing 
opinion, see Lane and Ross (1999).
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function, which was transferred to the executives of the soviets, they used their 
networks to move into new positions within the state apparatus (Karasik 1992) or to 
create economic institutions that could take advantage of market reform (Nelson and 
Kuzes 2002). They had connections with the federal government leaders and with 
the so-called 'red directors' (krasnye directora) - directors of big factories and plants. 
Through different 'prikhvatisatiori tricks5 and the oblast government executives' 
support (these executives being most likely greased6), 'red directors' became quasi 
'owners' of their enterprises and many sold out much of their enterprises' assets7.
However, they faced problems when emerging 'financial groups' and more or less 
'bleached' (legalised) organised crime groups encroached their property rights. 
Deciding that under the current conditions legal business brought bigger profits than 
illegal business, the latter developed links with state representatives and provided 
protection 'roofs' for market traders and enterprise directors.
New entrants into the lower strata of the economic elite, who were described in 
chapter 5, depended on patronage relations with the established economic and 
political elite. The role of these ties to this up-and-coming group is indicated in 
figure 30. They often adopted roles as brokers benefiting from building bridges 
between different factories or between firms and state organisations. Their activities 
involved manipulating corruptible bureaucrats, a weak legal system, inconsistent tax 
exemptions, attaining import privileges and export quotas on preferential terms.8
5 The large-scale privatisation of state industrial factories is locally called 'prikhvatizatsiya' similar to 
'privatizatsiya' (the word for privatisation) but based on the verb 'zakhvat', which means to snatch.
The verb podmazat' refers to greasing someone's palm with a bribe.
7 Several theorists have argued that these networks have privatised the state as their corporate 
property (Rigi 1999,49; Brovkin 1998, 513).
This is part o f what Christine Freeland calls Russia's 'loophole economy' (Freeland 2000, 95).
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3.5 Getting Around Red Tape
In Soviet times, patronage relations were based on the control of access to the 
distribution of resources and privileges. In the early 1990s, there was little state 
regulation of the economy, and the market was fluid in the sense that business 
networks were being formed and economic elites reconfigured. However, the 
regional leadership was able to adopt a more "exclusionary posture"9 with stricter 
rules for entrance and closing business engagement to outsiders. 'Gatekeeper' 
(Ledeneva 2001, 70) officials extended their control over access to market activity 
through licenses, privileges, and tax exemptions or by exchanging access to state 
property in return for commissions, securities, percentages and shares in businesses.
The integration of entrepreneurs into political patronage networks in the city had 
created particular patterns in administration-business relations. The political rivalry 
between Ekaterinburg's mayor and the oblast's governor, indicated in chapter 3, 
served to divide the economic elite's allegiance to one or other leader. Industrialists 
maintained contacts primarily with large enterprise directors who provided access to 
supply and distribution networks and with Governor Rossel10. Powerful organised 
crime groups, which were now shareholders in large industries, developed mutually 
dependent relations with Rossel. For these groups, connections at the oblast and 
federal levels made Governor Rossel an important ally. By contrast, the majority of 
respondents engaging in small service sector businesses had stronger links within the 
city administration. The cultural elite was linked to Mayor Arkadii Chemetskii and
9 This is a phrase used by Mendras to describe the tighter control exercised by the Sverdlovsk oblast 
leadership over regional politics (Mendras 1999,305) but which could equally describe its greater 
regulation over economic affairs during the latter part of the 1990s.
10 The local financial elite, the director of the Uralmash factory and the Uralmash crime group support 
Rossel in elections (Rizhenkov and Lukhterhandt 2001,179).
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his deputy and obtained sponsorship and charitable support from the city's organised 
crime groups. Traders too, relied on Chemetskii for contracts, access to premises, 
construction permission and the avoidance of minor bureaucrats. Chemetskii's 
support was more important because the viability of their businesses depended on the 
city-level administration.
Small and medium-sized businesses were reliant on patronage relations with large 
enterprise directors and state officials for their survival. Such dependency impeded 
the development of market-oriented practices that challenge the control over 
resources exercised by Soviet elites. Dependency on resources distributed from 
above mirrored paternalistic relations found in the Soviet enterprise. Integral to 
hierarchical relations, this dependence was "personal, particularistic, discretionary" 
(Ashwin 1999,16). Paternalistic dependency was coercive in nature because 
businesspeople, like Soviet workers, had "no alternative but to cultivate personal ties 
in order to survive" (ibid, 17).
While the state provided few bureaucratic obstacles to making money at the onset of 
market reforms, officials increasingly extracted bribes. Conventionally, bribery is 
defined as a form of exchange circumscribed in time and space, voluntarily entered 
into and requiring little trust. In practice, all business people believed that bribery 
was obligatory if their businesses were to survive. In addition, a level of trust was 
required and norms did exist governing the exchange and determining who could 
make a bribe.
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There were conflicting views as to whether monetary bribe payments had wiped out
the need for contacts. The contrasting views are evident in the following two
diverging opinions. Pavel, a Uralmash member, stated:
If I need to buy sausage, I buy sausage and if I buy an official, then I buy an 
official. It wouldn't be blat -  it would be corruption. Of course, I have 
contacts because I can't just come from the street and put a pack of money in 
front of an official -  a certain person has to recommend me. But all the same, 
money decides everything. (51)
Sergei, a former Komsomol leader turned businessman, stated by contrast:
I need to get a license... or I need a signature to build on some land. For 
money they may not give me the right, but through contacts, be my guest 
(91).
As these quotations suggest, in fact, a combination of contacts and money was
usually required to guarantee provision of a service. Vladimir had been trying to
open a construction materials shop in the city centre but had been unable to obtain
permission to purchase the land. He stated,
At the district level they tell me one figure and I pay them the money, and 
finally they allow us to start building the shop. The next thing I know, a 
decision has been passed by the mayor, which forbids a shop that size in that 
area. We fork out lots of money on an investigation meanwhile the tax 
inspectors find some kind of infringement and get on to us with a fine of 
$80,000. Then, it turns out that our place is also wanted by some bandit 
structure that bribed (podkupila) all the officials to get hold of it a long time 
ago. ( I l l )
Construction was halted and facing financial ruin, the firm collapsed. Vladimir did 
not gain permission to build his shop because he did not have access to sufficiently 
high-status officials. He found out too late, suggesting that his contacts within the 
state were inadequate. In addition, he was outdone by the size of the bandit 
structure's bribe. In this way, contacts and money were both necessary prerequisites 
for access to state services.
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3.6 Accessing Protection
As chapter 7 elaborates, with the state having lost its monopoly over the use of 
violence, other organised groups emerged to enforce contracts and provide security. 
The protection roof (krysha) was a relation that business people entered into by force 
that involved a monetary payment. Despite the predatory nature of the relation, 
organised crime groups provided a service and their leaders did command respect.
3.7 Creating Trust
Personal networks created trust and reduced risk in business transactions. Chapter 5 
described how in the absence of formal legal sanctions, business people minimised 
the risk of being cheated by working only with partners they personally knew. 
Through networks of long-term co-operation, they generated trust and punishment 
for non-cooperation (Granovetter 1992, 44). The exchange was structured11 and 
relations were "brittle" (Ekeh 1974, 52 cited in Uehara 1990, 526) because of distrust 
and self-interest motivations. Businesspeople tried to overcome this instability by 
prioritising long-lasting friendships where trust had built-up and by investing 
resources in making relations as reliable as possible. Financial investment in 
networks increased the likelihood of developing partnerships with reputable, 
powerful businesses. Andrei, the director of a home appliances trading firm, pointed 
out:
We spent a lot of money to establish contact {navodit' mosti) with our big 
industrial enterprises. (98)
11 Edwina Uehara makes a distinction between diffuse and structured exchange networks. In the latter, 
exchange partners are cautious and exchange for selfish reasons (1990).
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When deciding with whom to work, the firm chose those enterprises with whom they 
had the "tightest" working relations. Thus money had become a means for the 
development of fruitful business partnerships.
3.8 Monopolising a Market
Networks could control a specific market and ensured competition was kept out.
Konstantin was a businessman who had switched from commerce to the production
of linoleum and felt. He made his initial capital from brokering a deal involving the
sale of computers between two factories:
I had good relations with the director of the factory where I used to work and 
where I bought the used equipment. If I hadn't had these relations, then I 
wouldn't have managed to do an advantageous contract on the sale of 
equipment and I wouldn't have been able to develop my business. But 
because we had good relations and he was interested in my business, he could 
also earn money thanks to me and it was mutually advantageous. That 
director is also one o f my shareholders. (101) [emphasis added].
By establishing enduring patterns of exchange, networks restricted access. Zhenya 
continued:
... Of course the fact that we both produce linoleum hinders us in the market, 
but if I didn't do linoleum someone else would. Better that I do it than an 
outsider. And my friends who bought shares in my enterprise did this not for 
production interests. It's simply that when we previously were engaged in 
business together, they earned these shares with our general deals. (101) 
[emphasis added]
The network partners ("good friends") were at once factory directors (who had 
beneficial networks in the state administration), his shareholders (having invested in 
his business) and his competitors (also selling linoleum). Together they were 
"monopolists" who controlled the linoleum production niche in the oblast. By 
having friend-competitors, they hedged opportunities and prevented stranger-
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competitors from gaining access to this sphere of business. Therefore, cross­
ownership of business served not only to evade taxes and spread risk (Stark 1996); it 
also ensured that a small group of insiders could become monopolists of a market 
that excluded outsiders from its benefits.
3.9 For Recommendation and the Exchange of Information
Personal connections acted as intermediaries for recommendation and introduction 
into new business circles. There was an absence of formal mechanisms for 
advertising and the collection of information. Anatoli relied on revenues from 
advertising on his radio stations. He recalled how on starting his business,
Advertisers didn’t see the attractiveness of placing their advertisements on 
our station. The problem in Russia was partly that there was no 
understanding of marketing and advertising. Impolite shop assistants would 
do everything in their power to prevent you buying a product. The town was 
’grey without posters or billboards advertising products. The factories 
simply had plans for their production even if what they produced wasn't 
needed. The economy was planned. The marketing structure is totally 
different and requires serving and understanding people's interests and 
demands. (109)
Formal channels for accessing new markets were still poorly developed because of 
their expense and the informality of business. Entrepreneurs held the view that the 
risk of co-operation was less when relations were instigated informally with potential 
business partners, through a mutual friend, rather than formally. Entrepreneurs 
wanting to enter unfamiliar arenas were in a difficult position because potential 
partners were reluctant to do business with someone they did not know.
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Entrepreneurs could circumvent this problem through a bridging contact, known and
trusted in other milieus. Trust could be developed not only with known people but
also through a third person (cherez tret’e litso).12 Grisha, the director of a plastics-
packaging production firm, went to considerable lengths to operate through formal
channels, but nevertheless stated:
In Russia, there is no specialised service to check the reputation of 
entrepreneurs. When businesspeople propose to work together they may say 
that they will not do business with you because they don't know you. But if 
you then say that you worked with one of their acquaintances and their 
people, then they appear to trust you. (115)
Connections confirmed reputation and opened business opportunities. The bridging
contact gave the unknown entrepreneur information about economic transactions in
that milieu and/or financial backing. Lilia left her job in a Swedish-Russian metals
brokering firm and started a clothes boutique. Her previous boss helped her to
establish the contacts she needed:
With no money, when you start up business it is very important to have a 
recommendation to vouch that you will pay directly for your order. And the 
first of my contracts was guaranteed by my boss -  he took responsibility to 
pay for me if something happened with me. (99)
The exchange of positive useful information was not the only function of networks.
They could also be used against another. A business partner with extensive and
1 ^influential social networks could ruin another's reputation. The term 'black PR' 
referred to an action, which was useful to one side at the expense to the other.14 
Defamatory information could be disseminated through the radio, television,
12 In network analysis, the broker (the person who makes the bridge) over a structural hole (space 
between unconnected networks) joins together two separate networks for the exchange of useful new 
information (Burt 2002).
13 The popularity of the term black PR' should not be read simply as Russians being unused to 
advertising and the novelty of multiple voices in the press, although these factors do play a role.
14 In contrast, 'white PR' is beneficial to both sides.
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magazines and word of mouth.15 Even if proved untrue, the target's image would be 
ruined. In Soviet times, 'black PR' existed in the form of slogans to influence public 
opinion and it was used only by the state but today its use was more widespread.
Reliance on influential networks closed opportunities for newcomers wanting to 
expand into new markets. Konstantin's account of the use of networks to control 
linoleum production showed that tight personal connections kept stranger- 
competition out, hampering the excluded firm's ability to develop. Another firm that 
traded metal-smelted wares throughout the oblast, tried to trade internationally but 
was unsuccessful because it "had not grown up to the level required" (118). That 
firm could not stand up to the competition because those who already worked in it 
hid their information. As a result, the firm's directors could not access information 
about where to buy, who to trade with, what volume of products to sell, where and at 
what price to sell. They had a small staff of specialists collecting this information 
and the competition did all they could to prevent them from participating in the 
market. They were "novices without experience" (118) in the international market 
and did not "know the rules of that market". Because the firm did not have a 
guarantor to confirm their reputation and ensure they would meet their commitments, 
it was refused international orders. Aleksandr, the commercial director of the firm 
commented,
There is well-defined planning on the international market. If they [a foreign 
firm] decide to buy a certain quantity of goods from a concrete factory, then 
they won't back down from that plan. But we can't guarantee them the 
fulfilment of that plan because we don't have a stable guarantor. (118)
15 It is often said that positive information does not come for free. An advertisement designed to sully 
a competitor's reputation may be disguised as a journalist's article with the author's true identity and 
source of the information hidden.
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In this way, networks' informal codes of behaviour keep newcomers out. The 
examples of the linoleum production and metals brokerage firms suggest that the 
establishment of powerful networks made entry into the market difficult for outsiders.
In sum, this section sought to show that the role of social networks changed since 
Soviet times. Social networks were principally important for acquiring 
administratively allocated deficit goods, for greasing the flow of goods between 
enterprises and for reproducing elite privilege. In the present, while many goods 
could now be purchased, social networks nevertheless continued to play a vital 
function in households' survival providing access to services, gifts of food and 
personal loans and finding work. Personal networks were important to the city's 
elites, ensuring that they benefited from the distribution of state assets.
Entrepreneurs relied on networks because they generated trust and facilitated the 
exchange of information within a closed group of people. However, these relations 
could be brittle and trust needed to be built with caution and monetary investment. 
State officials' regulation of market activity meant that having money and personal 
connections within the state were a prerequisite for successful business. At the same 
time as creating moneymaking opportunities, social networks closed off the market 
to outsiders.
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4. Determinants of Access to Networks
This section discusses the role of marriage, nearby kin, employment, residential 
status and gender as factors shaping network participation. It draws on Granovetter's 
distinction, outlined in chapter 1, between dense and weak ties in order to explain 
networks' contribution to livelihoods.
4.1 Marital Status
Living in a conjugal household provided access to a double support network. In 
contrast, a kin-based household only had access to one set of kin ties. Figure 29, on 
the following page, maps Masha and Dima's network. It shows how their network 
functioned not only to provide them with help directly, but also in helping them to 
help others. For instance, Masha's father-in-law who works at the university has 
been able to arrange work for two of Masha's relatives. This was important because 
it meant they could draw on a wider circle of people who could offer a wider range 
of forms of support. People would help Masha and Dima if they could either 
because Dima and Masha had helped them in the past, or because they knew that 
Masha and Dima would return the favour at some point in the future. So, Dima's 
employment provided him with access to building materials that he could use when 
he did construction and repairs jobs as favours to his own and Masha’s friends. In 
return, Masha’s friend cut her hair and provided her with work opportunities.
Masha's investment in maintaining networks through help in domestic and care tasks, 
such as looking after ill neighbours and friends' children, complemented the 
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through parents, was a source of food and intermittent childcare. The prominence of 
kin in their network was also beneficial because they provided unconditional support 
("any help, anytime”).
4.2 Work status
An analysis of respondents' networks showed that the workplace acted as a pool of 
people with influential partners, friends or relatives. Some enterprises - such as the 
theatre or university - had a cross-section of employees and were more likely to 
foster heterogeneous ties. By contrast, in schools and factories, when one suffers, 
everyone was likely to be in the same position. This was especially true of factory 
workers whose kin and friends were in the same line of work. For example, a 
teacher couple was not paid their salaries for over one year in 1998. Tatyana, the 
wife, commented:
We had no one we could borrow money off because all our acquaintances 
were in a situation equal to ours. They are also all teachers. (77)
At the same time, employment could increase both the size and heterogeneity of
networks. Women and men who worked had more heterogeneous relationships than
those who do not. Housewives, first-time job seekers, non-working men and women
and the elderly were less likely to have weak ties. Women who stayed at home to
look after children felt isolated from their old networks, as Marina explained,
I don't like to sit at home. I never wanted to be a housewife. Before, I 
travelled a lot. I had a mass of friends around town and around the country. 
Now it's impossible for many reasons for example, I have my son and it has 
become very expensive. When I worked I felt different. (19)
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Work ties helped those without kin and friendship support networks. When her
husband died five years ago, Rosa returned from the North and found a job in the
local theatre, which also gave her a room in the theatre hostel. Because she was a
newcomer and always working or looking after her family, she did not have friends.
However, work colleagues provided support in critical situations. Rosa commented,
Now I don't have friends - there are only workers who have their own worries. 
When it was hard for me - when mother fell ill, as it turned out, there was 
nowhere I could get money from, and so I turned to acquaintances in the 
theatre for help. They lent me money and then I returned it. (34)
As a newcomer, work provided support networks, which were valuable because she 
did not have the time to form friendships. However, reliance on one support network 
meant that she has few alternative sources of support should her colleagues be 
unable to help.
4.3 Residential Status
Residential status was an important factor in determining access to networks. The 
majority of respondents who came to the city in the last ten years were located in the 
lower two economic positions. These newcomers were commonly cut-off from 
friendship networks and attributed this to their newcomer status. By contrast, an 
individual who grew up in the city was more likely to have a heterogeneous, far- 
reaching network based around parents, kin, education, workplace and 
neighbourhood.
The emphasis on helping your own people ('nashi') resulted in heightened negative 
significance of strangers. Newcomers faced exclusion from others' networks.
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Households that migrated from former Soviet republics of Tajikistan and Kazakhstan
fled their homes because the rising nationalist sentiment had made their lives
intolerable. They had few material assets because their wealth devalued in
comparison with the Russian currency and because the speed with which they left
meant they left their resources behind. Gregori and his wife and two children went
from Kazakhstan to Voronezh, where they stayed with his brother's family. After an
argument with his brother, they moved to Talitsa, a town in Sverdlovsk oblast, where
his wife's parents live, and Gregori got a job at the local factory. Gregori's wife, who
was more highly qualified than her husband, was eventually offered a post in the
factory on condition that she worked for a three-month unpaid trial period. At the
end of this period, the factory section head's son was awarded the job although she
was proficient in her work and he, by contrast, had no relevant experience. Having
only lived in the town for four years, they did not have blat relations and other
people's blat relations prevented Gregori's wife from getting work. While the
foreman was lingering outside, Gregori whispered,
We aren't local -  we don't have boss-relatives. Others' blat hinders my 
family. My wife lost work because they took the boss's son by blat in her 
place. They were pleased with her work, but they took on the boss's son. (80)
4.4 Economic and Social Status
In business, powerful, well-endowed networks could only be accessed from a 
position of strength because the recipient had to have something to offer in return. 
Powerful business contacts existed when there was mutual advantage in working 
together, and not in situations where a weaker partner needed help. Tatyana, a 
confectioner, noted,
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I have very many contacts around the world, in the oblast, in Moscow, but I 
haven't used them. To begin with, I want to stand on my feet and then from a 
position of self-sufficiency of a strong person, turn to someone for something. 
I am ashamed of showing my weakness. In business, they don't help weak, 
they help the fortunate and wealthy. (100)
Weak ties to wealthy people could also help resource-poor people find income 
generating opportunities. Influential friends provided access to people willing to pay 
for services, credit and information, and indirectly provided access to others in that 
network.16 Lydia was a self-employed artist and relied on wealthy friends for access 
to a studio and painting commissions:
I have friends who are more well-off than me. They may help by buying 
paintings from me or finding me customers. They may give me something. 
They bought me brushes and paints. They are all my old friends. I studied 
with some of them. (96)
In Lydia's case, the strength of ties from school and her prestige as a talented artist 
increased the likelihood of support from well-endowed bridging networks. In such a 
way, casual contacts could provide access to people from different social contexts in 
order to make a better living.
However, help from a weak bridging tie could fail to produce the intended results. 
Galina, an actress, was upset when she was asked by the head of the Drama Theatre 
to take early retirement. Her husband, a university professor, had become friends 
with Governor Eduard Rossel in his youth and they knew the Governor's wife well. 
At a reception, her husband told Rossel about his wife's unhappy predicament. 
Rossel told him that he would phone the Minister of Culture and sort the situation 
out. Galina explained,
16 Examples included an actor employed by state administration officials and businessmen to stage 
hospitality events; a reporter whose father, famous in media circles, found him translation work; a 
decorator who was employed by wealthy people to install ornamental fountains; an actress who, 
through the theatre, was introduced to a foreigner who rented her flat.
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It became clear that Rossel had phoned the Ministry of Culture but hadn't 
controlled his call. A private request turned into a complaint, which officials 
had to investigate. At the theatre a rumour went around, that I wrote a 
complaint to the Governor himself! It was a very unpleasant situation for me. 
Objectively there were, of course, reasons for my exit - my age and the 
infrequency of my performances. I went to the director and said that I didn't 
need anything and that I would leave. Then I met with the Governor and 
asked, "What did you do?" but I could tell by his expression that afterwards 
he had simply forgotten about my husband's request. He was slap dash and 
didn't monitor (prokontroliroval) the process and as a result put me in the 
awful position of informant {seksot).1 (33)
Galina had wanted her dismissal to be remedied through informal channels, but 
instead the Governor's intervention had led to the problem being addressed formally, 
which placed her in an uncomfortable situation vis a vis her employer and work 
colleagues. The weakness of the tie between Galina and the governor meant that she 
had little control over his actions and he misunderstood or was unwilling to do what 
she wanted hence his lack of supervision of the process.
The refusal of a request for help could be equally awkward. Kostya recalled how,
when without work, his attempt to use patronage relations failed,
One day I turned to my female acquaintance with a request to pull strings for 
me (sostavit’ mne protektsiyu) - 1 wanted to work in a large successful firm, 
and she could help arrange it for me. She refused. I was insulted because I 
had helped her in my time. (20)
In both these examples, the difference in social status between the donor and 
recipient of help meant that the donor had little incentive to carry out the favour.
Weak bridging ties were less reliable because they involved relating to a less trusted 
person. For this reason, some people said they preferred to give and receive help 
only from people they knew well. Two respondents mentioned lending money to
17 The word'seksot' was widely used during the Soviet period, especially in the Stalin period, and the 
time of the 'red terror'. People called a person a 'seksot' who informed the administration about 
everything that was going on and what people were saying about politics and the state.
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friends of friends and had not been paid back but felt awkward bringing the debt up 
with their friends. Exchange relations among socially distant partners were weaker 
because norms of reciprocity were laxer.
This section has shown that a number of factors - such as marital, work, residential 
and social status - influenced the networks in which respondents participated and the 
kinds of support they could mobilise through them.
5. Gender and Access to Networks
As chapter 1 argued, Jakob Rigi makes a useful distinction between influential ties of 
the new rich and support ties of the dispossessed. The former are important for 
accumulating formerly state resources while the latter ensure survival. Figure 30 
confirmed this general distinction between the functions of wealthy and resource- 
poor people’s networks, although as Lydia's case above illustrated, there was overlap 
between these networks. This section shows that these different kinds of ties are 
gendered. While support networks provided security for women respondents, they 
did not have the same level of access as men to well-endowed, bridging networks 
thereby limiting women's opportunities for enrichment.
Networks mirrored gender divisions in other areas of social life and the way they 
changed over time. While the Soviet state supported women's participation in the 
labour force, assuming responsibility for family provision, it did not challenge 
women's 'natural' role in the home. Within the family, women were responsible for
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the vast majority of domestic tasks (Ashwin 2002) while men's domestic role in the
Soviet system was very limited (Ashwin 2001). Rapid social change intensified
these patterns in gender relations. The cutback in social, health and educational
facilities described in chapter 3 meant that motherhood became a largely private
institution. The corollary of this was that men were expected to reassume traditional
male responsibilities but in a context where real wages were falling. Oksana, whose
husband left home because he was unable to provide an income for the family,
yearned for a reliable breadwinner.
For me to live well is to be provided for materially, not to think about money 
and not to remind the husband that he has to provide for the family (42).
Kostya was married and had a low, unstable income. He stated,
Here, if a man marries, then he is obliged to feed the family. How can I have 
a grudge against my wife because I bring the money home and she doesn't? I 
married, brought a child into this world -  so I have to provide for them. (20)
This expectation among women and men that although women wanted to continue
working, it was men who were the 'natural' breadwinners, meant that women were
disappointed by men who could not find well-paid work (Kiblitskaya 2000). Men's
status in the home was premised on their income-earning ability in the public sphere
(Kukhterin 2000) and yet their ability to fill the void left by the retreat of the state
was in doubt (Ashwin 2000,20). Women's responsibility for domestic tasks meant
that they had a bigger support network centred on the running of the household than
men, to which they could turn to in times of difficulty.
The scale of women's participation in the Soviet workplace did not eradicate the 
differences between male and female workers in the distribution of income, skill, 
status or power. Women predominated in low-paid sectors and were under­
represented in managerial positions (Lapidus 1993, 141). With rapid social change,
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women’s status in the labour market weakened. Irina Prisekina, the director of the
non-commercial organisation, Against Women's Unemployment, described women's
predicament in the city at the beginning of market reforms.
Massive downsizing took place in defence factories... enterprise directors 
tried hard not to dismiss anyone until the end. Those that ended up in cash- 
struck factories, factories undergoing reduction, were often women 
specialists with specific qualifications. Young able-bodied men left the 
factories voluntarily. They went into business. Women stayed until the end, 
but in the end, fell victim to staff reduction. (86)
Prisekina observed that it was mainly men who seized opportunities to enter business,
a point explored in chapters 4 and 5. Lacking the contacts, women were unable to
take many of the best entrepreneurial opportunities in the new private sector
(Racioppi and See 1999, 183). The nomenklatura, which was almost exclusively
male (Lapidus 1993, 156), used its political networks to accumulate capital for
entrepreneurial activities. Men's influential personal contacts that resulted from their
stronger position in the labour market and within the state apparatus than women's
provided them with greater enrichment opportunities.
5.1 Support Ties
5.1.1 Conjugal Instability and the Security of Female Kin Ties
Anna Rotkirch describes the 'frailty of conjugal ties' as a key feature of gender 
relations in Soviet Russia. It was brought about by the perception of marriage and 
having a child at an early age as obligatory and highly valued (2000). In addition, 
Rotkirch discusses the importance of women-centred cross-generational ties that care 
for and control daily life in the Soviet family (2000, 115). This argument is 
elaborated here to show that kin-based support networks were important for women
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due to the instability of conjugal ties. Furthermore, they provided more security for 
women than they did for men because of women’s responsibility for the maintenance 
of kin relations and household survival.18 Some examples of the use of kin ties as a 
survival practice included female kin co-residence, the exchange of food, joint 
budgets, and the care of the young, elderly and infirm family members.
Women relied on and invested in kin networks as an insurance against the instability 
of conjugal relations.19 There were several reasons for the instability of conjugal 
relations. In Soviet times, the state laid down that the primary relationship of 
individual men and women was to the state rather than to each other (Ashwin 2000, 
2). Access to education, employment, and independent income enhanced women's 
freedom to enter and leave marriage by reducing the value of resources gained 
through marriage (Lapidus 1993,146). Men's incomes were often too small for
OC\women to be wholly dependent on them. Men's drinking practices, which 
continued to be a principal cause of divorce (Vannoy et al. 1999,123), the unequal 
division of housework, and the close proximity of parents and children because of 
the housing shortage were further reasons for the fragility of conjugal ties. High 
rates of divorce, the large gender gap in life expectancy, and the loss of men in wars 
and Stalinist era repression added to their instability. Moreover, this was self- 
perpetuating because women who grew-up with their mothers or who, as adults,
18 Women have been found to have greater kin ties whilst men have greater co-worker ties (Fischer 
and Oliker 1983). Gwen Moore found that while women and men's networks were the same size, 
women's networks were comprised more by kin than non-kin compared to men's (1990).
19 This argument has parallels with literature on West Africa, which shows how women's networks are 
an investment in the context of conflictual household relations (Hill 1975).
20 For women, men's drinking is evidence of weakness (19), has a detrimental effect on men's income- 
earning ability (57) and exhausts scarce resources (43).
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lived with their mothers might not consider marriage an option.21 Having 
experienced loss of a father, seen their parents' marriage fail and perhaps having 
experienced a failed marriage themselves, some women had come to the conclusion 
that it was better living without a man who was unable to provide a satisfactory 
income and likely to drink heavily. Three women who grew up in three-generation 
female households said they found it difficult to imagine living with a man and 
preferred to live by themselves.
Men's kin ties were weaker because of their limited role in family and household 
relations. Men who invested in their breadwinner identity considered marital rather 
than kin relations key to daily living. For example, Stas's young family, until he 
recently got a well-paid job, was financially dependent on his wife's parents. Now 
that he had a good income, he complained about the demands of his kin for money:
When you have money sometimes you face conflicts in kin relations. I don't 
like to loan money to relatives. (22)
He did not like loaning money to kin because he was unlikely to see it again. He 
preferred lending to friends who reliably return money. His scorn for obligations to 
dependent kin was in line with his preference for concentrating resources in the 
household. While in the face of unstable conjugal relations, women attributed value 
to kin relations, men were linked to the domestic sphere through their breadwinner 
status, which led them to value conjugal relations over and above kin relations.
5.1.2 Conflict Between and Within Conjugal and Kin Ties
21 For example, Olga's grandmother's husband was arrested and killed during the Stalinist purges and 
she took sole responsibility for bringing up her daughter. Olga's mother never married and continued 
to live with her mother. Olga called her mother and grandmother her 'parents'. After their deaths, she 
said she did not marry because she knew she could live without men and did not want the dependency. 
When asked, she agreed that if a man appeared in her life, she would fear losing him.
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In situations where kin co-operation was a survival practice, vertical blood ties might,
for some women, take precedence over conjugal ties. In harsh economic conditions,
cross-generational interdependency between female kin might increase as state
welfare and social provision shrank. Rotkirch argues, "often, the expectations,
conditions and dynamics of extended mothering were stronger than the institutions
of heterosexual love" (2000,137). Twelve respondents prioritised kin over conjugal
relations22 through actions such as co-residence, support around the home and
financial support, which involved taking on additional work. Nina’s husband had a
drinking problem, and given the opportunity, could spend up to half their pensions
on vodka. As a result, Natasha and her husband agreed that Tanya, their daughter in
her late-thirties who lives with them, should keep the money so that he does not
spend it all. Tanya would have liked to live independently, but when the opportunity
of marriage and moving to a separate flat arose, she declined because she felt that
she could not leave her mother alone to look after her father. Tanya's brother lived in
a separate flat with his wife and child in the same courtyard. Tanya and her parents
are irritated that despite his proximity he provided no help. In another example,
Nina, a 55 year-old widow, moved in with her mother in order to look after her and
earn an extra income from renting out her flat (102). Nina saw her friends less
because she could no longer invite them to visit and she did not think that she would
marry again because she had little time or opportunity to meet men. In addition, in
five conjugal relations, two of which broke down in 2000, the wife, seeing her
husband's inability to cope, looked to her relationship with her mother as a source of
immediate support and as a form of insurance in the event of marital breakdown.
22 This does not include individual acts of support to kin, such as buying a flat, but steps based on 
commitment to kin over conjugal relations that alter extra-kin relations and the potential for entering 
conjugal relations. Two of these twelve are men, but both are said, by their friends, to be homosexual.
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The strength of women's kin ties could trigger tension in relations with the husband 
because they threatened the husband's identity as provider. Conflict between a 
husband and his mother-in-law could arise if the mother-in-law's support revealed a 
man's inability to live up to his breadwinner responsibilities. In two instances, the 
husband who prioritised his professional over his breadwinner identity, a stance 
discussed in chapter 4, was the source of concern to parents-in-law who tried to 
intervene. Oksana's husband had his labour book at a musical institute, but earned 
no income there. He also mended musical instruments in a workshop. However, 
over the previous ten years, there had been little demand for his work and it brought 
in very little money - sometimes, instead, accruing debts in workshop rent payments. 
In desperation, Oksana's stepfather offered Oksana's husband work earning R2500. 
She believed that her stepfather was right to offer him the work because his creative 
work "doesn't allow him to feed the family" (43). Her husband refused saying that 
he did not have the time to tear himself away from his creative work, thereby 
insulting her stepfather. Her husband had since left home.
Men's accounts played down kin support but in reality, mothers played an important 
role. Victor was a self-employed decorator earning a small and irregular income and 
his wife, working as a nurse, earned less still. His mother-in-law's contribution of 
her pension and help in domestic tasks provided significant support but he was 
reluctant to admit this because her support threatened his breadwinner role by 
making visible the family's need for his mother-in-law's income. He emphasised 
instead that his mother-in-law's budget was separate and how he supported her:
Mother-in-law has separate money. I would never ask her for money. I 
consider that I am in a position to feed my family and not to borrow money 
off anyone, least of all, my mother-in-law... I constantly help my mother-in-
law because she lives in my flat, in my house, and feeds on my money. If my 
mother-in-law's pension appears, then she spends it on our son. If she sees 
that certain things are needed around the house, then she buys them. When 
our son was small, mother-in-law sat with him because my wife and I 
worked. (23)
Strong relations between mother and daughter were not necessarily harmonious
especially when their strength arose out of enforced obligation. Natasha lived with
her mother and 22 year-old daughter. She married at the age of thirty because she
was "frightened of being alone" and her husband moved in with Natasha and her
mother. Her husband earned an income but instead of contributing it to the common
household budget, gave it, and a portion of Natasha's income, to his relatives. When
their child was bom he left and she raised the child by herself. Over twenty years
later, she still lived with her mother and daughter. This arrangement was taking its
toll. Natasha commented,
I never wanted to live with my mother, and now especially. We are already 
tired of each other and for that reason are starting to argue. Mother will be 
86 years old; I am 56 and my daughter in 21. It's a big difference in ages... 
Unfortunately we [in our country] don't have the opportunity to live 
separately from our parents. (39)
Natasha attributed the failure of their marriage to the tight nature of relations with 
her mother.
We should have thought about a separate home, but we didn't and this is one 
of the reasons why we split up. My mother and I are used to living together, 
and then a man appears in the home... I was the initiator of the divorce 
because I didn't like the fact that he didn't work. In that, I am to blame 
because I took the initiative in all worries around the home on myself, and it 
needed to be the husband that did that. Earning and providing for the family 
is men's responsibility. But my husband wasn't predisposed to this and for 
that reason it was difficult for him to cope. (39)
Recently, she and her estranged father re-established contact and she took out a loan 
of $US1000 in order to buy him a small house. The repayment of this loan was the
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cause of great concern to Natasha. It was difficult to see how, with an income of 
R800 per month, occasional additional haircutting (R300) and her mother’s pension 
(R667), she would be able to repay the loan. Even after his exile for twenty years 
because of Natasha's disapproval of his infidelity, she nevertheless felt obliged to 
buy her father a house.
Natasha's account raises many issues in relation to the conflict between kin and 
conjugal obligations. Parent-child relations were strong partly because the housing 
shortage meant that younger and older generations were compelled to live together. 
After her marriage, her primary obligations were always to her mother. The frailty 
of the conjugal bond was compounded by her husband's failure to be a breadwinner 
and to help in the household and, ultimately, demonstrated by his desertion on the 
birth of their child.
Together, these examples show how reliance on family was necessary because some 
men could not fulfil the breadwinner role. While necessary, reliance on family had 
costs in terms of women's obligations to kin and men's redundancy in the home. 
Ultimately, reliance on family ties might contribute to men's abdication of 
responsibility in the home.
5.1.3 Conflict between Conjugal and Friendship Ties
Friendship networks, like kin networks, tend to be segregated by gender. This is 
reinforced by gendered job segregation, which means that co-workers are more 
likely to be of the same sex (Ashwin and Yakubovich 2001). Men's networks are
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commonly focused around men.23 Male-female friendship is rare (Brandes 1981) 
and informal interaction is often sex segregated.24 Male friendship is played out in 
contexts of male recreational activities such as hunting, sport, football, wrestling, 
picking mushrooms and may involve drinking 25 Same-sex friendship is said to 
compensate for the inadequacy of heterosexual companionship. For men, friendship 
provides reprieve from household obligations.
While women's priorities were to support kin, men were more likely to have 
autonomy from kin ties and invested more resources in their friendships. Men found 
it more acceptable to turn to friends as the primary source of help. While women 
with family commitments said they had less time for friends because they were 
combining jobs or could not spend money on hosting or visiting friends, men 
continued to socialise.
5.1.4 The Gender Aspects of Requesting and Providing Support
Men found it unacceptable to ask kin for help because kinship networks were 
associated with women who serviced them. Men were concerned that their 
masculinity would be compromised by turning to kin for help. Thus, Victor, the 
self-employed decorator, noted
23 Studies on men's networks show for example, that Greek men congregate in cafes (Herzfeld 1985); 
Hungarian men co-operate in home construction (Sik 1988); men engage in masculinity rituals in 
Andalucia; (Driessen 1983) and provide each other with services and emotional support in Toronto 
(Wellman 1992).
24 In the domestic setting, men's drinking networks often met in the garage while women gathered in 
the kitchen.
25 Drinking is in the main, still a 'male realm' (Ries 1997, 55) that symbolically signifies men's ability 
to transcend the strictures of daily existence and the utopian purposes of the state (ibid, 69).
26 It has been argued that friendship relations are associated with autonomy and freedom and stand in 
juxtaposition to household and kin relations, which evoke long-term obligation, hierarchy and are 
tainted by association with the state (Day, Papataxiarchis and Stewart 1999, 15).
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I turn to my friends for help in insignificant issues. For example, today I 
needed a car to take an order to a client and I asked my friend to come with 
me in his car. I ask friends for help because I am ashamed to ask neighbours 
and relatives for help - 1 am a grown-up man and I am ashamed that I can't 
cope with my problems by myself. (23)
He believed that it was more acceptable to turn to friends than relatives for help. In a
desperate situation, men might be reluctant to show their helplessness and
consequently refrain from asking for help. Vladimir, who managed the Urals State
University's biological centre, said:
I turn to friends for help more often than relatives. I try to be independent. I 
try not to be obliged to anyone. I can help anyone, but try not to turn to 
others for help very often myself. (69)
The impact of not being able to support one's family and turning to relatives for help
could be devastating psychologically for a man. Kostya left his former wife to marry
Marina in 1992, and at the same time, lost work. Marina remembered his difficulty
accepting help from his mother-in-law:
At first, when I started to live with my husband, we had very big problems 
with money. He lost work as a builder and for a time, didn’t work anywhere. 
We lived on my mother's money. It was for him, a very big psychological 
trauma. You know, before that he didn't live badly and when he left his other 
family in order to live with me, he lost an awful lot, and most of all, the 
status of boss. (19)
Norms against men's dependency on kin-based support networks meant that men had 
fewer avenues down which to turn in times of trouble. Not wanting to be perceived 
as groveling, Stanislav, on release from prison and without a home, did not think of 
turning to kin or friends for help. He went instead to the night shelter in 
Ekaterinburg "in order not to be a burden to others - everyone has a family... it was 
difficult but I will never go onto the rubbish heap. Better to die standing than live on 
your knees" (45). Men might feel that they could not turn to friends or kin with big
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requests. Because of the nature of male ties - primarily between friends who provide 
minor forms of help - when facing severe hardship, a vulnerable man might be 
isolated from support. When his wife left, Victor had to bring two sons up alone, 
one of whom had learning difficulties. They were forced out of their home by 
bandits (from whom his elder son borrowed money) and now homeless and a heavy 
drinker, Victor found that his friends were unwilling to help when he was in greatest 
need.
I don't have relatives or friends. Probably there are some, but they all turned 
away from us. Contacts broke up. I don’t like to be a burden. Now, in 
general, with friends and mutual help it has become difficult (46).
While men experienced prohibitions against asking for help, they often felt
compelled to help kin because they were are assumed to be providers not just in the
household, but also among kin. Mikhail was divorced and in his early fifties, an art
historian by profession, who lived with his sister and niece in their two-roomed flat.
When Mikhail's sister, working in the defense industry, did not receive her wage in
1998-1999, he helped her with money.
The enterprise paid some money but very little - it wasn't possible to survive 
on it. She received 15% of her wage of R700. Two people [his sister and her 
thirteen year-old daughter] can't live on this money. For that reason I always 
helped them. For me it was absolutely natural - they are my closest people. 
(15)
Mikhail was proud of the fact that he helped his sister financially. When the factory 
paid the workers the wage arrears, he did not accept her offer to repay the money she 
borrowed, because "as a proud and independent person, I can't allow myself that" 
(15). This refusal to accept repayment was despite the fact that he had, by that time, 
lost his job and was without an income. His wife, who left him and moved to 
Moscow, offered him the flat where they had lived but he refused despite the 
cramped conditions in the two-roomed flat where he lived with his sister and niece.
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When I split up with my wife, I left her and my daughter the flat, because it is 
natural that a man behaves that way. Now she is married to a wealthy man 
but when she offered to help, suggesting that I buy the flat, I refused. I 
consider that in this world no one owes anyone anything. If I am offered help, 
then I refuse - 1 don’t want to be indebted to someone - 1 don't consider 
myself a weak person. (15)
It was important to Mikhail that he appeared self-sufficient even in times of hardship
and that he fulfilled his ’’natural" role as provider to his sister and niece. In practice,
his masculinity was threatened by the fact that he was left by his wife for a wealthy
businessman, was without work and dependent on his sister for accommodation. His
refusal to accept help from support networks - the loan repayment and offer of the
flat - was designed to regain his sense of status, but at the same time worsened his
material predicament. Men withheld from asking for help because they decided that
their status was more important than their material predicament.
These observations had consequences for women and men's livelihoods. Firstly, 
women were better insured in emergencies than men because they could rely on 
enduring kin relations. Men by contrast, face taboos against asking kin for help. 
When conjugal relations broke down, men might not have the kin relations they 
could fall back on. While their friendships might be reliable in helping in small 
problems, men could not turn to either friends or kin to help with large problems.
Kin relations were not infallible and could not always be relied upon as a safety net. 
There is a danger that in attempting to explain how families get by, the safety net 
function of networks as a positive form of support is overemphasized. Networks 
provided psychological support, access to job opportunities, and goods and services. 
However, daily survival was primarily based on household practices described in
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chapter 4: household members working long hours, going without goods in the face 
of rising prices, struggling with illness and the experience of considerable anxiety. 
The final section shows that households with depleted resources sometimes resorted 
less to support networks and were excluded from support they provided.
Secondly, the density of the mother-daughter bond could involve friction and control 
as well as amity especially when the tie involved considerable dependency. Tension 
could arise from men's conflict with their wives' kin networks because men felt that 
their identity as breadwinner was threatened by kin support.
Finally, the gendered character of dense kin networks had implications for men and 
women's opportunities for bettering their livelihoods. The homogenous nature of 
women's kin networks made them ill equipped to furnish access to new information 
and resources.27 Obligations to kin ties prevented women from engaging in 
friendship networks and in extreme cases, from engaging in conjugal relations.
Men's greater autonomy from kin relations and household responsibilities meant they 
had more opportunities to access resources for bettering their livelihoods through 
friends.
5.2 Gender and Access to Influential ties
Access to well-endowed networks that provided opportunities for enrichment in the 
market - like access to support ties - was gendered. Entrepreneurship required a
27 It has been shown that a high proportion of kin and homogeneity of networks are critical 
disadvantages facing small business owners (Renzulli, Aldrich and Moody 2000). Furthermore, kin 
ties are less likely to provide access to instrumental resources and information (Wellman 1990).
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level of autonomy that some women, embedded in support networks, did not have.
As described above, men's privileged position among the city's elite and the
continuing role played by influential networks consisting of men meant that
professional men were well-positioned in relation to the redistribution of resources at
the beginning of the reform process. Chapter 5 showed that men viewed
entrepreneurship as activity gendered male because of perceived masculine attributes
required by the market. This discourse has concrete implications for the shape of
women and men's participation in the market. In the early 1990s, women were
excluded from social networks, such as Komsomol networks and brokering chains
that acted as channels in the redistribution of resources and favours. Sergei was the
oblast Komsomol Secretary for 12 years and member of the district committee
(Raikom) bureau and subsequently, a businessman and executive director of the
Sverdlovsk branch of the Russian Union of Young Entrepreneurs. In response to a
question about women's participation in business he stated,
Women prefer to work in [state] enterprises and earn a stable salary. A man 
is more inclined to risk because he is more suited to life. A man falls, picks 
himself up and goes on further. Women need stability; they are not 
predisposed to risk. Women have less skill towards conducting business. 
Businessmen do not rely on women or include them. (91) [emphasis added]
Same-sex friendships with university friends often formed the basis for the formation
of businesses as Andrei suggested,
the business started on the bench in a public garden when with five friends 
we decided to engage in the computer business. I graduated from the radio- 
technological faculty of the UPI [Urals Polytechnic Institute] and my friends 
were technologists as well. (98)
The gender aspect to business creation was suggested by the situation in which the
idea came about and the male composition of his friend technologists. Men
emphasised the role of like-minded friends in starting up business.
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All businessmen respondents said they did not take on kin as employees because 
tlhey made unreasonable demands. However, they relied on their influential kin ties 
for credit and access to favours by blat. While resource-poor men are humiliated by 
asking for help, blat amongst high-status men was acceptable. For example, 
Evgenya's influential father who was the director of the drama theatre and well- 
connected in the state administration, helped her husband, Sasha, expand his shop 
chain. This help did not compromise Sasha’s status, but rather confirmed that he was 
within 'the circle' and worthy of support. His business was already established and 
his own father was in federal government. This example illustrates how kin ties 
provided access to market opportunities in a gendered way.28 Evgenya's parents 
could have helped her had she wanted to engage in entrepreneurial activity, but as it 
was, neither she nor her parents expected her to go into business. Evgenya decided 
to accept her housewife role despite her desire to work because it conformed to her 
husband and parents' wishes.
I don't have enough communication but in principal being at home is OK and
good for everyone else -  father, mother, my husband and the children. (72)
Businessmen also said that they did not work with their wives because of the 
importance of keeping work and family life separate. However, women's role might 
not be confined to providing a supportive, calm, home environment as men typically 
suggest. So-called 'housewives' played an important role in running businesses and 
in a very small number of cases, conjugal couples went into business together 29 
Vladimir had a building materials business and considered his wife, Natasha, a
28 MacEwen Scott noted that in Peru, whilst kinship networks had the capacity to mobilize resources 
for kin generally, they distributed resources to men and women unevenly and transferred a gender- 
segregated ideology to the labour market (1994,170).
29 Two conjugal couples engage in business together -  one owned a successful pastry firm and the 
second traded in home-grown vegetables
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'housewife', although she worked day and night to keep the business viable. When 
they first started going out, Natasha worked in the shop. Later, Vladimir could not 
afford accountants and Natasha painstakingly checked the books and kept up-to-date 
with changing red tape. When Vladimir was away she was responsible for running 
the business. Despite this, he controlled the business and household income (111). 
Women by contrast, were likely to work with conjugal relations and kin. Women 
pointed to the role of husbands in providing start-up capital, an income while 
business was not making a profit and contacts.
Sponsorship could be a type of contact to a richer world employed by resource poor 
women. Three women respondents had sought sponsors largely for the material 
support they provided30. Ludmila was dismissed from a wood-processing plant in 
1998 and had not been paid for three months. She and her four year-old daughter 
"survived thanks to my lover who provided for us. But I related to him precisely as a 
lover and not like a sponsor. I don't have those kinds of relations to men as people 
giving money. Now I rarely see him because he is married with two children" (30). 
Her unease about the explicit monetary aspect of the relationship was suggested by 
her mention of the word sponsor and insistence that he was in fact her lover.
30 Women may use their sexuality as a resource to access opportunities albeit within the context of 
considerable constraint. Four women respondents (unconnected to each other) sought husbands 
through advertisements, through marriage agencies or on the internet.
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6. Are Networks Eroded by Social Differentiation?
In analysing the impact of social change on networks, theorists have posited that
dense ties are likely to be stronger than weak ties and therefore less likely to break 
1 1
down . Weak bridging ties are thought to be the first to decay in situations of flux 
because they are not embedded in enforceable social norms to the extent that dense 
ties are. One reason given for this is that the increasing power of money in post- 
Soviet society has lessened the importance of personal connections (Koroteyeva and 
Makarova 1998). It has also been argued that weak bridging ties cost a lot of time 
and money to maintain (Burt 2001). In Russia, weak ties are said to disintegrate 
because people with limited resources concentrate their resources in dense ties 
(O'Brien and Patsiorkovski 2000). As a result, people's vulnerability is increased 
because they are cut off from bridging ties that provide access to new livelihood 
opportunities (Lancaster 1992, 67).32 It is suggested here by contrast, that while 
there was increased reliance on dense networks in survival practices, support 
networks became fragile in the face of the depletion of financial resources. Dense 
support ties showed signs of strain as a result of new dependencies on them.
It was shown above that dense ties were important for support in the context of 
shrinking state social services. However, in the face of the depletion of financial 
resources among network participants, these networks underwent strain. Jakob Rigi 
makes a second useful distinction between the 'reproductive' and 'strategic' types of
31 It has been argued that embedding slows decay due to information flows and enforceable social 
norms (Burt 2001, 14).
32 Research carried out in Santiago, Chile showed that access to wide social networks was restricted to 
middle income groups. High levels of poverty and inequality meant that the poor were stigmatised 
and excluded from wider networks with the result that people took refuge in family relations. Relying 
on dense ties and without access to new information provided by extensive ties, these households' 
vulnerability increased (Beall 2000).
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networks (1999,118). The former maintain social relations vital for survival while
the later are urgent forms of help contributing directly to survival. This distinction is
applied here to two kinds of practice necessary for the functioning of any network.
Norms of reciprocity stressed the value of friendship and sanction against self-
interest in social relations. The principle "you [give] to me, I [give] to you" (ti mne,
ya tebe) was central to mutual help relations, and was the equivalent o f ’what goes
around comes around'. As one pensioner in his late seventies pointed out, this
principle was incompatible with an individualistic rationale:
... I help [residents in] the block with home repairs. And if I go into the 
courtyard and ask a neighbour for money, he without hesitating, lends me 
money. The principle 'you give to me, I give to you' exists for me only in 
unselfish conditions. (7)
For support networks to continue, they could not solely be treated instrumentally for
the favours and resources of the strategic type extracted from them. They required
maintenance through unsolicited gifts. Olga described in mythical-like terms, the
reciprocal norms of friendship,
At work I have friends who support me morally and help with advice but we 
consider that you have to solve your problems yourself. Often psychological 
help - to bolster the spirit is more important than material help; and advice 
can be more important than money... We don't ask for help, but if people 
simply offer us some sort of help, we may accept it with thanks... It is not 
even necessary to ask true friends to help because they know your situation... 
You don't need to ask friends for help - they always know when to appear. 
Otherwise they wouldn't be friends because a true friend doesn’t wait till you 
call him - he feels your necessity... and comes. (10)
Her explanation of the role of friendship was saturated with norms about appropriate
behaviour among friends. Olga stressed the spiritual nature of true friendship.
Friends were a source of non-material support (advice, moral support) but when it
came to practical material problems, individuals should solve them by themselves.
She referred to the ritual surrounding the exchange process whereby asking or
waiting to be asked for help was wrong. A friend was obliged to help ("feels" your
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need and "comes"). Despite the prohibitions against relying on friends materially 
and requesting help, in practice, Olga greatly relied on her friends for daily survival. 
It is suggested here, that the reproductive exchanges, or demonstrations of dedication 
to support networks, that help sustain them may become more difficult with the 
impoverishment of exchange partners.
One example of the difficulty of continuing reproductive exchange practices was 
resource constraints on hospitality and participation in gift-giving rituals. In 
conversations, examples of generous hospitality and spontaneous spending on 
friends in Soviet times abounded. Several respondents recounted spending half a 
month's wages on inviting friends to a restaurant and then living very modestly until 
the next payday. The story's message was that one night's sociality justifies 
extravagant and irrational spending, although in practice, the lesser importance of 
money in Soviet times meant that they were unlikely to go hungry as a result.
People now lamented the inability to spend money on friends. Economising was 
perceived as contradicting the desire to spend money on friendship bonds. Indicative 
of the continued importance of collective values, spending on rituals continued 
despite considerable financial hardship. Individuals gave gifts even when money 
was desperately needed. Three individuals had taken out large loans in order to 
provide elderly parents with a home. Communal kitties for weddings and burials 
were still used. Tatyana, who was a single-mother supporting her separated and now 
elderly mother and father, recalled an instance when working at the factory, although 
experiencing wage arrears, she gave to kin when asked,
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Not long ago my nephew died and all the family collected money for the 
burial. I also gave R30033. For me it is quite a lot of money... and I really 
needed the money because I hadn't received my salary at work and was 
looking after my paralysed mother. (28)
Other examples of continued spending on communal relations included the large 
proportion of the household budget allocated to official holidays and men buying 
presents for colleagues on international Women's Day.
However, continuing these exchanges became problematic in the face of economic
hardship. Cash-struck individuals might decide that they could not afford to visit
nearby friends because they would have to take a gift with them and they did not
have money available to invite others around. Household survival took precedence
over social obligations. Oksana, who raised her two daughters alone, explained,
Before we gathered together more often. And now it has grown harder to 
have guests because you have to offer them something to eat. But when there 
is no surplus money, it’s better to buy something tasty for the children than 
invite girlfriends round, although my girlfriend knows how we live and 
brings something to eat. When we are invited as guests we also have to bring 
something with us. (42)
People did not have time to see their friends if they are combining jobs and might
refuse invitations to weddings because of the cost of a gift. Although Masha refused
an invitation to a friend's wedding, it proved impossible however, to avoid attending
her husband's sister's wedding. Without spare money and considerable debts, the
present was a source of great anxiety. In the end, Masha and her husband took the
drastic step of giving their bed, which they had not been able to replace (3).
33 At this time this sum would have been well over half her month's salary.
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The contradiction between the desire to give and the household’s economic need 
takes on a gendered aspect. Whereas for women, obligations lay squarely with 
household welfare, men faced a tension between household financial obligations and 
the need to maintain male friendship networks, which also demanded money.34 Men 
were expected to have pocket money that they could spend on their extra-household 
friendships (Ashwin 2001). Money should be spent on socializing, an important 
element of which is drinking, which made conversation flow (43). Men's drinking 
with friends could lead to heightened conflict in the home in difficult times. As a 
result, men's friendships could be the source of stress in conjugal relations.
People with friends and relatives some distance away might no longer be able to 
afford the journey.35 In the past, travel by air and train around the Soviet Union was 
affordable and people could regularly visit distant kin and friends. In addition, 
inviting kin or friends to stay involved the expense of providing for an additional 
person.36 The rising cost of inter-oblast telephone calls meant that friends and 
relatives who lived far away from each other found it harder to keep in contact. 
Finally, sending money to extended kin who were worse off economically stopped 
among respondents in the mid-1990s because of the lack of spare cash.
The implications of lending money were greater because of the instability of 
incomes. In the past, people were paid twice per month and it was easy to predict 
when a loan could be repaid. People took loans from the enterprise where they
34 Two examples of men's expenditure on their friendship networks include alcohol and petrol for 
giving friends lifts.
Four years ago, a train journey to another oblast to visit relatives, go to a funeral, or visit 
schoolmates was more affordable to respondents.
36 There is also the fear that kin will ask for money/steal.
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worked to buy large items, a practice that continued in some enterprises. Recently 
however, there was no guarantee if and when money lent would be paid back.
People lent money to friends without demanding interest on the loans because norms 
of reciprocity - as everywhere - dictated that they did not make profit from friends. 
However, periods of high inflation meant that there was a risk that the returned 
money was worth less than the money originally lent. The tension between giving 
because of obligations to friends/kin and as a form of insurance against the future 
comes to the fore.
People might not ask friends for a monetary loan because they did not know when 
they could pay it back and did not want to be obliged to another person indefinitely. 
Persistently low wages meant that people would have to constantly ask for money. 
This might create new strains on the relationship. Individuals with outstanding debts 
might avoid borrowing more money when they needed it. For example, Marina had 
a network of girlfriends who were concerned about her predicament. They knew that 
she needed money but refused to accept loans. She was reluctant to borrow money 
from friends, and said that she should rely on no one but herself, because she was 
already steeped in debts. While she borrowed money from friends a few times, when 
debts continued over a prolonged period, the cost to her pride of accepting further 
material help was too great. Her difficulties were compounded by the fact that she 
did not have nearby kin to whom to turn.
The scarcity of money could exacerbate tension between close kin as well as 
between friends. Ludmila raised her daughter alone and her mother was her only 
close kin. In describing the deterioration of relations with her mother, Ludmila
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thought that one reason why her mother was colder towards her now than she used to 
be and reluctant to see her was her mother's fear that her daughter would ask for 
money:
I never turned to my mother for money -  the opposite -  when visiting her, I 
tried to leave her a little money... my mother is afraid that I will ask her for 
money, but I have always said to her that I don't need her money. It's just 
that my daughter needs a grandmother. (30)
A few people would not tell their kin of their problems to prevent them worrying 
since kin felt obliged to give money as a gift and not accept a return payment. This 
could make the recipient feel awkward so that in the future s/he avoided such mutual 
help relations. Oksana stated,
The worse we live, the more rarely we meet because mother has started 
asking about my children and I don’t want to distress her and so for that 
reason I prefer to talk with her by telephone. It's awful that I am already 40 
years old and she is 65 and I should be helping her. (42)
Oksana resorted to communicating with her mother by telephone because she did not 
want her mother to see their difficulties and then feel compelled to help when 
ideally, she thought that she should be supporting her parents in their old age. With 
only a small income from administrative work in the university and sweeping floors, 
Oksana was forced in critical situations to turn to work colleagues who accepted 
money as a return payment. As a result, she avoided worrying her mother. She 
explained,
Relatives don't want to take the money back -  they simply give it to us as a 
free gift, and I feel awkward. For that reason I prefer to borrow money off 
friends. But I turn to others for help not often -  only in critical cases. (42)
By turning to work colleagues for monetary loans, the impact of the obligation to 
give in the exchange was reduced to a minimum because the money was - or was
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supposedly - returned at the soonest opportunity. Borrowing money from a weak tie 
might be preferred to borrowing money from a close tie because s/he was more 
likely to accept a return payment of the loan. In addition, the financial difficulty was 
hidden from close ties, preventing them from feeling obliged to help when their 
resources were scarce. Weak ties became valuable during recent times of hardship 
because the giver did not experience the same degree of obligation to help if s/he 
could not. In this way, weak ties might be a preferred source of support if dense ties 
were tense, involved conflict or lacked resources.
Parallel with people’s views about the value of mutual help, there was a strong 
individualist rhetoric, that personal initiative reaped rewards. It disparaged those
^7who, struggling to get by, were dependent on others. People who counted on
support networks were perceived as stuck in old, collectivist ways and were unable
to adapt to market relations. As mentioned in chapter 5, dependency on networks
was criticised because it was thought to be triggered by laziness (not being prepared
to work) and an instrumentalist attitude towards others and as such, breached norms
of reciprocity (always taking and never giving back). 'Scroungers', 'lumpin' and
people who accepted handouts ( ‘khaliyavchikiT), whether it be vertically from the
state or horizontally from friends, were looked down upon. Galina explained,
Now very many have a grudge against the state. But all are used to waiting 
for something from the state. I look at the people who beg or those that fail 
to make ends meet {vodit' kontsi s kontsami) and I think that it is better to do 
something than complain and ask. I am not talking about begging old people. 
But the remainder could wash the floor; work in the mines and in a 
kindergarten. It seems to me that it is possible to find yourself some kind of 
activity in order not to starve or to become impoverished... You need to 
adjust and act. (33)
37 Pensioners' predicament is by contrast, sympathised with.
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Some respondents believed that dependency on vertical and horizontal forms of 
support was a brake on the development of society.
This unsympathetic attitude was not restricted to the wealthy. Oksana felt that the
opportunities opened up by the market were not available to her.
A flexible person can better his life -  a person who can adjust to new 
conditions. My husband and I aren't like that. We are honest (chesni) and 
proper (poriyadochni), romantic (romanticheski), moody {nastroenni) people. 
We aren't suited to contemporary life. For that reason we don't have the 
opportunity to better our life. (42)
Olga, who received a smaller income and had never met Oksana, commented harshly
that Oksana's problem was not so much that she was "honest", but that she was
"passive" and "frightened of making changes in her life".38 She said of Oksana,
It is a comfortable position: to talk about yourself as a person that can't adjust 
(niprisposoblenni). People found in this position always want help and 
complain.
Olga's lack of sympathy was itself a defence mechanism, as receiving an equally low 
income but without the dependants Oksana has to support, her comment betrayed a 
wish to distance herself and appear to be in a stronger position in relation to the 
changes going on around her. Acutely aware of the need in friendship to maintain a 
balance of being in a position of giving and receiving, she criticised Oksana for 
constantly being a recipient of help, suggesting even that this was due to her lazy 
character. Olga's opinion on Oksana's situation hinted at the danger of isolation for 
those without access to resources to maintain networks.
Many resource-poor people lamented the passing of togetherness and cohesion based 
on mutual understanding and moral standards that existed during Soviet times. It
38 Olga transcribed the interviews, hence her comments.
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had, they claimed, been replaced by distrust in relations between people, crime and 
theft. Victor, who is in his mid-forties comments, "before people helped each other. 
Now they only look what you have to steal" (46). This sense of isolation is a result 
of the fact that despite people's continued expectations of vertical and horizontal 
forms of support from the state and friends, for some these have gone.
This section argued that support networks were coming under strain as a result of 
economic hardship. An individualistic rhetoric that explained people's hardship in 
terms of their deficient personal characteristics suggested intolerance for those who 
needed support. Weak ties took on an important role in survival and accumulation 
practices. Conflict between kin, pride, and the reluctance to cause worry led 
individuals to turn to weak networks as a last resort.
7. Conclusion
This chapter found that networks were not just a symptom of instability during a 
period of transformation but shaped the way 'transition' occurred at the local level 
and were an important element in new economic political and social formations. 
They contributed to increased social differentiation in the city, ensuring that Soviet 
political and economic elites preserved their power and accumulated wealth. 
Business people whose belief was that state regulation of economic activity 
increased as the 1990s progressed, maintained that personal connections were as 
important as they ever were. The particularistic nature of economic and political 
relations excluded newcomers from access to market opportunities and made the
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business environment unpredictable for entrepreneurs without personal connections 
in the state administration or among large enterprises. This, at least in part, explains 
the failure of SME to be the engine of growth radical reformers anticipated.
Analysing changes in the role of social networks, the chapter suggested that although 
in the post-Soviet context, money provided access to goods and services where in the 
past only networks provided access, social networks continued to play a crucial role 
in obtaining food, services, loans and work. Now that the state and enterprise could 
no longer be relied upon for these essential elements of people's livelihoods, the role 
of networks in providing them took on new importance.
In identifying factors that influence access to different kinds of networks, this 
chapter showed that marriage increased people's support network considerably, as 
did employment, nearby kin and long-term residency in the city. Having a wide 
support network was advantageous because it allowed a household to draw on its 
contacts to help others, thereby accruing favours from others as support in future 
difficult times. Consequentially, marginalisation from networks had negative 
repercussions on people's ability to maintain their livelihoods in a context where 
state structures barely provided support.
The role played by networks in people's livelihoods was analysed from a gender 
] perspective. The premise of this perspective was that social networks were not 
I gender-neutral institutions that served everyone equally. Rather, the gender division 
(of labour in Soviet and post-Soviet Russia was mirrored in men and women's 
metworks. The chapter suggested that support networks provided security for women
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more than they did for men because of women's responsibility for the maintenance of 
kin relations and household survival. The mother-daughter bond was particularly 
strong and compensated for the frailty of conjugal ties. The chapter drew attention 
to the specific difficulties faced by men in this position who felt unable to turn to kin 
networks for support and increasingly found their productive role in the household 
called into question.
However, other men did have more freedom to engage in well-endowed, influential 
ties because they were not obliged to use networks to solve problems related to the 
daily running of the household as women were. Women did not have the same 
opportunities for enrichment because of their responsibilities for support structures 
and male-biased market institutions. This suggested that some men had more 
opportunities for enrichment and women were better at organising survival.
Finally, contrary to some theorists' predictions that weak ties would be the first to 
erode in times of hardship because reciprocal norms that govern them were less strict, 
this chapter suggested that weak ties could be strong because the obligation was less. 
Norms of mutual support came under strain in the face of economic hardship 
because the strength of the reciprocal norms attached to support networks - that is, 
the obligation to give freely, even when resources are very scarce - was contradicted 
by processes of differentiation. The strain on networks came about due to people's 
material dependence on networks but lack of resources for their reproduction. 
Reciprocity involved mutual co-operation and in the long-term, could not be 
sustained if one side was continually giving and the other continually receiving.
That is, in order to turn to others for help, people needed resources. In this way,
households without resources, whether they be time, information, other connections 
or money, to bring to networks could be thought of as amongst the most defenceless 
in the face of the harsh effects of market reform.
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Chapter 7: The Emergence of Organised Crime
1. Introduction
The criminal world in Ekaterinburg is thought to be one of the most powerful in 
Russia.1 This chapter examines the development of organised crime groups in the 
city and considers how the circumstances at the beginning of market reform 
produced specific conditions conducive to the rise of organised crime. It analyses 
their rapid adjustment to changing conditions and whether they have become 
legitimate actors. Organised crime is conceptualised as groups of people, rather than 
networks, because of the importance ascribed to their distinct collective identities.
As chapter 1 noted, these groups primarily engage in activities defined as illegal by 
the state and, through coercive techniques of service provision, establish order over 
that which they control.
This chapter seeks to show that, at the onset of market reform, an environment 
conducive to accumulation and long-standing institutional arrangements between a 
corrupt state and illegal business allowed for the rapid rise of organised crime 
groups. It suggests that organised crime groups in the city were, with some success, 
dropping their criminal image for a more 'civilised', reputable one. This new 
legitimacy was based on their economic and political power rather than adherence to 
a universal principle of law. The suggestion that these groups were changing is not 
intended to imply that they are following an evolutionary path of legalisation or that
1 Sverdlovsk region is considered by the Transnational Crime and Corruption Centre at the American 
University to be the most criminal region in Russia. In 1998, law enforcement agencies reported 1025 
contract killings and 96,000 reported crimes (Belousova 1999, 8).
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they were necessary for kick-starting the market economy. Rather, new hybrid 
forms were emerging based on close relations between business, organised crime and 
politics.
2. The Political Economy of Organised Crime in Ekaterinburg
Organised crime had a long history that is intimately connected to the state. Until the 
1970s, the organised crime scene was outside the formal sphere. In the 1920s, just 
when the new Soviet rulers were questioning the value of law, criminals were 
systematising their own conventions and rules (Humphrey 1999a, 204). At this time, 
the GULAG system provided the conditions, which allowed the criminal fraternity 
(known as the 'thieves' world') to become a complex, hierarchical organisation with 
links across Russia (Varese 2001). On the boundary of the Criminal Zone in the 
GULAG empire, with some of the Soviet Union's worst prison camps, Sverdlovsk 
became an outpost of this thieves' world (Konstantinov and Dikselius 1997). It 
developed well-defined rules based on its hostility towards the state and regulating 
interaction between thieves and with outsiders. In the 1950s, large numbers of 
prisoner thieves who fought against Germany were killed by other prisoners as 
punishment for associating with the state (Gurov 1990).
The 1970s signalled a shift to a more entrepreneurial orientation in criminal groups 
both in the enterprise and in the thieves' world. This shift was linked to a change in 
the state's approach to entrepreneurial activity. During the Brezhnev leadership, the 
regime struck a 'little deal' with the populations of large urban centres, whereby there
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was tacit accommodation of private marketeering and enterprise and the use of 
personal connections to obtain deficit goods. These transactions stood not outside, 
but within a "symbiotic relationship" with the official state enterprise in order to 
make "the total system more flexible and more responsive to household demand" 
(Millar 1985, 698). The cause of this shift in state attitude was the growth in regime 
corruption brought about by the collapse of the boundary between the party's general 
interest and personal status and material interests of its cadre. The result was a state 
system that had lost its unifying ideological purpose but sought to preserve its 
exclusivity while, at the same time, accommodating a range of interests. The apparat 
sponsored semi-illegal and illegal activities in return for "gratitude, deference, fear 
and 'tribute'" (Jowitt 1983, 286) by those granted the right to engage in these 
activities. This arrangement was at once predatory and protective and was intended 
to preserve elite privilege. Predatory officials fed off the tributes they received as a 
result of paternalistic informal relations with entrepreneurs and exercised the law 
partially with bribes often shaping the outcomes of court cases (Simis 1982).
This lax approach on the part of the state to underground business created the 
conditions by which entrepreneurs were vulnerable to criminal groups who seized 
the opportunity for greater involvement in business. During the Brezhnev era, 
organised crime groups realised that the minor rackets in which they engaged could 
be "massively enhanced by moving into the patronage structures of the main shadow 
economy" (Humphrey 1999,210-11). This re-orientation was accompanied by the 
acceptance of payments as personal wealth. In Ekaterinburg during the 1970s, two 
gangs, Orchina and Trifon smuggled vodka and timber. By the late 1970s, the 
tolkachi underground factories ignored the criminal underworld's prohibitions
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against trade and created new groupings of their own. These new mobsters - 
nicknamed Beli (Whites) to distinguish them from the old thieves, the Sini (Dark 
Blues) - exploited the new shadow economy (Konstantinov and Dikselius 1997).
The collusion between the state and organised crime intensified during the 1980s. 
The anti-alcohol campaign in the mid-1980s resulted in a boom in the trade of 
bootleg vodka. The growth of co-operatives in 1988 facilitated the laundering of 
money obtained from stealing raw materials and goods from enterprises and the 
growth of underground production.
Rapid social change in the 1990s led to the development of a more diverse and 
fractured organised crime scene. Controls on state corruption were removed with the 
collapse of the Communist Party. The culture of bribery and operating through 
informal connections provided fertile ground for the development of closer inter­
relations between politics, business and crime. Enterprise directors amassed huge 
wealth because of established close relations with the regional leadership. Collective 
action by Soviet-era lobbies promoted predatory and particularistic behaviour by the 
state (Varese 2001, 35). The government's privatisation policy triggered a rise of 
crime in Ekaterinburg (Megapolis-Express no.32,18.08.93,12). As chapter 3 
showed, Eduard Rossel, then head of the regional administration, had enormous 
power over the privatisation process, determining the value of land, buildings, 
permits, licenses, regulations and taxation (Brovkin 1998). Central government 
granted permission for an increase in the export quotas so that the Urals exported 
surplus nonferrous metals and chemicals left over from the production process in 
factories (Govorukhin 1993). The oblast's traders sold vast quantities of chemicals
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on the international market at very low prices. More than 300 commercial export 
firms which operated through a chain of four or five intermediary structures from the 
factories to the buyers were given over 1000 licenses to sell for American dollars 
metals and chemicals they obtained for rouble prices. Millionaires were made out of 
this activity, and at this time, many criminal gangs appeared who extorted money 
from these entrepreneurs. In this process, entrepreneurs depended on privileges and 
benefits from state officials, such as securing access to buildings and equipment, 
receiving permits, licenses and special taxation permits. Rossel ensured personal 
enrichment for himself and his friends by approving particular contracts and 
providing permits. These favours were repaid with lucrative jobs for relatives of 
officials, and bribes or goods' payments (Nelson and Kuzes 1997). Many of the 
organised crime groups owed their success to special tariffs, privileges and tax 
breaks awarded by officials.
2.1 The City's Criminal Scene in the 1990s
Four main organised crime groups emerged in and around Ekaterinburg at this time.
1. Uralmash group was named after the area of town, Uralmash, in the Ordonikidze 
District, where its initial leaders were bom: Grigory and Konstantin Tsyganov, 
Alexander Khabarov, Sergei Vorob'ev and Igor Novozhilov. These men formed one 
of Russia's bloodiest and most cohesive groups. Their business included vodka, 
retail trade, control over markets, prostitution and trade in nonferrous metals (The 
Moscow Times 12.07.00, 3). In 1993, Konstantin Tsyganov and Sergei Kurdyumov 
shot over 30 competitors and organised a bazooka attack on the Department for
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Fighting Organised Crime and the government of Sverdlovsk oblast.2 While 
gangland-style assassinations were commonplace in the early 1990s, as the decade 
progressed, they became less frequent.3 In 2000, Sergei Vorob'ev and Aleksander 
Khabarov were the acting leaders (Belousova 2000).4
The legitimate face of the group, Uralmash Social and Political Union, was officially 
registered and consisted of 23 leaders (one of whom allegedly hanged himself).5 The 
leaders were shareholders of over 100 enterprises and conducted business in 
countries such as the United States, Canada, England, Argentina, Bulgaria, Hungary, 
China, Germany, the Canary Islands and Cyprus (51). The group's website 
catalogued 53 industrial, trading, sports and service organisations owned by the 
group.6 The group claimed to have 500 members comprising workers from 
enterprises belonging to Uralmash and who supported the group. However, others 
believed it had several thousand members and tens of thousands of supporters (40).7
2. TsentraVni group, so called because they were based in the centre of the city, was 
the most powerful organised crime group in the early 1990s, engaging in commercial 
kiosks and local factory smelting furnaces, which produced a quarter of the country's 
ferrous and non-ferrous metals and emeralds (Konstantinov and Dilselius 1997,
2 This attack was in response to the fact that Konstantin Tsyganov's right hand man, Igor' Maevski 
had been set-up by the militia, leading to the arrest of Konstantin Tsyganov. Both were thought to be 
abroad ( A r g u m e n t y  i f a k t y - U r a l  no.23, 05.06.01,11).
3 Between April and July 2000, Oleg Belonenko, the director of Uralmash factory, Vladimir 
Klement'ev, the karate champion of Europe and a leader of the TsentraVni group were murdered. 
Pavel Fedulev, a local oligarch was attacked {The Moscow Times, 11.02.00, 3).
4 See their web pages on the Uralmash official website for career histories, sporting achievements and 
involvement in socil activities: http://www.ops-uralmash.ru/AboutUs.asp.
5 See Podrobnosti no.75 (558) 9-15 July 2000,2.
6 See <http://www.ops-uralmash.ru/catalog>.
7 Uralmash controls 20-30 large enterprises. For example, they controlled Perveuralsk tube factory 
where 15000 people work. Mainly though, the group said it is made up of small businesses (51).
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313). Oleg Vagin was its leader and Misha Kuchin, his right-hand man. The group's 
power weakened when Vagin, and then, Eduard Kazaryan were arrested on extortion 
charges in 1994 (Dunn 2000) and Vladimir Klement'ev was killed in 2000 (Belimov 
2000). The group was ethnically diverse and included Greeks, Chechens and 
Russians. They were involved in prostitution, the export of raw materials, gambling, 
metal, drugs and arms smuggling.
3. The Sini, meaning 'Dark Blues', were so called because of the blue tattoos that 
covered the skin of members that spent time in prison. The leader was a former 
convict and the group operated in the city outskirts, nearby towns and villages. Their 
main activity was racketeering (Dunn 2000).
4. The Afghantsy comprised Afghan and Chechen war veterans. The Afghanistan
soldiers came back from war expecting to be greeted as heroes, promised jobs and
privileges but instead came back as amputees, with psychological and marital
problems, drug addictions and without jobs. Olga, the wife of an Afghanistan war
veteran, explained how veterans survived their return to civilian life by replicating
the rules and relations that structured their lives whilst fighting.
In warfare, laws of human society don't operate. For some old Afghantsy, it's 
easier to continue violating law than find their place as normal citizens in a 
law-abiding society. It's difficult for them to survive in this society. The 
creation of the Afghantsy is a distorted war. They were used to dividing the 
world up into 'ours' and 'strangers'... It's easier for them to feel at home in 
criminal circles because everything is quite strictly divided. (94)
The experience of fighting and ways of living according to their own laws shaped 
the group's identity. The group had greater legitimacy among businessmen than 
other groups because of members' heroic status as soldiers.
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The group's first leader, Vladimir Lebedev, organised the Sverdlovsk oblast branch 
of the Union of Afghan veterans in 1989,8 providing employment for 85,000 former 
soldiers. In May 1992, understanding the futility of dialogue with the authorities 
about their housing problems, Lebedev organised the colonisation of Tanganskii 
road, without state authorisation. The creation of the Afghantsy, as a self-help group, 
represented the rejection of a state that betrayed them. The group bound by war, 
projected life at war onto civilian life, in response to the authority's refusal to tolerate 
open discussion of the war. The Afghantsy considered themselves a soldiers' group 
(soldatskaya groupirovka) - "We are soldiers, not bandits" (95). Oleg, an 
Afghanistan veteran and deputy director of the medical rehabilitation branch of the 
Union, stated,
When we needed a building for our office, we conferred with the town 
administration and they gave us some land. This is Afghantsy land. It's the 
same situation with Taganskii market. It turned out that the market was 
moved onto Afghantsy land. That is, Afghantsy didn't kill anyone in order to 
get the land, and didn't buy it. But the understanding 'Afgantsy own 
Taganskii market' carries a kind of insulting nuance. Those people who have 
started to live better, are simply ordinary Afghantsy whose affairs are going 
well... (95)
By Presidential decrees, the fund was granted full exemption from all taxes, fees and 
customs duties. This promoted the growth of a huge commercial structure around 
the Union involving the import of consumer goods and export of strategic raw 
materials (Kryshtanovskaya 1995, 608-9). According to entrepreneur respondents, 
these commercial firms accumulated huge resources and began to act like many 
other criminal groups by robbing the robbers.9
8 Officially the Union co-ordinates the work of other organisations bringing together Interior Ministry 
veterans from the Afghan war. It delivers material and social assistance to ex-soldiers and seeks to 
help them find employment, and to create new jobs (Dissanayake, Geller and Zyrina 1999).
9 Grab nagrablennoe refers to a situation where someone steals items from other people who 
themselves stole those items beforehand. This phrase was used during the New Economic Policy
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Between 1993 and 1996, Lebedev was imprisoned and Evgenii Petrov became 
president. Vladimir Lebedev was killed in 1998 (Podrobnosti no.85 18-24 August 
2000,4). In the second half of the 1990s, the group swelled in size following the 
return of discontented soldiers from the two Chechen wars and because many 
TsentraVni members joined its ranks (101). The group's main activities included 
extortion, drug smuggling from Afghanistan and car and petrol selling (Dunn, 2000).
These four groups shared the common goal of capital accumulation and the intent to 
be criminal. However, their development, forms and identities differed considerably. 
While Uralmash was intrinsically an entrepreneurial group that emerged with the 
onset of market reform, the Sini had a longer history in the Soviet underworld, the 
primary purpose of which was to resist state authority. The origins of the Afghantsy 
were specific to their collective experience of war and the response of the authorities 
to the war.
During a period of'gangster war' (gangsterskaya voina) between 1993-1994, the
spheres of influence were redistributed between these four main groups. In 1991, the
Uralmash leader, Gregori Tsyganov had been murdered. His brother's hunt for the
killers began an episode of violence that resulted in the death of many Tsentral ’ni
members. Pavel, a Uralmash member, recalled,
All those security structures and the carrying of weapons were illegal. People 
travelled in cars holding kalashnikovs behind their backs because it was a 
gangster war. In 1993-4, when people started engaging in business, earning 
money, then many people didn't like this and they started the re-division of 
the market, dividing their spheres of influence. (51)
when people accused landlords of robbing poor people with the result that revolutionaries robbed the 
landlords.
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This was a period of'uncoordinated competitive theft' (Olson 1993) when different 
groups competed for control over property. There was also fighting within groups as 
younger bandits pushed aside (ottesnyali) older ones. This period was imprinted on 
the population's memory. According to one resident, it was "a frightening war - the 
traces of it are still seen... I don't think there will be an end to this war" (10). Pavel, 
a Uralmash member, stated that it was a time when "very many people were killed", 
when "bandits killed bandits" (51). Uralmash was victorious in this struggle for 
influence, in which "by the law of evolution, those that survive are the strongest"
(51). The group attributed its success to its unity, organisation and mutual support
(51).
3. Protection and Predation
The key to organised crime groups' success lay in their ability to provide protection 
and extract the largest profits possible simultaneously.
3.1 Suppliers of Protection
Entrepreneurs distinguished between three types of organisation controlling the use 
of violence: the state (gosudarstvo), organised crime (kriminal) and private security 
firms (ichasni okhranni predpriyatiya). The state's authority weakened considerably 
opening the doors to organised crime groups in the early 1990s. Private security 
firms10 arose "like mushrooms" (98). Most senior staff of large private protection
10 The largest private security firm in Ekaterinburg is called ‘SOVA’.
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companies were former officers of state security forces - the KGB, MVD (the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs) and GRU (Army Intelligence Department) who had 
successfully transformed their skills into a market resource.11 Business people 
perceived these structures to be based on the same strict and hierarchical internal 
structure of a tsar and slaves (rabi)}2 The brysha - which literally means "roof1 and 
refers to the payment for protection - was the principal way they made money.
Although people distinguished between protection from criminal gangs, the state and 
private security firms, in practice, they overlapped in their functions, structure and 
inter-relations. Up to 90% of private security firm employees were former state 
security organ personnel and many used their unlawful access to hidden state 
information, contacts and services in the sphere of private protection (Adashkevich 
1994, 34-35). State officials provided criminal groups with information about 
wealthy business people and informally formed rackets or offered protection to 
entrepreneurs they knew personally. Organised crime groups obtained information 
from registration organs about small and medium-sized businesses, either for money 
or through their channels.
3.2 The Demand for Protection
As mentioned in chapter 1, Federico Varese has compared the difficult transition 
from feudalism to democracy in Sicily with the demand for 'mafia' protection 
services that emerged during the transition in Russia. Diego Gambetta shows that in
11 Working as a security guard had become a very common blue-collar job.
12 This categorisation matches Vadim Volkov's three ideal-type agencies controlling violence (1999).
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early nineteenth century Sicily, vast amounts of church and common land were 
auctioned to private purchasers and by the mid-nineteenth century, trade began to 
thrive. The lack of clearly defined property rights and the fear of being cheated 
increased the demand for protection. The state could not meet this demand, but at 
the time, there was a supply of unemployed former field guards, trained in the use of 
violence and released from baronial control, who could provide protection.
Therefore, instead of a state monopoly of protection, the demand was satisfied by 
autonomous protectors, who formed the Sicilian Mafia (Varese 1993). In the same 
way, at the onset of market reform in Russia, the state did not emerge as an impartial 
and credible protector of property rights. Property titles were poorly defined and 
unprotected, and during privatisation, the state was seen to be distributing resources 
in a particularistic way. Trust in the state fell and a demand for protection grew. It 
was satisfied by former police and KGB officers and disbanded army soldiers trained 
in the use of arms (Varese 2001).
My respondents confirmed Varese's argument. The demand for protection was linked
to the threat to property. Protection services were sought out, as Andrei explained,
because alone you can't protect yourself... it is impossible not to pay... and if 
you don't want to pay anyone a krysha then you won’t manage to engage in 
business. It's similar for a flat. If in your flat there is nothing, then the thief 
won't break in but if you have gold or foreign currency or some valuable 
item, in order not to lose it all, you defend your flat: put in an iron door, bars 
on the windows, an alarm. In business it's the same. While you earn only a 
little money then bandits leave you alone, because no one needs your kopeks. 
But as soon as you start earning a lot of money, you become noticed and you 
have to think about your security. (98)
Business people agreed that "in the beginning, it was impossible to engage in 
business without 'enforcement support' (silovi poderzhki)" (51). The state failed to 
enforce property right and at the same time, organised crime groups emerged to
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create an atmosphere of fear and violence under which it was infeasible to reject 
their advances. Zhenya, the director of a medical equipment production firm, 
commented,
Why were there bandits ten years ago? Because no-one could protect you.
But the bandit would come and say, "If you pay me, I guarantee that you can 
calmly work. But if you don't pay me, then the militia will provide your 
business's security, regime of well-being (<rezhim blagopriyatstvovaniya) and 
comfort". But I knew perfectly well that of all structures, the militia wasn't 
able to provide for me. And I needed to choose what was important for me.
I had to face bandits but thanks to God I am alive, I didn't soil my hands or 
my spirit (121).
Uralmash presented itself as a Robin Hood type organisation in the early 1990s,
responding to the threat of violence with a readiness to stand up for itself and its
partners. The group portrayed the exchange between racketeers and traders as
"mutually advantageous" (51). However, 'roof payments were far from voluntary.
The refusal to pay 'debts' accrued from being on a group's territory carried with it
retribution against an entrepreneur's family and burning his office (93). Konstantin,
the director of several firms, recalled,
Ten years ago rackets were coarse and rude. It was very difficult for 
businesses. From 1991 till 1995 there was an awful lot of people who 
wanted to make money without doing anything, who engaged in racketeering. 
It used to be the case in the first half of the 1990s that business people had to 
pay a krysha. There were raids and you were threatened with death if you 
didn't pay. Most paid, but some turned to the police, if they had personal 
relations with them (101).
Although organised crime acted as a substitute for the state protection, business 
people were compelled to pay tributes to one group as protection from other groups. 
Business people perceived organised crime as playing a positive economic function 
distinct from the money-grabbing techniques employed by state officials. While the 
state applied law arbitrarily, organised crime groups were trusted to operate 
according to rules. Business people accepted paying organised crime groups but
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disliked nothing more than paying taxes or bribes to the state. They believed that it
was in bandits' interests to support and encourage business growth because they
would profit from that success. Zhenya commented,
I think that for business protection about 20-30% of income is spent. I 
believe that this is not much because in fact, the biggest racketeer taking 
money from businessmen is not bandits, but the state. Bandits don't take 
your last money from you because it would not be advantageous for them if 
you were to collapse. Bandits take care of their tax-payer 
(nalogoplateVshchik*) so that he doesn't collapse and brings them money. If 
bandits take too much money (pazorit') they won't get any more money for 
themselves. But our state doesn't have the intelligence not to ruin them 
because it wants a lot of money and straightaway. (121)
Protection money is perceived as an equivalent to taxation and as Zhenya suggested,
organised crime has replaced the state as tax collector. According to these
respondents, protection payments provided more reliable services than tax paid to
the state. Vladimir, a businessman discussed in chapter 6, who failed to get
permission to build a shop despite bribe payments, stated,
democracy is worse than bandits. The state - actually democratic structures - 
has cheated us much more than bandits. We pay fines, taxes and thanks to 
this, we owe an enormous sum of money. While bandits ask for a concrete 
sum, it's hard to understand what state officials require. ( I l l )
Chapter 5 discussed the economic incentives of informal tax payments to organised 
crime groups. It illustrated this argument with a market trader's comment that these 
payments were 40% of the cost of official tax payments to the state.
Business people described choosing the right 'roof as an important business decision.
Konstantin recalled,
I never had problems because I straightaway worked with the Afghantsy. It's 
a half-criminal structure. I started working with them because there came a 
point in my life when I had to choose with whom I was to work - Uralmash 
or the Afghantsy. I didn't want to work with Uralmash because these are 
people with extreme views, they don't honour criminal law. For example, 
bandits came to my office in two cars and they wanted to give me a 'roof.
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For this 'roof they asked for 50% of my income. It's very expensive. They 
proposed their 'roof to me in a very aggressive and rude way. (101)13
Zhenya chose to work with the Afghantsy because according to him, they worked
according to rules in a proper way and asked for a fair price. The costs of security
were tolerated as a normal business expense and business people were prepared to
pay 20 - 30% of their profit or an agreed monthly sum for a group to 'solve
questions' for them. The question 'who do you work with?' became a normal part of
business dealings. In business relations between Moscow and Ekaterinburg, the
Moscow partner only co-operated when local criminal groups were involved because
they had a reputation of making sure business was done (Handelman 1994).
Konstantin commented,
The Afghantsy provide security (ukhrana) for my business and I officially 
pay them money by agreement (po dogavoru). But in fact I pay them more 
money than written in the agreement - it's a fixed sum and not a percentage of 
income. Until the crisis, I paid $10,000 [per month], and now I pay ten times 
less - around R50,000 roubles. I never faced anyone from Uralmash or the 
Dark Blues personally. If I come across problems then my security sorts 
them out for me. (101)
3.3 Avoidance Strategies
A small number of respondents developed strategies to avoid organised crime. Some
business people, owing to personal connections in the state, were protected from
organised crime group's advances. Andrei's firm avoided organised crime because of
contacts (lichni kontakt) in the militia:
The first time criminal structures came to me was in 1991. But we didn't pay 
anyone. We were one of a few who paid no-one because, as it turned out, we 
had an accidental friendship with the militia. But this was very dangerous 
because people who turned to the militia for help could seriously suffer in the 
face of criminal structures if the bandits realised that the entrepreneur was 
turning to the militia for help. They could do absolutely anything - throw a
13 The way Uralmash "proposed their 'roof" was a raid, in criminal language 'nayezd'.
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bomb into the office, bum your car, kill - and that's simply because you 
turned to the militia. But I had a friend in the militia who was the boss of the 
Department for Fighting Organised Crime. He instructed me how to behave 
when people from a criminal group came to me. When bandits came to me a 
second time, one of them was put in prison and a Russia-wide criminal 
investigation was launched against the other. And then they understood, 
better not bother us. (98)
In 1994, the firm created its own security service (sobstvennaya sluzhba
bezopasnosti). Andrei continued,
The problem of threats from criminal structures disappeared in 1995 when 
we created our own security service. Our security has its own weapons, as in 
the militia, and for that reason, bandits know that if they threaten me, that our 
security has the right to shoot. But not all have that opportunity. And for that 
reason, small (melki) entrepreneurs need to either pay criminal structures or 
the militia a krysha because in the militia there are also people who take 
money for security. You could say that we are the exception to the rule. (98)
Larissa also received informal personal protection from the state. Her husband was a 
FSB agent who acted as the krysha for her gold-trading business. Before she met her 
husband, she and her parents who also engage in gold smuggling had a big 'roof 
(siVnaya krysha) provided by Mikhail Kuchin (a TsentraVni group leader). Elena's 
father was a factory head and had helped some friends related to Kuchin get a flat.
In return, Kuchin provided her father with initial trading contacts in Thailand and a 
'roof.
Some business women stressed how they distanced themselves from organised crime
groups. When Lilia began working for a foreign firm trading metals, she told her
boss that she would not be linked with big payments and that her bank account must
be just for the representatives' expenses, and not the payment for goods, in order to
avoid confrontation with criminal dealings. These precautions served her well:
The first time the criminal structures tried to demand money from me, they 
understood that I had very little money. There were attempts to rob me. One 
day they sat me down in the cellar the whole day, but then the bandits
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understood that I had no money and they let me go. This was eight to ten 
years ago when our firm had a lot of money, although personally I had none. 
(99)
In another case, Tanya, a confectioner, thought long and hard about the types of
business that would not attract the attention of organised crime groups. She decided
on confectionery because it was a sphere untouched by crime:
Before, it was dangerous to start your business. I worked out for myself what 
the criminal structures are interested in - metals and vodka - and for that 
reason decided to get involved in cakes and buns. I tried to find my niche in 
business so that I would keep out of harm’s way (rastalkivat’ loktyami). (100)
Nevertheless, she still paid a 'roof.
One businessman said he was able to stand up to organised crime because of the
public nature of his work activities. Anatoli, a local media magnate owned several
radio stations, and commented,
I don't have anything to do with criminal structures. Our business is not 
attractive to them - we're too public. Any scandal can become famous. For 
example, if bandits come to us and we told other media about this, tomorrow 
the whole town would know about it. This is not good for criminal 
structures. And then, for criminality we don't have that much money.
Bandits are interested in money and power. For power they buy politicians, 
officials, bureaucrats - there everything is criminalised. (109)
Finally, small businesses said that organised crime did not bother them because their 
profits were too small.
3.4 The Social Form of Organised Crime
While there were similarities in the functions played by mafia in nineteenth century 
Sicily and organised crime groups in post-Soviet Russia, the forms of protection
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were historically and culturally specific. In Ekaterinburg, large organised crime 
groups provided protection in traditional institutional forms. In many ways, they 
replicated the role of Soviet enterprises whose paternalistic bosses guaranteed 
employees' livelihoods and provided benefits and privileges according to 
particularistic relations, which determined whether employees' received more or less 
help.
For people falling within the boundary of these groups, a gamut of services was 
provided. Vera, resisted calling the Uralmash leaders 'criminal elements', insisting 
that they were neighbours from childhood, "ordinary boys who we grew up with"
(52) who had simply attained success.
Our krysha -  it's a mafiya structure. As it happens we all know each other
very well. (52)
Vera's invalid son who suffered from fits, had to be rushed to hospital at very short 
notice and required very expensive medicine that was difficult to obtain. While the 
state, according to Vera, would sooner have seen her son dead, the family's 
Uralmash friends put themselves in her position, humanely (po chelovecheski) 
related to her family and helped them financially at any moment without requiring 
repayment. They trustingly lent the family an expensive car and had given them 
thousands of dollars on several occasions to send their son to Moscow for treatment.
The protection 'roof was not simply a market-driven service that appeared with the 
introduction of the market. It reproduced hierarchical relations in the enterprise 
where tributes were paid in return for general protection. In relation to the 
enterprise, Ashwin has shown how in the post-Soviet context, workers "address their 
problems by hunting for that elusive strong leader guiding the mine through the
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troubled waters of transition" (1999,175). Much like the enterprise director, the 
organised crime group boss was a respected and well-connected leader, as Tanya 
suggested,
For me, mafiya is a firmly established person in their business. People start 
to respect you. You have friends everywhere - it's already mafiya. (100)
Pavel recounted how to begin with, his mother was very frightened that her son was 
joining Uralmash and thought they would kill him. Now, he claimed, his 
grandmother was getting her neighbours to vote for Khabarov and his mother hated 
the police because they restricted (zazhimat') Uralmash:
Mother bleeds (boleet) not for me, but for the idea. It's also evolution. (51)
Taken at face value, this comment suggests that his mother and grandmother 
fervently supported Khabarov, the group's leader, as the strong leader, whose 
election to the duma would solve the neighbourhood's problems. At a deeper level, 
it suggests that the group promoted an ideology ("the idea") which incorporated 
people who felt that they belonged.
The group's protection was manifest in other ways. It promoted itself as an 
organisation that responded to new social problems that the state failed to address. 
State failure to combat the rising drugs problem in the city led Uralmash to fight 
against drugs.14 A campaign, City Without Narcotics, financed by Uralmash, was 
launched in 1999 with a 'demonstration of strength' in the gypsy village of the 
Verkh-Isetsk District of Ekaterinburg. 300 businessmen and thugs stood for one 
hour in silence in front of the gypsies' houses, then dispersed peacefully. City
14 Its long border with Kazakhstan makes the Urals region the drug gateway o f Russia acting as a 
transit point for heroin smuggling from Pakistan, Tajikistan and Afghanistan.
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Without Narcotics continued the campaign by asking for information from the public 
about where drugs were being sold and, as a result, over 400 sales points were 
identified. These events were celebrated as a victory and law enforcement officials 
appeared weak in comparison. Uralmash criticised the militia for threatening 
journalists who exposed how the militia provided a cover for the drugs trade (51).
The group claimed that the fight against drugs was due to their members' children 
becoming the prime targets of drug dealers owing to their wealth. They wanted 
effective rehabilitation centres to treat their children's addictions. Uralmash leaders 
were former sportsmen and, as such, were morally opposed to drugs (51). According 
to Uralmash, ethnic groups - the Tajiki, gypsies and Azerbaijanis -  controlled the 
divisional inspector of the militia who provided a krysha to drug-trading groups (51).
Cynically, the group's crusade against drugs was viewed as a public relations 
exercise. It announced the 'demonstration of strength' to the media and as a result, 
the event was very public. The group dismisses this, alleging that the event had the 
detrimental effect of turning the MVD against it (51). However, the group was said 
to have close relations with the FSB, who were 'enemies' of the MVD locally.15 
Local journalists suggested that Uralmash used the raid and support of the anti-drugs 
campaign as a smokescreen to detract from their control of the Ekaterinburg drugs 
market.
15 Law enforcement agencies said the campaign succeeded in dividing up the drugs market thereby 
driving up the price of heroin and paralysing law enforcement agencies. In addition, it brought votes 
for Uralmash candidates during elections (Belousova 2000).
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Uralmash sought to change public opinion about the group by appointing a press
secretary, creating their own website, and gaining control over several radio
stations16 and newspapers.17 They donated to charities and social programmes and
provided leisure services. The website stated,
Understanding that the state can't support the volume of sport and culture, the 
Uralmash entrepreneurs without personal advertising or noise, finance 
children's sports, schools and cultural programs. The workers of the 
Uralmash security structures organised a patrol of the streets of 
Ordzhonikidze District for the defence of passers-by from street hooligans 
and constant patrol of the district's school.
This passage, with patriotic overtones, promoted the organisation's social activities 
and vigilante-like form of law and order in the absence of state protection.
In sum, organised crime groups shared some common features with the state and were 
taking on some of its functions. They did go to war to protect their interests and 
appropriate assets and territory in the early 1990s. Organised crime groups were 
considered by most entrepreneurs to be more legitimate than the state. Although both 
types of institution were hierarchical, predatory and related to business in an arbitrary 
fashion, criminal groups were perceived as providing services more reliably. In return 
for tax payments of sorts, they enforced property rights, invested in local businesses and 
infrastructure, established order and provided some welfare and social services. The 
'demonstration of strength' was a technique used to claim power and to send messages 
to the public about the group's ability to protect and provide. The approach to 
protection was similar to that of a Soviet enterprise in the sense that their legitimacy
16 It controlled the TV station '‘Studio 4V  and 'Kanal 10' and bought the right to create its own radio 
station.
17 Uralski rabochii and Vechemie vedomosti are newspapers supportive o f the Uralmash.
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was the result of economic performance and protection services that guaranteed 
livelihoods.
4. Are criminal groups becoming more legitimate?
4.1 The Profitability of Formal Activity
Mancur Olson has distinguished between two kinds of bandits - 'roving bandits' and 
'stationary1 bandits (1993). Under conditions of'uncoordinated competitive theft', 
much like the turf war period in Ekaterinburg, 'roving bandits' steal and are 
continually replaced by other competing groups. This destroys the incentive to 
invest or produce, leaving little for either the population or the bandit. Both are 
better off in a context where the 'stationary bandit' monopolises theft and rationalises 
it as an affordable tax. It is in the bandit's interests to provide conditions conducive 
to productivity because then he can extract profits and it serves the population, 
because people have the incentive to generate income and invest the sum they retain 
after tax.
This distinction sheds light on the institutionalisation of the criminal scene in
Ekaterinburg in the late 1990s. Legal activity, such as enterprise ownership, became
more attractive to criminal groups because it was more profitable than criminal
activity. Businesspeople viewed this change in organised crime as part of an
evolutionary move to market relations. Zhenya, a firm director, commented,
Any bandit goes through classical stages of development and growing up: in 
the beginning he needs to grab money through any means. When he already
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has a considerable amount of money and he already wants this money to 
work, he tries to settle in some business that will give him legal profits. (121)
Many people drew comparisons between the crime situation in Ekaterinburg and 
Chicago during the time of alcohol prohibition in the 1920s and 1930s. When the 
prohibition ended, bootleggers legalised their businesses and made large profits. In a 
similar way, many of these organised criminal groups were expected to become 
legitimate security companies and legitimate shareholders, investing their 
accumulated wealth in industrial enterprises.
Respondents said it was natural for organised crime groups that had accumulated
money through criminal operations to want to engage in legal business because "no-
one wants to constantly be a bandit outside the law" (120). By investing his money
in a factory, which did not have sufficient funds, a bandit's 'dirty* money became
clean and the bandit became a businessman. Elena, the director of the American-
sponsored Centre for Citizens' Initiatives in the city, endorsed this process:
Criminal structures have a large amount of accumulated money, which they 
want to launder. They are looking for commercial enterprises in which they 
can invest their money. If there is a person who has an idea for opening a 
new business but doesn't have money for it, bandits propose their investment 
on the basis of a 50/50% split. In such a way, dirty money stops being dirty 
and the bandit becomes an entrepreneur. I think that acting in this way, 
groups can help the development of business. If you take by way of example, 
America in the 1930s, when there was the dry law (sukhoi zakon) and alcohol 
was smuggled illegally, the money got from the sale of alcohol - criminal 
money - was put in to the development of business. It wasn’t transferred out 
of the country. (120)
She believed that investment of criminal groups' money in legal business would aid 
development of small business activities by injecting money that enabled 
entrepreneurs to realise their plans. This new legitimacy was partly based on legal 
foundations because organised crime groups were investing in legal enterprises.
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However, the legitimacy also had a cultural basis because these groups were 
investing in large production enterprises, which was considered superior to trade.
For business people, the reorientation of organised crime groups to legal business
meant that whereas before it had been difficult to prevent these groups from
extorting money, it was now difficult to refuse money that the criminal groups
wanted to invest in their businesses. Andrei stated,
Bandits came to us and demanded money. If you didn't give the money, they 
simply wouldn't let you engage in your business or let you live calmly. Now 
the racket has become something different. Now the most important thing is 
that they don't come to you and give you their money, that you have enough 
strength to refuse their money because in criminal structures, they have 
accumulated a considerably large amount of money and now they have to 
legalise this money. Any bandit reaches the classical level of development 
and growth: in the beginning he needs to grab money through any means 
possible. When he has got a lot of money, he wants to make this money 
work and he tries to fix up (pristroit *) a business, which would give him a 
legal profit. (98)
4.2 Widespread violence loses its function
The reliance on violence as the basis to a group's power was costly in terms of
leaders' lives and its role appeared to have reduced in the case of Uralmash because
it had achieved monopoly control of its markets. According to Pavel, a Uralmash
member, while the group resorted to violence in the past, this period was now over,
These people from Uralmash never specially hid themselves. Previously the 
militia sometimes announced an all-union investigation on them, but most of 
them live like they lived before and engage in the same things they engaged 
in before. So no legalisation has happened. It's just that before these 
Uralmashers frightened children and now they don't... People engaged in 
business before and now. Before the militia bore a lot of pressure on them 
(prizhimala) for this and now it doesn't. There was a period of gangster war: 
killings, people snapped at each other. But this was no more than a period. 
(51)
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Now that the group had a monopoly over market trade, it no longer acted in a 
competitive environment that justified a turf war between rival groups. Pavel 
commented,
The understanding of krysha and racket relates to 1993. Now such services 
are legally provided... Now Uralmash owns TsentraVni and Uralmash 
markets, what's the point of having rackets there? (51)
The exchange had become "absolutely legal" (51) in the sense that the group rented
out space to traders. The only illegal part of activity was that the rent collected on
market space was, for the most part, undeclared:
The only illegal aspect of the process is that only a tiny proportion of the 
money paid to those who control the land officially goes through the 
accountant. A large proportion is cash exchanged from hand to hand 
(ichernoe nal). (51)
Uralmash no longer defended traders because no criminal activity took place that
demanded protection. Debts were collected according to "lawful, civilised
conditions" (91). A business person could not open a car park because all car parks
were monopolised by Uralmash. Sergei, the director of the Sverdlovsk branch of the
Russian Union of Young Entrepreneurs, stated:
All kiosks at Uralmash belong to Uralmash. If someone wants to trade, then 
they can take a kiosk and pay rent for it. Before it was called a 'roof, now 
'rent'. Before they took an undetermined amount, and now you pay according 
to the rental agreement. (91)
Whilst groups, such as Uralmash, considered the money they extracted as 'rent', very
little had changed for traders. They still considered it a 'racket' that they had to pay.
This was understandable since the group's control over the kiosk and car park
markets was uncompetitive and likely to generate low quality services and high
prices. As monopolists extracting a high rent from traders, organised crime groups'
relation to traders continued to be coercive.
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4.3 Involvement in Politics
In the mid-1990s, Uralmash began getting involved in politics to further its
economic interests. It established good relations with Governor Eduard Rossel and
mobilised voters during local, regional, and national elections through their control
over enterprises. Pavel commented,
Something's there with Rossel. Not long ago he hand delivered me an 
official document from President Putin for help in conducting the election 
campaign. We have good relations not just with Rossel, but also with Putin. 
I'm not the only one with an official letter. Khabarov and Vorob'ev have 
similar official letters of thanks from El'stin. I also have an official letter 
from Rossel. I wouldn't say that it's some kind of indulgence. (51)
Uralmash claimed that the Governor "cannot operate without the group... We helped 
him very much in his pre-election campaign. He valued this" (51). In addition, by 
controlling dozens of legal enterprises in the oblast, Uralmash contributed a 
considerable amount of taxes to the oblast budget.
Two of the group's leaders became official local representatives of Ivan Rybkin's 
Socialist Party. In 1996 and 1997, Khabarov ran unsuccessfully, as a candidate for 
the Deputy of the State Duma in the Ordzhonikidze District. In the 1997 elections, 
although Khabarov beat all his competitors in numbers of votes, the elections were 
declared invalid due to poor voter turnout. In the same electoral district in December 
1999 and campaigning with the slogan 'The Urals for the Uralites!', the district's 
electorate cast most votes 'against all candidates', thus invalidating the single­
majority part of the state duma elections in the district. Elections were repeated in
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June 2000 and again invalidated owing to poor voter turnout.18 Eventually, 
Uralmash's founding member was likely to become a state duma deputy due to 
support from the oblast administration and the sound financial base of his electoral 
campaign (Umland 2000).
The true extent of organised crime’s involvement in politics was unclear. They had 
access to information in city and oblast level state departments - and if Uralmash's 
contention that they have helped President Putin in his election campaigns was to be 
believed - they were likely to have leverage over policy and legislation. However, 
so far, the population had refused to vote its leaders into the duma.
4.4 The Inter-penetration of Crime, Business and the State
The relationship between business and crime was characterised by mutual 
interdependence (Radaev 2000) whereby criminal groups were moving into 'white' 
and 'grey' areas of business and entrepreneurs, unable to work according to formal 
rules, negotiated with crime groups and bureaucrats to access information, resources 
and privileges. However, this change had not resulted in neutralising criminal groups, 
but in the creation of new hybrid forms of organisation. Cartels made up of business 
people and organised crime groups made bids to the leadership's discretionary power. 
This was apparent in Rossel's arbitrary distribution of state resources and allocation 
of permits and licenses in the early 1990s, discussed in chapter 3. Chapter 6 
described an instance where an organised crime group, with powerful connections,
18 Although their candidate failed to win the elections, the local press at the time suggested that the 
Uralmash candidate did in fact gain the most votes. Uralmash explained the failure in terms of the 
youth of their supporters who typically, did not vote (51).
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outbid a small business for a construction permit because it had better connections in 
the state and paid larger bribes. Another example was the violent struggles for 
directorships of factories in the region, whereby conflicting claims to property were 
determined by violence, personal contacts with organised crime groups, the judiciary, 
militia and the regional administration.19
One implication of the particularistic relations that operated between business, crime 
and state actors was the absence of competition for government contracts. Sergei 
commented,
I need a license. Officially, you wait two months for the result. I can do it in 
two days. Or, I need a signature from the land allocation department 
(zemleotvod). For money, they might not give me the right, but through 
connections, be my guest. It's the same with permission on the right to trade. 
The Day of the Town will be on 19th August. In order to go to the centre of 
town and sell pies, kebabs and the like, you need a trading permit. The 
person with the needed acquaintances is most likely to get that signature.
And it's very important because on one day, you can make a month's takings. 
It's advantageous to open a cafe in the centre of town. The permit goes to the 
person with the needed connections. It's the same with vehicle permits. The 
use of connections is legal (po zakonu) but it's an opportunity for the select 
few. You can't call it market relations. There is no basic competition. The 
people who get the land in the centre of town are not those that win the 
competition but those who have connections. It's difficult for construction 
firms to get state orders. The firms that get those orders are the ones that 
have connections, not the ones who build the best. (91)
As chapter 6 showed, some new enterprise directors expressed the desire to operate 
on legally-based principles and be independent of the state. However, networks 
between politics and business had a powerful advantage over more discrete market 
practices. Business people yearned for a stable legal system but they were too weak 
to resist leverage by corrupt state officials and criminal groups. Semi-state semi­
19 Two examples include the violent struggles for control over Uralkhimash chemical producing 
factory and Kachkanar Vanadium Mining Complex which continued in 2000 (The Moscow Times, 
15.09.00).
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private structures occupied an ambiguous, yet increasingly powerful space in the 
economy. Valentina Samsonova, the executive director of the Foundation for the 
Support of Women Entrepreneurs, believed that businesspeople witnessed less 
violence now,
because those who were involved in the control of territory already control 
the state and are dividing an absolutely different market. The scale of 
criminal structures' activity has grown. Before they were interested in certain 
areas of town, now they are interested in the whole country and even the 
whole world.... For example, the Uralmash group are no longer interested in 
our women entrepreneurs because the incomes which they could get with us - 
it's kopeks for them. Before members of the groups participated in violent 
criminal showdowns (v razborkakh). Now that they possess state power, 
they have a detachment of the militia whose special purpose is the violent 
showdowns with those who are unpleasing and those not subordinating. (93)
As this quotation suggests, organised crime had not replaced the state so much as 
semi-captured it, partly absorbing it, and inserting itself into a political community in 
which it could co-exist with the state symbiotically.
4.5 The Limits to Organised Crime Groups' Legitimacy
Uralmash appeared to have transformed from a criminal group extorting money from 
small entrepreneurs into a financial industrial group that was able to take advantage 
of opportunities to gain power over production and commercial facilities and was 
extending its control over the state apparatus to fulfil this aim. Moreover, the group
90was no longer defined as criminal by the regional leadership. As groups became 
more powerful, their activities lost their criminal meaning for many state and 
business actors. Since the 1990s, illicit activity covered a greater extent of the
20 In 1996, the Ekaterinburg Administration for the Fight Against Organised Crime stated that because 
leaders of organised crime were moving their money into legal channels, the criminal situation had 
calmed down (Kirova 1996 cited in Williamson 2000). Militia reports stated that Uralmash was one 
of the least criminally dangerous in Ekaterinburg (Belousova 1999, 8).
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economy and polity and was not restricted to crime groups but was an aspect of
much economic activity. For many entrepreneurs, 'criminal*, 'dirty' activities
included drugs and arms smuggling and prostitution but not tax evasion. Pavel
denied that Uralmash was laundering money by questioning the moral basis on
which criminality was defined.
Understand, for those people who wanted to get this money, it wasn't 'dirty'. 
'Dirty money* is a moral understanding. A tip, which a waiter receives 
appears 'dirty'. For me it is absolutely OK. (51)
Formal law was not the sole basis to legitimacy. The line between dishonest and
honest business, legal and criminal behaviour and 'black' and 'white' money was
slippery and rarely legally-based. Pavel continued,
Actually this line [between honest and dishonest business] depends only on 
who draws it. From within our organisation, nothing has changed. So, the 
line is to a large extent, conditional. Uralmash never got involved in drugs, 
trade in arms, prostitution, and isn't now. (51)
The line between acceptable and unacceptable activity was decided by the group
rather than defined by formal law.
However, the legitimacy of organised crime was not widespread. The nature of its
protection inevitably implied that a large portion of the population went unprotected.
To those excluded from their protection, the whole economy appeared
"underground" or "mafia-like" (Sergeyev 1998, 17). Nickolai, a pensioner who
worked as a security guard, commented,
I believe that now it is impossible to improve your material situation through 
honest means. If you steal, then it is possible. But you can't make enough 
money to live on in the state or in private enterprises. Only people who act 
dishonestly are able to improve their lives. This manner of improvement is 
not a destiny for all. (114)
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Among economic elites too, Uralmash's legitimacy was limited. The group was now 
a major shareholder in many of the region's biggest enterprises but the biggest 
enterprise, Uralmash factory, had been strong enough to fight off advances by the 
group. Although, historically, the group has had some control over the factory, as 
chapter 3 indicated, the factory's director has resisted penetration by organised crime. 
One of the group's leaders, Sergei Vorob'ev, recently approached Uralmash factory's 
primary shareholder, Kakha Bendukidze,21 to buy shares in the factory, but was 
turned down since such ownership would damage the factory's reputation.
People without protection believed that state officials and organised crime groups 
had co-operated in order to accumulate wealth. This bred cynicism that democracy 
was a propaganda ploy of those in power to justify grabbing the country's resources 
for themselves. For example, Boris was an unemployed architect who in the late 
1970s worked with 'criminals' smuggling deficit products into Russia and building 
private houses. He portrayed this work on the side with his 'ally bandits' as 
resistance to the state more than a money-earning venture. He described how his 
relation to these criminals and to the state had changed dramatically with the onset of 
'democracy' because now the officials and the bandits had come together as 
legitimate state actors under the guise of 'freedom'. By contrast, he continued to be 
outside the system and paid the price of reform. On the evening prior to our 
discussion, 'bandits' had come into his flat and threatened to take it from him. He 
had not paid his rent for over one year and also worried that the state might evict 
him.
21 He took over directorship after the former director, Bolonenko was murdered. At the time, the local 
press linked Belonenko's death to the Uralmash group (Moskovskii komsomolets-Ural, 13-20 July 
2000, 10).
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.. .now those people who were my ideological enemies [i.e. state officials], 
say everything the other way round. They propagandise freedom, democracy, 
but do everything the same as they did it before, but it’s already legal. Who 
did I work with before, when I did something underground? With bandits. 
They were afraid of the law and the state. Together, we found a common 
language. We didn’t think the same, but we had a point of contact. We were 
united in independence from those above (verkhushki) because everything 
they did was lies. It was awful. And now, the officials and the bandits -the 
evil ones - have become lawful. Only we are outlaws. (122)
The perception that organised crime controlled the state22 discredited the state further 
and reaffirmed in people’s minds that market reform presented opportunities only to 
the corrupt and criminal. As long as organised crime groups' reach was restricted, 
their legitimacy would remain limited.
5. Conclusion
This chapter showed that during the 1970s, opportunities for illegal entrepreneurial 
wealth accumulation increased, which provided a conducive environment for the 
growth of organised crime. In the early 1990s, the city's criminal scene was diverse 
and divided - both in terms of the differences within and between the groups - and 
was made up of groups with different identities, histories and motivations. By the 
late 1990s, some organised crime groups had become wealthier, more powerful and 
integrated into the economy, permeating business and the state, to a greater extent 
than before.
These groups were at once protective and predatory. Using the example of Uralmash, 
the chapter showed that organised crime groups had taken on many of the functions
22 Larissa Petrova, a Sociology professor at the Urals Pedagogical University held that organised 
crime groups' hold over the state was less than people believed and that people conflated their 
economic and political influence (112).
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that the state was unable to provide in a form that resembled the Soviet enterprise 
that provided a range of services that guaranteed workers' livelihoods. However, 
their legitimacy was limited because they were incapable of providing generalised 
protection.
Coalitions between businesses, organised crime groups and state officials 
monopolised market opportunities. Organised crime groups, in some business and 
state circles, became more legitimate not because they were neutralised as they 
accumulated wealth, but because business and the state was criminalised. These 
institutional arrangements, based on informal, particularistic relations between 
corrupt state officials and business, continued from Soviet times. Market aspects to 
the city's institutional framework - such as the right to trade freely and to bid for 
contracts on a competitive basis - were subordinated to these long-standing informal 
relations between previously underground and now legal businesses and the state.
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Conclusion
This study has provided a view of social change that presupposes neither a simple 
‘transition’ from plan to market nor a continuation of Soviet practices. Rather, it 
adopted a holistic approach to rapid social change that addressed the interaction 
between continuity and change in social institutions at the local level. It has sought 
to understand how rapid social change affected the organisation of socio-economic 
life at the micro level by looking at how people constructed their livelihoods though 
institutions such as the economy and labour market, organised crime groups, social 
networks and households in one Russian city.
1. Social Differentiation
A novel contribution of this project has been its approach to understanding the 
dynamics of social differentiation in Russia. At the time of writing it was, to my 
knowledge, the only piece of qualitative research conducted in Russia that addressed 
a cross-section of society, incorporating a broad range of different kinds of people 
from rich businessmen and state officials right through to the newly impoverished 
and homeless. Because one of the features of this thesis has been its holistic nature, 
it has been able to look at how a range of factors including household and social 
networks, and not simply economic ones such as employment and professional status, 
affect social stratification.
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Rapid social change involved enrichment opportunities for a few, while the majority 
found that their livelihoods had become increasingly vulnerable in the face of the 
withdrawal of state provision and exposure to the impact of market reforms. This 
study found that the households that prospered were conjugally based and most 
likely to resemble the neo-traditional form of male breadwinner and female 
housewife. Chapter 5 showed that important resources allowing for the pursuit of 
wealth accumulation strategies at the onset of market reforms were professional 
status and education, access to personal connections within the state administration 
and the economic elite, and being young and male. The means of enrichment were 
outside official state regulation and invariably illegal, often involving stolen goods 
and fraudulent exchanges.
The middle strata of society became impoverished in the first half of the 1990s but 
chapter 4 described how a sizeable proportion of respondent households had been 
able to secure a living in the second half of the 1990s, after initial impoverishment. 
One path was to use their professional skills and networks to diversify into different 
private moneymaking ventures informally, while maintaining a foothold in high 
status, profession employment in the formal economy. Another was to become a 
well-paid bureaucrat. Alternatively, respondents engaged fully in new private sector, 
in self-employment or as employees in firms. These households were in the main, 
conjugal in form, which often provided access to a double set of networks and two 
incomes.
Households with the poorest profiles had the least opportunity to mobilise resources 
to improve their situation. Their lack of marketable skills and qualifications meant
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that they were often reliant on small incomes from the formal state/privatised sector 
or from irregular individual labour activity. Coupled with their weak position in the 
labour market, they are without conjugal partners and/or supportive kin and could 
have a high proportion of dependants.
2. The Inability of the State to Contribute to People's Livelihoods
This thesis has contributed to theory on survival strategies by demonstrating the 
importance of social resources - and not just material and human ones -  for 
understanding how people make a living. It stressed that in a city like Ekaterinburg, 
it is not possible to retreat to Soviet-style practices, that households remain 
connected to the labour market and people cannot survive by simply relying on their 
own resources as may be more the case in rural areas. Even when people continued 
to do what they did in the past, this was a decision - albeit made under considerable 
constraints - that had novel implications. While it was pointed out in chapter 2 that 
the sample size was small and in chapter 3, that there were contextual specificities to 
the city studied, the dynamics of social differentiation and the analysis of the ways 
people make decisions is generalisable more widely to other contexts in Russia.
This research showed that those people with the richest social resources have been 
the best able to better their situation. By contrast, those people most reliant on 
dysfunctional formal state and market institutions are the most vulnerable section of 
society. It came to this conclusion by making its analysis of social networks central. 
As mentioned in chapter 1, social capital theorists and development policymakers
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have uncritically espoused social capital as a positive attribute for the advancement 
of society. This thesis has provided a rather different approach that looks at social 
networks as conservative and exclusive institutions that hamper equitable economic 
growth. In addition, it rejected the economistic notion of social networks as ‘capital’ 
providing instead, an analysis of how they restrict and drag down certain kinds of 
people -  whether they be businessmen wanting to expand into new markets or 
women overburdened with obligations to dependent kin.
Social networks are rather seen from the standpoint of the individual in the context 
of other institutions (such as the household and market) that can act both as 
resources as well as hindrances depending on the situation and their function. In 
addition, the thesis sought to address change in social networks -  their deterioration 
among the poor and their strengthening among the rich.
The thesis showed that for most respondents, the sharp decline in purchasing power 
of money wages and irregular wage payments created a qualitatively new situation. 
The biggest change people had to come to terms with was moving from a situation 
where the Soviet state penetrated social, economic and political life and was the 
basis to their livelihoods, to one where it failed to provide employment security and 
welfare protection.
The transformation of the work environment did not just involve the withdrawal of a 
state guaranteed employment and the provision of services and goods. The 
institutional context impeded people's efforts to make a living. The coalition between 
enterprise directors and the regional leadership resisted competitive practices at the
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city level and presented a barrier to structural adjustment. The demonetisation of the 
ecoiomy resulting from stabilisation policies meant that they experienced wage 
arrears and low salaries and moved between low paid unstable jobs. This made it 
very difficult for people to secure a living through formal employment alone, and as 
a result, they are compelled to mobilise alternative resources to get by.
Money now provided formal access to privately provided services but in practice, 
access to services became more problematic for most respondents. Chapter 4 
showed how preparing young children for school, higher education and illness left 
poor families steeped in debt. Despite a wider variety of medicines and health 
services available at a cost, people continued to rely on personal connections in the 
medical profession to access services, although this also involves payment. The 
rising cost of childcare and the abandonment of the Soviet rhetoric of equal 
opportunities for women and men increased the pressure on women to stay at home 
rather than send children to kindergarten. The state no longer provided housing and 
yet, private housing remains unaffordable for most families with adult offspring or 
elderly parents. Extended households were a response to the difficulty faced by 
young people in gaining financial independence from their parents and the 
responsibility falling on families for the care of the elderly and infirm.
The formal institutional context was also inimical to new private firms. Chapter 5 
showed that small firms struggled to access capital from banks, were vulnerable to 
financial shocks and political changes, fell prey to a prohibitive tax regime, were 
stifled by bureaucratic red tape and threatened by organised crime. This was 
symptomatic of the state's failure to put in place formal legal mechanisms to protect
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entrepreneurs and as a result, cheating and fraud pervaded business practice. In 
order to reduce the risks of market activity, entrepreneurs built horizontal, exclusive 
ties with partners to engender trust and exchange information. These ties restricted 
opportunities to network insiders and perpetuated the circular flow of resources and 
opportunities within a small group.
3. The Spread of the Informal Economy
3.1 The Implications of Informal Activity for Rich People’s Livelihoods
Informal activity was a way of circumventing the institutional barriers to the 
construction of livelihoods in the post-Soviet context. As chapters 4 and 5 noted, 
people engaged in informal activities during Soviet times, but they had now become 
more widespread and important to livelihoods. Access to property, licenses and 
permits was facilitated by informal payments or bribes. Firms employed lawyers 
and accountants who provided knowledge on how to escape state interference 
through legal and illegal means. Chapter 7 demonstrated that businesses pay private 
security firms, law enforcement officials and criminal groups protection ’roofs' or 
informal 'taxes' to provide security. These forms of activity had become acceptable, 
normal behaviour by those who engaged in them. The view for outsiders was of a 
market dominated by lawlessness and criminal activity.
Contrary to the conventional view that the informal economy is separate from the 
state, for business respondents, engagement in informal activity entailed forming
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personal relations with state officials. The state - in the shape of officials in the 
regional and city administrations - no longer had collective responsibility for the 
population, but it nevertheless remained a formidable power at the local level. 
Successful entrepreneurs acted outside the purview of formal legal activity but in 
order to remain viable, also required informal patronage from state officials. 
Particularistic networks between politics and underground business in Soviet times 
created an environment conducive to the growth of these informal ties in the 1990s. 
Vertical relations with the state were necessary for business to remain financially 
viable in order to attain state contracts, access premises, privileges and tax reprieves, 
which were not handed out on a competitive basis, as chapters 6 and 7 showed. 
Respondents, with trade and service sector businesses, depended on the Mayor, 
whilst region-wide production businesses required the support of the Governor.
Access to personal connections with state officials was differentiated along gender 
lines. Referring to other studies conducted in Russia, including in Sverdlosvk, 
alongside observations from the small number of cases of businesspeople in this 
study, chapter 5 drew some conclusions about gender dimensions to engagement in 
entrepreneurial activity. It was suggested that a smaller number of women went into 
business than men, that women’s businesses tended to be smaller than men's and 
were concentrated in the service and trade sectors. Women did not have access to 
nomenklatura and Komsomol networks or to the enterprise directorship to the same 
extent as men did. During the Soviet period, men's privileged position among the 
city's elites meant that they had advantages over women in accessing redistributed 
state resources that provided the basis to the creation of firms at the onset of market 
reform. Influential networks, vital for creating trust in business, operated according
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to gender norms, which dictated that business was a male pursuit. While it was 
impossible to know how representative these observations were, they went someway 
towards suggesting the existence of a gender gap in market opportunities.
Big business was in the strongest position to avoid encroachment by the state 
because it had the economic clout and political connections. Small businesses were 
weaker in the face of arbitrary state regulation and predatory organised crime groups. 
Despite this, respondents in business estimated that as much as 80-90% of business 
took place informally.
3.2 The Consequences of Arbitrary State Intervention
Although informal activity provided opportunities for bettering people's livelihoods, 
it also compounded risk. Because of the city and regional administrations' powers to 
impose constraints on entrepreneurial activity or relieve them of it at a whim, 
respondents perceived the business environment as unstable and their livelihoods to 
be insecure. Respondents were aware that the administration had the power to use 
their illegal economic activity as a means to destroy their livelihoods. Therefore, 
businesses bound themselves to powerful networks in order to prevent this from 
happening. Yet, their limited access to power meant that they failed to act as 
channels of initiative from below, and they remained powerless to challenge the 
status quo.
Because state protection was provided in a particularistic rather than generalised 
fashion, the demand for alternative forms of protection arose. Although a small
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number of business respondents had personal connections with the state that 
provided protection, the majority of them entered into relations with organised crime 
groups. Chapter 7 showed that respondents found it almost impossible to avoid 
these relationships in an environment where the state failed to provide for legal 
protection of property and the enforcement of contracts. New groups, based on 
pools of opportunistic men, emerged to fulfil that function.
Chapter 7 posited that new organised crime groups reproduced, in miniature, the 
Soviet model of inclusive institutions that fulfilled many of the functions of the state. 
As a result of the state's loss of legitimacy in a range of its functions, organised 
crime groups have stepped into its place largely through seizure of the monopoly of 
violence. In order to accumulate further wealth, they moved into the formal 
economy. They attempted to sustain and increase their wealth by investing in small 
businesses and becoming shareholders in the region's large enterprises. They also 
actively propagated cultural myths about their identity, their 'civilised' activity and 
economic contribution to the region. Whether these attempts succeed, organised 
crime groups nevertheless compelled acquiescence through their new monopolistic 
position in some niches of the economy and their penetration of the state.
Chapter 6 contended that uncompetitive cartels and monopolies between Soviet style 
enterprise directors, new private firms, predatory state officials and organised crime 
groups, set the rules of engagement in the market and prevented entrance to 
newcomers. New businesses were compelled to enter into personal relations with 
organised crime groups, the state administration and large enterprises in order to 
remain viable. Particularistic relations severely restricted the flow of information
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about the pool of potential partners, in turn, creating barriers to extra-network 
participation. Business people's inability to move outside their networks hampered 
business expansion.
These entrenched particularistic relations stifled grassroots development and 
impeded market practices. Chapter 6 argued that new private sector business 
directors exhibited entrepreneurial attitudes and practices. Firm directors said they 
tired of evading the law and wanted to operate legally to secure their wealth and 
property. At the same time, they had a stake in retaining the distortions that impeded 
the establishment a fully functioning market economy. Political neutrality was 
possible in certain niches of the economy if they had money and status. However, 
many entrepreneurs, in need of capital, accepted the investment of criminal money in 
their businesses because they were too weak to refuse.
Thus, entrenched particularism fragmented the economy and reduces the capacity for 
collective action to bring about radical change. There was a dearth of horizontal ties, 
such as political movement/mass protest based on people's interests, that promoted 
democratic ideals and had the capacity to challenge vertical control by organised 
crime groups, a predatory state and monopolistic behaviour. As a result, discrete 
'market' practices and 'democratic' processes were subordinated to, and incorporated 
by, existing institutional arrangements.
3.3 Informal Activity in Ordinary People's Livelihoods
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Chapter 4 showed that for households that faced impoverishment with the onset of 
market reforms, informal activity was a response to the failure of the depressed 
formal economy to secure people's livelihoods. However, profitable side earnings 
came at a cost to health, time spent with family and friendships. Households in most 
need of secondary informal incomes had few opportunities to engage in additional 
income-generating work. Resource-poor people who relied solely on informal work 
to make a living were the most vulnerable in the labour market, with irregular and 
low-paid incomes and insecure or piecemeal work. There was little incentive for 
those people to move from low-paid work in the state sector to entrepreneurial or 
individual labour activity as noted in chapter 4 and they preferred the option of 
clinging to the security of a low-paid state/privatised sector income.
4. The Household's Role in Shaping Livelihoods
This study provided a schema for understanding different kinds of people’s 
livelihood paths -  a schema that could apply beyond the city in question to Russia 
more generally. It was shown that income from employment made up one part of 
households' resources. Households that had faced impoverishment shifted the focus 
of their livelihoods from the enterprise to the household. Chapter 4 showed the 
centrality of belt-tightening strategies on a range of goods and services in order to 
make money go further. For example, a couple with young children might have 
decided that the woman should look after their children at home because of the 
difficulty of finding work that matched the high cost of childcare in the city. Any 
extra money was spent on items for the home or loaned to others because this
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provided more security for the future than saving money that could plummet in value 
with inflation or currency fluctuations.
The maintenance of support networks was a key further household level strategy. 
Households maintained as large a network as possible as insurance against difficult 
times. These networks provided access to loans, work, information, high quality 
services and emotional support. Chapter 6 noted that among households whose 
ability to cope has decreased, support networks have weakened. Vulnerability to 
marginalisation from the goods and services that networks provided was exacerbated 
by the growth of an individualist rhetoric that apportioned blame to resource-poor 
network 'outsiders' for their fate thereby justifying only helping people within one's 
circle.
In analysing the role of different forms of household on economic status, chapter 4 
demonstrated that conjugal households predominated among those that were able to 
secure a living because they benefited from the security of two incomes and a wider 
social network. Relations between respondents in these households were most likely 
to be equal, co-operative and stable. The husband would fulfil the gender role 
expected of him, often by combining jobs, as the wife might also. However, 
resource-poor conjugal households, in which male partners did not conform to 
gender norms, were characterised by conflict caused by men's inability to match the 
breadwinner ideal and lack of contribution to the functioning of the household.
Yet another pattern was found among wealthy households, which were in the vast 
majority conjugal and exhibited openly patriarchal forms. Chapter 5 showed that in
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the majority of cases, husbands had high incomes and, consequently, expected their 
wives to stay at home. Although women continued to value work, they had a weaker 
fall-back position in these households from which they could challenge men's 
expectations that they only raised the children and made a good home. The small 
number of entrepreneurial women, discussed in chapter 5, earning more than their 
husbands had the most unstable conjugal relations among entrepreneur respondents 
because they challenged rigid gender norms.
5. The Impact of Household Level Responses on Individuals
The withdrawal of the state from family life resulted in the renegotiation of 
household roles. Male respondents would try to be the breadwinner, but for those 
without marketable skills and weak social ties, their ability to do so was very limited. 
In addition, they showed little inclination to take on an increasing burden of 
household management and maintenance of kin ties. Chapter 6 argued that women 
shouldered the increased burden of household management - juggling several jobs, 
supporting dependant kin, maintaining support networks. This made it difficult for 
them to engage in wider weaker, influential networks. Chapter 4 indicated that, 
among respondents, members of kin-based households were more likely to be female 
and rely on one income (and possibly also state transfers) and supported 
economically inactive, elderly and infirm dependants. Chapter 6 suggested that 
women in kin-based households drew back from forming marital relations because 
conjugal interests were likely to conflict with obligations to dependent kin.
Therefore, the density of kin relations between women and the inability of some men
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to live up to the breadwinner role expected of them was self-perpetuating. Women 
increasingly relied on kin rather than conjugal relations, which contributed to men's 
further abdication of responsibility in the home.
Chapter 6 demonstrated that men were in a weaker position than women to withstand 
the frailty of conjugal relations in resource-poor households because they were 
unlikely to have kin relations they could fall-back on for support as women had.
This was compounded by the taboos against men requesting help from a position of 
weakness. Thus on the one hand, women's investment in kin provided them with a 
safety net in hard times. On the other, it was a quagmire dragging them down. Men 
meanwhile were at once freer to engage in entrepreneurial activity and less protected 
should their livelihoods have failed.
The social and economic status of households had repercussions for the younger 
generation's future opportunities and constraints. Households that could secure a 
living or prosper ensured access for the younger generation to opportunities and 
services such as housing, education and work, which, in turn, promoted economic 
prosperity in the younger generation. Households that had become impoverished 
had less capacity for providing education opportunities, new housing, or work 
thereby creating younger generations' dependency. This dependency impoverished 
the older generations even more. Differentiation in the resources that the older 
generation could pass on to the younger generation was likely to further increase 
social inequality in the longer term.
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6. The Role of Identity in Responses to Rapid Social Change
For those whose status or livelihood had suffered a dramatic fall, rapid social change 
was experienced as a personal crisis. People exhibited feelings of fear of, and 
alienation from, the 'disordered' and 'lawless' world around them. Chapter 4 
considered how some people had decided that because of their personal traits, they 
were unsuited to work in the new private sector while others had realised this after 
negative experiences in the new private sector.
As a result, a sizeable proportion of respondents did not entertain new private sector 
activity. High expectations, that the market would bring meritocratic relations and 
the opportunity to better one's life through personal initiative, were dashed and 
replaced by a strong sense of disillusionment about what the market had to offer 
them. People's rejection of new market institutions, as dishonest and immoral, was 
intended to appear as a choice but at the same time, reflected the real constraints in 
which they acted which excluded them from its opportunities. Households' 
structural position in the market shaped their economic predicament, which in turn, 
influenced members' subjective perceptions of rapid social change. Chapter 4 saw 
how manual workers and workers with few marketable skills continued to expect the 
state and enterprise to provide and were at the same time, bitterly disappointed when 
they failed to do so. As a result, this group perceived rapid social change as betrayal 
by a paternalist state and displayed a tendency to look back nostalgically to a golden 
past.
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With few livelihood options, a professional person might choose to prioritise the 
survival of his/her identity over material survival. Prioritising status over material 
need detrimentally affected household welfare and, for several respondents, became 
a cause of conflict between conjugal partners. With ten years of accumulated 
knowledge about the market, these groups' livelihood strategies were based on a 
realistic assessment of opportunities according to material, human and social 
resources.
By contrast, as chapter 5 pointed out, people who had accumulated wealth through 
entrepreneurial activity upheld a strong ideology of entitlement to the fruits borne by 
the market, based on their talent, professional skills and readiness to risk. Male 
entrepreneurs portrayed themselves as heroic individualists, and pioneers in 
independent, creative activity. Entrepreneurship was perceived as masculine and 
contrasted to economic activity in the Soviet planned economy or state sector which 
was associated with conservatism, collectivity and feminine traits. Women were 
more likely - although by no means in all cases - to portray themselves as avoiding 
relations with organised crime groups and motivated by the wish to do good rather 
than make profits.
As the story opening this study suggested, Ekaterinburg society consisted of two 
separate worlds. In the wealthy one, the collapse of the Communist Party and new 
opportunities for enrichment resulted in the creation of a community that had 
become more diverse. Below the top economic and political echelons that 
maintained their control over the region's resources, there was some fluidity in the 
shape of economic elites, with the early reform period witnessing the rise of young
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entrepreneurs and new criminal groups. However, many of these people were 
destined to work their way up in the Soviet power structure, having secured their 
position in business through their Soviet occupational status, position in the 
Komsomol and their parents' and friends' influential ties. This world had become 
more fragmented as new business and organised crime groups partly penetrated and 
interacted symbiotically with state officials in order to compete for control over 
resources. It was becoming increasingly difficult to enter because the state was 
tightening its grip over the economy and those established in the economy excluded 
outsiders by working only with people within their circle.
In the other world, structural adjustment has not produced a burgeoning new private 
sector that was expected to be the basis for the creation of a large middle class. Some 
individuals were able to draw on resources mobilised through households and 
networks to engage in the new private sector, but for the most part, people used their 
resources to insulate themselves from the changes taking place around them. State 
and privatised enterprises continued to play a major role in these people's livelihoods 
providing psychological, social and material stability, but some people risked new 
forms of marginalisation from the labour market and support networks. The 
destination to which this path of ‘transition’ is leading, through the reconfiguring of 




Figure 30: Respondents’ Networks According to Income (poorest first)
Household type Network reference Help given to others Help received If changed work, method for 
getting present job
122 m, single, lives 
alone
V few friends none Money in emergencies No job
46 m, single, lives 
with child
none none Temporary shelter from state; 
Institutional care for son
Off the street
68 f, married, 10 
children
Mother and children, work 
colleagues, district state social 
protection dep’t
none Importance of solving problems oneself. Mother and 
children - domestic, childcare, garden;
Work colleagues -  information, advice, moral support 
State -  cheap holidays and trips to the sanatoria, arrange 
references
Same job
49 F, married, 2 Mother, grandmother, mother-in- Brings up son in-law Mother -  accommodation (mother moved in with Same job. She got her husband
children law.
4 girlfriends -  see each other 
rarely because live far apart. 
Husband has 2 “v tight relations” 
with small number of friends -  
avoids villagers who drink 
heavily.
Kin and friends -  vegetables grandmother), advice on domestic tasks; 
Mother-in-law -  milk, vegetables 
To husband from friends -  tools for mending car 
Neighbours -  vegetables, plants
work as electrician in school.
15 M, divorced, lives 
with sister and 
niece
Sister, mother Mother - with sister, sends R100 per month 
Kin - moral support and paperwork dealing 
with state pension
Sister -  accommodation.
Mother - vegetables and accommodation in village
No income. Refuses to look for 
work. Will work if asked.
42 F, husband left, 
lives with 2 
children
Parents -  only sees mother lx per 
month because mother has to look 
after grandmother and she does 
not want her mother to worry, 
work colleagues,
2 girlfriends from institute who 
she sees 1x6 months (less than 
before due to money worries)
Work colleagues -  makes pies Work colleagues -  loans, clothes Tried unsuccessfully thro’ 
employment bureau. Found work 
“accidentally”.
Husband refused work offered by 
her step-father.
30 F, divorced, lives 
with daughter
No contact with kin. 
10 girlfriends
Girlfriends -  food, finding work 
Male friend -  transport




80 M, married, 2 Following family conflict no Friends -  loans Mother-in-law -  accommodation when they migrated Wife’s aunty found him work.
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Household type Network reference Help given to others Help received If changed work, method for 
getting present job
children longer sees kin.
Lost contact with Kirgizi friends.
Neighbours - vegetables from Kirgizi, advice 
Friends - loans
Other’s blat prevent wife from 
getting work.
19 F, married, 1 child Mother, sister (most often); 
Neighbours and forma- work 
colleagues.
Friends -  separate from 
husband’s, difficulty of seeing 
friends because of child
Mother -  big help with childcare and money, large items 
e.g. fridge, clothes for Marina and child, cosmetics, 
vegetables and summer holiday at dacha. Lived on 
mother’s money when husband unemployed.
Sister (earns good salary at bank) - gifts
Sister’s fiancde (good salary) -  any help
Friends -  advice, support on personal problems, loans
Cannot turn to mother in-law for help.
Housewife. Husband has offered to 
find her work, but she wants to work 
separately from him.
20 M, married, I child Friend and work colleagues; 
Relatives on official holidays.
Children from previous marriage -  v. 
infrequently gives small sum of money, 
Friends -  work and transport (f + m)
Friends - work and additional work; blat car license. 
Doesn’t like to turn to his or his wife’s relatives for help.
When unemployed, his wife found 
him work in a newspaper. Found 
following job thro’ male connection 
in newspaper work
39 F, divorced, 1 
child
Mother and daughter, father, 
School friends, work clients
Mother and adult daughter - material support 
Father - bought flat 
Friends -  loans and advice
Friends -  loans and advice Found work in thro’ friend who 
worked on a neighbouring allotment
31 F, widowed, lives 
with daughter and 
son in-law and 
granddaughter
2 children, 3 grandchildren and 2 
great grandchildren, sister often 
talk by telephone;
1 girlfriend who she regularly 
telephones
Co-residing kin - all money for food and 
medicine;
Non-residing daughter - gifts on holidays and 
childcare.
Youngest daughter and her husband help with dacha She found her son in-law work as a 
fire inspector in the theatre
10 F, single, lives 
alone
Work colleagues and girlfriends. 
No kin
Friends - accommodation in the city centre 
for friends who work late; advice and 
information, work
Friends - loans, food, additional work Has found her friends work
1 f, single, lives with 
parents
Parents -  daily 
Work colleagues - daily 
Girlfriends - weekly
Brother - financial Parents - financial;
Girlfriends - information re. work
3 f, married, 2 Parents - monthly Parents - garden help, loans, medicines, Parents - childcare, loans, food Her husband found work thro’ his
children Sister - daily
uncle, aunt, cousin - monthly 
university friends - every few 
months
neighbours - few times per week
Extended kin - tutoring 
Friends - information, flat repairs. 
Neighbours - loans, food, care when ill, 
childcare
Extended kin - loans, transportation
In-laws - enrolment in university for friends and kin,
loans
Friends - income opportunities 
Neighbours - small loans, food, childcare
friend. She has found piecemeal 
work thro’ her girlfriend
28 F, divorced, lives 
with adult son
Son, cousin’s family, work 
colleagues,
1 friend in Petersburg
Son - material support;
Kin - donated to fbneral kitty for deceased 
cousin,
Neighbours - keeps an eye on house while 
they are away
Son - help in die garden Son as first time job seeker unable to 
find paid work
34 F, widowed, lives 
with mother and
Mother, daughter, son and his 
young family, work colleagues.
Mother and adult daughter -  material support. 
Son, daughter in-law and small child - money
Work colleagues - loans Son first time job seeker and is only 
able to find occasional work.
316
Household type Network reference Help given to others Help received If changed work, method for 
getting present job
daughter No other kin and no friends -  no 
time and too old to make new 
friends. Newcomer.
and childcare
47 F, married, lives 
with 2nd husband 
and son
Friends important source of help. 
She and husband hardly see 
parents siblings who live in oblast
Financially unable to provide for parents. Friends - accommodation when they moved to city, 
washing machine, transport, childcare, house 
repairs/decoration, payment for medicines and sanatoria
Found piecemeal work thro’ a male 
friend
69 M, married, lives Brother and sister's families in Sent 1“ daughter money for medicine and Wife's sister and friends - loans to purchase car, Found work at university thro’ male
with mother and 
2nd wife
Orenburg and Siberia, mother's 
sister, wife's sister, former wife's 
aunt, 1“ daughter from first 
marriage
operation
Brother, sister's children + 1“ daughter stay in 
summer
Friends - building work





F, divorced, lives 
with daughter
30, f, single
Mother, 1 friend in Snizhensk 
2 step-brothers and their wives, 
neighbours
Parents - every other month 
Sibling - weekly 
work colleagues - daily
Brother -  help in garden Mother - childcare, money, food 
Brother - food, money, moral support
Parents - food and money
Sister in-law's class-mate found her 
work in defence factory
7 F+m, married, live 
with daughter
Children, neighbours Former work colleagues - v. small loans 
Neighbours - repairs, v. small loans
Daughter - money, household chores
12 F, single, lives 
alone
Neighbours, girlfriends from 
university and creative circles, 
No kin in oblast - brothers in 
Kaliningrad and Estonia
Friends - loans, food, medical help thro' 
friend, decoration and repairs
Neighbour - v. small loans Used to rely on friends for work but 
spoils friendships. Found present 
piecemeal in newspaper
77 F, married, lives 
with husband and 
mother
Daughter student in Ekat, son, his 
wife and baby in Istok, 1 friend
Friend - loans and food 
Children money and food
Mother -  care and material support 
Mother - pension shared between children 
Striked with other teachers over wage arrears 
Unable to turn to work colleagues because they are also 
teachers with wage arrears
113 Widowed, lives 
with 2 divorced 
sons
2 sons, cousin and nephew in 
Ekat, daughter in Moscow and 
sister in Novosibirsk. 
Telephoning relatives in other 
oblasts and visiting relatives in 
Ekat. too expensive
Adult sons -  material support Friend - loans for bread
56 Married, lives with 
2nd husband and 
younger daughter
Brother, elder daughter, 1 
girlfriend (meet IX 2 yrs), work 
colleagues.
Husband has fishermen friends
Elder daughter - loans and produce, childcare Work colleague - information about payday.
Brother and elder daughter -  loans.
No loans acquaintances because work in same factory 
with same money problems
Factory nearby
2 29, f, migrated to 
city and lives
Work colleagues - daily 
Father - every few months
Father - financial Work colleagues - information
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28, f, migrated to 
city and lives in 
hostel
39, m, single, lives 
with parents
54, divorced, lives 
with sister and 
nephew.
45, m, married 
with son, also 
lives with mother- 
in-law
39, f, married with 
son.
49, m, 2nd 
marriage with 2 
children
71 40, m, 2 children
36, m, 4* marriage 
with 1 child
48, m lives with 
wife, son and 
mother-in-law
Mother in another oblast, student 
and work colleagues
Younger brother’s family, friend 
in militia. Avoids men in village 
because they drink heavily.
2-3 “real” friends; Circle of 
people “almost friends” in Ekat, 
Peter and Moscow.
2 male friends, 2 aunties (meet at 
funerals)
2 parents, 2 siblings + 2 step 
siblings. I sister married and 
moved to Switzerland, one sister 
in Ekat (meets regularly), brother 
in oblast small town (2x yr) and 
sister in Moscow. Large network 
of friends.
Many friends -  from childhood 
(rarely meet but “always ready to 
help each other”), fellow students, 
and people who live nearby. Kin 
ties severed on divorce 
Few friends because newcomer to 
city. Parents deceased.
5 real friends (drinking partners). 
Parents deceased
Former work friends.
Parents and brother - help around house and 
garden.
Shares responsibility for nephew with sister.
Mother-in-law - accommodation
Parents/relatives - physical help in garden 
and around home. Financially can cope by 
themselves.
Elderly neighbour - checks blood pressure
Friends - painting and repairs
Mother-in-law provides childcare
Mother-in-law -  accommodation and 
financial support
Adult son -  material support_______
Mother -  vegetables, money
Friends -  loans
Militia friend -  help getting out of police sobering cell 
and avoiding work finding out.
Sponsors: Deputy major -  Yurii Osintsev, criminal 
group operating behind front ‘Centre of Culture and 
Art’.
Personal contact with Mayor Chemetskii.
Good friend helped when depressed.
Friends - “insignificant” things (transport) 
Mother-in-law -  pension, chilcare, domestic tasks 
Better not to turn to others for help.
Mother - childcare + vegetables from garden.
Younger sister - clothes.
Friends - financial help, arranged good doctor when son 
broke his back.
Old acquaintances - concert tickers and arranging 
holiday, info about services.
Neighbours - telephone
Family for daily problems and friends less often.
Friends - money after August 1998 crisis. Turns to 
friends for help first of all.
Husband’s son’s girlfriend -  looks after children when 
she is ill/busy.
Friends -  transport to take children to hospital, friend in 
polyclinic arranges good doctor who helps for free 
Friends - transport, moving furniture, in the exchange of 
flats
Does not accept financial support from mother-in-law
Wife turned to medical friends to get 
job in cardiographic centre.
Found additional work thro’ work 
colleague who started up a lawyer’s 
firm.
Thro’ friends of friends - additional 
work.
Found work in theatre thro’ friend, 
aims to get permission to start up 
kiosk through Greek friend who 
knows kiosk owners
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5 35, F, living with Parents - daily Parents - domestic chores, in garden Parents - money, food, gifts
partner girlfriends from work - daily Extended family - sewing, domestic tasks Friends - not money, advice 
Neighbours - not money, food 
Extended family - transport
75 43, m lives with Parents, and family. One friend in Elderly parents -  physical not material Friend in Moscow got her work as
husband and son Moscow and one in Ekat. support as father gets war pension 
Elder sister - financial
Ekat representative for Moscow- 
based marketing research centre, but 
no income.
6 69, F, married, 
grandson
Daughter in-law, her husband and 
grandchild - weekly 
siblings and siblings in-law - 
monthly
Work colleagues - daily 
friends from youth - reunions, 
birthdays
Daughter in-law - money, food, childcare 
Siblings - money in critical situations, care 
when ill
Siblings in-law - medicine, money 
Neighbours - loans, repairs
No help
85 51, m lives with 2 ex-wives, mother, parents-in- Mother - bought flat (SUS2500) earned from Friends - information (not material help) Prefers to turn Clients who hire him to put on show
partner law, large circle of friends with 
weak ties
additional work.
Parents-in-law -  help in home/garden rarely. 
2nd wife -  food on anniversary of their son’s 
death.
Friends - arranges good hospital, avoidance 
of army conscription (his friend knows a 
friend and he gets gift e.g. computer, by way 
of thanks from the person making request).
to old, close friends hear of him thro’ his acquaintances. 
Philosophy professor acquaintance 
who engages in election 
campaigning work asks him to work 
with candidates.
36 76, f  lives with Relatives have died. 2 children, Children - sit with grandchildren and material Children - help in garden
husband one with children. Friends and 
former work colleagues (meet on 
holidays and birthdays). 
Neighbours
help.
Work colleagues - emotional support and 
advice
Neighbours - small things in emergencies
37 66, m lives with 
wife
Few friends left (from army, 
former work colleagues). Many 
friend-managers, friends around 
former Soviet Union and abroad.
2 children - flats.
Friends and children - vegetables. 
Son-in-law - protection roof contacts, passed 
on firm. Siblings can provide for themselves 
and don’t need support.
Turns to friends for help but not in serious situations.
114 50, m married Sister and children’s family. Children - financial help and full support to Friends -  frequent, e.g. when car brakes down. Always
lives with younger Friends and work colleagues meet younger son. turns to friends rather than relatives for help.
son on holidays. Loans to sister and niece
54 25, m, lives with Father and sister, grandparents. 1 Grandparents - dacha. Unemployed father - Entrepreneur-friend - loan to buy a car Prefers not to go
partner friend (from car park) financial support
Friends often - road inspection work, 
certifications
through a third person.
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27 50, f  married with mother (meet everyday), cousin in Husband helps friends with handiwork. Mother - looks after son from 1st marriage and helps in Found job in House of Concert
2 children Omsk, neighbours, work 
colleagues
Neighbours - loans the garden. Gives R3000 she earns selling her 
vegetables in village.
Aunty in Omsk - holidays.
Husband’s friend - medicine as he works in emergency 
services.
Organisations thro’ an acquaintance 
who works on the adjoining piece of 
land.
24 17, m lives alone Fictive ‘brother’ from orphanage, 
friends, uncle.
Friends -  pays when go out Uncle - arranged room in communal flat, vegetables. 
Friends - food when he has none.
Friends of friends -  loans with interest.
Neighbours -  loans and food
92 34, f  single lives 
with daughter
Mother (meet daily). Friends 
from work and institute. Belongs 
to marriage agency
Mother - pension pays her rent and for daughter’s 
kindergarten.
Friend -  loan for trip to Cyprus to meet potential 
husband.
Mother found her work at tax 
inspectorate
50 42, m married “elementary protection” from Relatives - holidays. Friend -  thro’ cashier acquaintance at the railway station Friend invited him to work in local
with 2 children heads of enterprises -  blat in 
several spheres.
Brother - arranged place for brother’s son in 
particular kindergarten,
Friends -  obtaining contracts with the 
administration,
Daughter -  blat place in institute.
Mother’s pension sufficient.
helps him get train tickets in summer. administration
52 54, f  married and 
lives with invalid 
son
Daughter (meet 2x wk), 
colleagues from former work as 
lawyer. Mafia friends thro’ her 
husband’s work in car park and 
her daughter’s work as vet
Grandson lives with her Elder daughter and her son - childcare when she is ill. 
Large circle of doctors
Militia friend - gets hold of medicine at wholesale price. 
Mafia ‘roof - paid for her trips to Moscow for specialist 
treatment for son, provide car to go to hospital
Husband’s work at car park and as 
security guard found thro’ friends
57 51, f, 2nd marriage 
and lives with 
daughter-in-law
2 daughters, one with family, 
mother and mother-in-law, sister. 
Many more distant relatives (meet 
on holidays/funerals)
Elder daughter’s husband - car and built them 
house (and furniture) in his name, childcare 
to daughter’s children.
Mother - plants potatoes.
Relatives - funeral and wedding kitties 
(R250).
Neighbours help each other
Friends and acquaintances - buying 
early potatoes, cherries from 
Chelyabinsk. Former factory 
colleagues for taxi service to and 
from work and stolen animal feed.
102 55, f  widow lives Single daughter with 2 children, Daughter - buys nappies, childcare for long Friends - when nothing to eat friends, brought pies and Thro’ friend found lodgers for her
with mother sister-in-law, work colleagues, 
neighbours
periods. Daughter self-sufficient -  boyfriend 
is wealthy.
Mother - medicine and care.
potatoes.
Daughter - advice e.g. flat rental price.
flat
55 43, f  married 2 daughters, one with child Elder daughter - rent and money (R200 per 
wk), childcare at w/ends.
Younger daughter - little money and pay for 
her study (10000 per yr), transport and
Work - loan to buy flat in city
Friend - arranged teacher at institute to give daughter
tuition
She got work in bank in Rezh and 
her husband in private firm in 
Ekaterinburg thro’ friends
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61 50, m, married Sister and forma* work colleagues Friends - accountancy programme on Friends -  loans only in critical situations.
with son (see friends less because they 
work long hours. Work friends 
have gone elsewhere.
computer to help friends which they pay for 
with food.
Contacts to avoid son’s conscription 
Sister -  helped financially in past but no 
longer able.
Sister -  thro’ contacts arranges good hospital for son
22 30, m, married 
with son
Sister (3x per month) Parents - financial (R500-1000 per month), 
garden and transport.
Friends - sells cars thro’ contacts
Friends - loans for large purchases.
Grandparents - childcare.
Business contacts -  thro’ contacts found trading partners 
in Ukraine
Parents help sister because as proud person she won’t 
accept help from anyone except close kin. He NEVER 
turns to relatives for help -  only acquaintances. Child’s 
upbringing solved only with relatives
83 27, f  lives with Parents, 2 younger siblings, Relatives - sews Girlfriend -  advice
fianc6 mother-in-law Parents -pays for brother’s medicine Mother helps grandparents
60 32, f  divorced 
lives with 
daughter
Parents (poor relations, rarely 
meet)
Parents - clothes Acquaintance-police - solve problems with stall at 
Taganskii market
Acquaintance-owners of market - reduced rental price. 
Friend -  contact in road inspectorate to redeem brother’s 
driving license.
25 26, m married Parents (meet lx  per wk), parents- 
in-law,
Parents- bought flat (US$10000); helped pay for 
wedding (R10000), gave washing machine which was 
present from her employees.
Friend - tools, transport
Father got him work thro’ friend 
who is director of construction firm. 
He then got his friend job in firm 
thro’ boss
45 45, m, divorced Ties with family and wife severed 
when he went to prison. Prison 
warden.
Prison warden - clothes, info re. Night shelter Prison warden got him job with 
Italian textiles firm
123 49, f, single lives 
with younger 
daughter
Elder daughter, work friends and 
creative circle
Elder daughter -  bought flat and financially 
supports her young family.
Friends - loans.
Work for daughter in Goskino
38 59, f  married Daughter (meet 4x per wk), Daughter - vegetables and financial support Friends -  loans for large items Found work in Palace of Concert 
Organisations thro’ the husband of 
her cousin who is the director. She 
has found work for 3+ people there 
due to this connection.
63 32, f  married lives Parents, brother, cousin friends Parents - garden, gifts of money Parents -  childcare when moved to north to live with her Husband found work in North thro’
with son husband
Friends - loans (which she repays within a week)
friends he made while in prison 
there.
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124 27, m lives with
partner
8 28, m single
72 35, f, married with
2 children
Grandparents, parents
Mother - 3 x per year (lives in 
another oblast)
Work colleagues daily 
Friends - weekly 
Parents, parents in-laws, 
girlfriends
Grandparents - garden so that it can be sold 
and income will be used to buy him better flat 
in exchange for flat in small town.
Friends - moral support
Girlfriends -  gifts, trips at w/ends, dinner 
parties
Friends and f  cousin - emotional support 
Cousin - train tickets thro’ cashier friend Most 
frequently turns to f  cousin and parents for help 
Grandparents - fruit and vegetables
Friends - moral support, work advice, washing machine 
Work colleagues -  advice.
Father and father-in-law - useful contacts in 
administration and business
14 45, f  divorced and
lives with younger 
daughter
110 31,fmarried
111 34, m married
118 34, m married
91 31, m married
99 60, m lives with 
husband
Parents (lx  per wk), daughter and 
grandchild and former husband
Parents + brother (meet regularly), 
husband-in-law’s parents (live far 
away), friends from theatre and 
university
Parents, parents-in-law, brother- 
in-law, friends from institute
Komsomol friends, friends from 
institute.
Komsomol friends, friends in 
administration
2 children -  both live separately 
and engage in business
Daughter - financial and childcare.
Parents - physical support around house and 
garden and financial for big item. Relatives 
and friends - advise.
Sponsors cultural events 
Mother - around house and garden;
Relatives self-sufficient 
Friends - loans
Father-in-law - contacts meant he didn’t have 
to pay protection ‘roof; then later brother-in- 
law’ contact with ‘criminal authority’. 
Criminal group -  access to linoleum to sell 
on.
Friends -  goods for trade 
Institute friend -  business partner
Clients -  advertise her shop by word of 
mouth (“obs” odna baba skazala)
Doesn’t use help thro’ 3rd person because it makes 
person she turned to indebted to another.
Brother’s wife - contacts for medical care
Friend from institute who went into factory security 
recommended him to factory security as person who 
could sell on stolen goods.
100 F, married Mother. Big circle of friends in Mother -  material support
Local administration for contracts, licenses;
Son - loans
Former employer - vouched for her in loan with another 
individual.
Started firm with friends from former private firm -  then 
split up due to differences.
International trading partners give her goods on credit 
Bank contact -  loan.
Step-father, head of television 
station, found him work as 
journalist
Husband constantly pestered to find 
work for acquaintances’ children 
thro’ his wide network on influential 
contacts
As director of legal firm, has 
employed acquaintances from 
former work. She arranged work for 
her daughter as secretary in district 
court.
Father-in-law -  work as director of 
small firm.
Started up business with Komsomol 
friends
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Moscow, around the oblast and Couldn't ask friends for loan because they didn’t have
internationally. Nomenklatura money.
from former days in banking.
98 M, 41, married 
with 2 children
Institute friends, Komsomol 
contacts
5 institute friends -  started business together 
City and oblast administration connections. Personal 
relations with deputy mayor who will organise getting 
license, obtaining land, permission for construction, 
Connections in factory directorship -  provided work 
floor and labour for business, for buying cheap 
computers etc. that they sold-on with mark-up.
Tax inspectorate in Moscow -  information.
Friend head of dep’t in fight against organised crime -  
protection from organised crime
115 M, 45, married 
with 2 children
Institute ad factory connections, 
Komsomol friends
Friend from institute -  partner in setting up business 
Factory directors in several oblasts - trading items, 
provision of initial work floor and labour. 
Industrialist/sponsor -  invested in their business plan 
Business friends -  personal recommendation to potential 
business partners
51 30, married with 2 
children
Mother. Lost some old friends 
from former work because he now 
works for criminal organisation
Personal connections with Rossel, and group with Putin Additional election campaigning 
work.
59 34, f, married with 
child
parents Parents - capital for purchase of 1“ kiosk
109 43, m, single lives 
with mother
Mother, rock-club friends, 
business friends in Moscow, US, 
France and Britain
Mother -  material support Inter-oblast contacts -  search for highly qualified 
workers,
International contacts -  business practice
121 43, m married 
with 2 children
Factory, institute friends Defence factory directorship -  for brokering of medical 
equipment/computers.
Institute teachers -  start-up medical equipment 
production business
Bank -  start-up capital due to mutual help relations 
Contacts in Afghantsy - protection
101 40, m, married 
with 2 children
Friends from Komsomol, institute 
and OPS Uralmash
Friends in Young People’s Creative Organisation (MTO) 
- tax reprieve, access to trading partners 
Machine construction factory directorship -  access to 
cheap equipment for re-sale, clients for middleman 
activities, sponsors and shareholders in business.
Banks -  loan because friends did not have the money.
58 30, f, married with Parents, Parents-in-law -  financial support and Parents - introduced her to trading partners in Turkey Started shuttle-trading with
2 children vegetables and shops in oblast, and to Central protection roof. girlfriends from college
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Contacts among customs officials -  let her 
smuggle items across border
Girlfriend -  imports goods
324
Appendix 2 
Figure 31: List of Respondents
No. a8e gender work activity
1 50 m security guard
2 28 f editor
3 30 f Housewife, tutoring in evenings, selling cosmetics
4 29 f Biologist, additional teaching at university
5 64 f Accountant in good processing firm
6 38 f Costume designer in theatre
7 68 f Pensioner
8 28 m Journalist and election campaigning work, organises social events
9 37 m Director of chain of kiosks selling jeans
10 39 f Theatre worker and additional editorial work
11 38 f University lecturer with additional teaching jobs
12 40 f Interviewer for marketing firm
13 43 m actor with additional theatre work during pantomime season and 
advertising work on the radio
14 43 f Director of legal consultancy firm
15 45 m Piecemeal lecturing
17 28 f Secretary
19 35 f Housewife
20 42 m Marketing for state circus
21 30 f Administrative work in defense factory and kiosk trader
22 28 m Manager in air conditioning firm
23 44 m Mechanic with small construction brigade, erects ornamental 
fountains
24 17 m Piecemeal work as security guard
25 25 m Manager in construction firm
26 28 f Administrator in a marriage agency
27 45 f Hairdresser in a small business in the House of Concerts
28 58 f Warden in House of Concerts
30 33 f Factory worker in wood processing plant
31 77 f Theatre worker
32 34 m Director of music recording studio
33 57 f Retired actress
34 48 f Accountant in the theatre and washes floors
36 72 f Pensioner
37 68 m Pensioner
38 57 m University professor
39 58 f Hairdresser in a state enterprise
41 33 m Founder of small private bank
42 43 f Administrator in the university and washes floors
43 34 m Cobbler at theatre and has additional shoe orders
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45 45 m Electrician in textiles firm
46 45 m Delivers newspapers and collects bottles
47 33 f Housewife and commissioned to make puppets
48 36 m Assistant in a small shop
49 29 f School teacher
50 45 m District level state official, also organises holidays on the side
51 29 m Member of Uralmash, and does election campaigning work
52 55 f Housewife
53 59 f Manager in the militia
54 25 m Militia employee
55 5 m Housewife
56 58 f Manual worker in poultry plant
57 55 f Trader in homegrown vegetables
58 32 f gold trader, shuttle-trader to Turkey
59 33 f Owner of several kiosks and a mini-market
60 34 f Shuttle trader
61 55 m Consultant in industrial research institute
63 34 f Housewife
65 45 m Driver
68 44 f Hairdresser in factory
69 50 m Caretaker
70 59 m Director of a private dance company
72 34 f Accountant in small legal firm
75 36 f Urals sales representative for a Moscow firm but without income
77 44 f School teacher with overtime and extra tutoring
80 43 m Factory worker and does addition welding and construction work
83 28 f Seamstress for local clothes designer
85 41 m Actor with work as an image-maker and putting on private functions
91 33 m runs a construction firm
92 36 f tax inspector
96 39 f self-employed artist
98 41 m Director of a domestic appliances trading house
99 60 f Owner of a clothes boutique
100 43 f Owner of a confectionery enterprise
101 43 m Director of several firms that produce linoleum, felt and salt.
102 45 f Actress
103 45 f Director of a small image-making firm
109 38 m Local media magnate
110 31 f Housewife - helps her husband run his firm
111 31 m Director of a construction materials trading firm
113 54 f Farming
114 52 m Manager in security firm
115 46 m Director of a plastics packaging production firm
118 39 m Commercial director of metals brokering firm
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121 41 m Director of a firm that produces medical equipment for hospitals
122 40 m unemployed architect/self-employed artist
123 46 f journalist, poet and with additional translation work
124 27 m cartoon film-maker
125 42 m director of light textiles company producing workers' uniforms
126 40 m director of computer trading firm
127 40 m director of a small advertising firm
128 43 f Engineer
129 38 m Journalist
130 27 m Chechen war veteran who works in public services enterprise
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Lists of Interviews with Experts
no. Respondent
16 Group discussion with students and teachers at the Urals Pedagogical Institute
18 Meeting with Boris Pavlov, Economic Director Sverdlovsk branch, Russian 
Academy of Science (RAN)
29 Victor Vasil'evich Kon'shin, Director of the Palace of Concerts
35 Ludmila, Ekaterina Crisis Centre for the Victims of Violence
40 Steve Harrison, Consul, British Consulate, Ekaterinburg
44 Director of homeless shelter
62 Vera Veniaminovna Strebezh, 'Shans\ Children's Rights Organisation
64 Nalal'ya, Department for Social Protection, Chkalov District
66 Valentina, Department of Guardianship, Chkalov District
67 Maria, psychtherapist, Department of Social Protection, Chkalov District
74 Zoya, Department of Social Protection, Kirov District
76 Nalal'ya, head of the Department of Family and Chidren, Department of Social 
Protection, Kirov District
78 Irina, Employment Centre, Talitsa
79 Oleg, commercial director, spirt factory, Talitsa
81 Orphanage director, Talitsa
82 Talitsa Department for young people
84 Ludmila, manager of oblast Centre for Family Planning
86 Irina, director of organisation, 'Against Women's Unemployment'
87 psychologist, oblast Centre for Family Planning
88 Larissa Dokuchaeva, Urals Women's Association and politician
89 Ludmila Semenova, Urals Migrants' Association
90 Petr, Memorial
93 Valentina Petrovna Samsonova, Urals Women's Association
94 Olga, wife of Afghan veteran
95 Aleksei, Manager in Veterans of Afghanistan fund
97 Larissa Leonova, 'Family of the World' working on family conflict
104 Rima, director of Sverdlovsk branch of Soldiers' Mothers Organisation
105 Nail' Shaimardanov, Legislative Assembly of Sverdlovsk Regional Duma, 
Chairman, Committee of Industrial Policy and Economic Activity.
Vera Sokolkina, President Urals Associations of Women, Regional Duma, 
Legislative of Sverdlovsk Oblast, Committee for Economics and Politics, budget, 
finance and taxes.
106 Gregori Kobemichenko, Government of Sverdlovsk Oblast, Deputy 
Representative, Government of Sverdlovsk Oblast, on questions of Internal 
Politics.
107 Vladimir Turinski, Oblast minister for Social Affairs
108 Maiya Innokent'eva, City Administration Department for Work with Religious and 
Public Organisations
112 Larissa Petrova, Pedagogical University, Chair of Sociology
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116 Jakov Sylin, Chariman of Ekaterinburg City Duma
119 Director of vegetable depot
120 Elena Novomeiskaya, director of the American Centre of Citizen's Initiatives
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